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 Abstract 
 
Accident reports and experimental research have documented difficulties when 
operating and evacuating through overwing emergency exits. The factors influencing 
exit operation and evacuation from smaller regional transport aircraft are less 
understood as previous studies have focussed solely on large single aisle aircraft.  
 
Experiment One examined the influence of a smaller interior configuration and the 
seating configuration close to the exit on evacuation rates. The results indicated no 
effect for interior configuration or vertical projection. Experiment Two investigated the 
influence of interior configuration, a modification to the exit operating handle and the 
exit operator’s briefing on exit operation time. The results showed the exit was operated 
significantly faster when an in-depth briefing was delivered. No significant differences 
were attributable to the operating handle mechanism or the interior configuration. 
Experiment Three investigated a major modification to the overwing exit mechanism on 
exit operation time. The results showed the exit was operated faster when an 
automatically opening hatch was installed compared to the traditional plug exit. 
Experiment Four examined the effect of the placement of the disposed traditional exit 
hatch on evacuation. The results showed the evacuation rate was significantly slower 
when the hatch was placed inside the cabin.  
 
The experiments have contributed to knowledge regarding exit operation and evacuation 
from smaller transport aircraft. The benefits of an automatically disposed hatch exit 
mechanism on a smaller transport aircraft and an in-depth exit operator’s briefing in 
both large and small aircraft interior configurations have been shown. The work has 
highlighted that the interior configuration of the smaller transport aircraft, in particular 
the restricted headroom, is perceived as a hindrance. Finally the work has quantified the 
negative impact of an inappropriately placed exit hatch inside a smaller transport 
aircraft cabin. Recommendations for further research in evacuation and exit operation 
from smaller transport aircraft are suggested. 
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 1 
1.0. Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction to thesis 
The aim of the research was to explore factors influencing passenger evacuation from 
smaller transport aircraft including the operation of the overwing passenger operated 
Type III exit. Although extensive research has been conducted on passenger evacuation 
and the operation of the Type III exit, the majority has concerned large single aisle 
cabins. Many smaller transport aircraft are configured with passenger operated Type III 
exits. These exits are located in the wing area of the aircraft, and on smaller transport 
aircraft, depending on the aircraft design are located either above or below the wings. 
Relatively little research is publicly available on evacuation from smaller transport 
aircraft (for example cabins with two seats either side of the main aisle). As a result of 
this imbalance, it is not known if research findings from trials conducted in large single 
aisle cabins will generalise to smaller transport aircraft. The issue of evacuation from 
smaller transport aircraft is of relevance as these aircraft have a narrower fuselage, and 
therefore less cabin width (and number of seats either side of the aisle) and lower 
headroom. In addition, regulatory full scale evacuation demonstrations are not required 
by the current regulations for aircraft with fewer than 44 seats, therefore there is limited 
knowledge of the pertinent factors influencing evacuation from these types of aircraft. 
The literature review will now explore issues surrounding aviation accidents, 
emergency evacuations and experimental research into factors influencing passenger 
evacuation.  
 
1.2. Air travel 
The development and advancement in aviation over the last century has been extensive. 
The first powered aircraft flew in 1903 and by 1909 two aircraft had been designed 
specifically for passenger travel (Edwards and Edwards, 1990). The “modern” airliner 
was developed in the United States in the 1930s, with the launch of three aircraft - the 
Boeing 247 which carried 12 passengers, the Douglas DC-2 with 14 passenger seats and 
the Lockheed L-10 Electra with 10 passenger seats (Edwards and Edwards, 1990). 
Developments in aircraft cabin design have also continued over the years which have 
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resulted in a large range of aircraft with different passenger capacities and cabin designs 
(Edwards and Edwards, 1990). 
 
On the 6th December 2007, the UK Department for Transport (DfT) released the latest 
edition of its publication Transport Trends, which provides data on usage of different 
modes of transport (DfT, 2007). Although the greatest increase in travel overall had 
been by car and van, when these data are excluded, the highest increase in distance 
travelled was by air, with the distance travelled increasing three fold between 1980 and 
2006 (DfT, 2007).  
 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) using data from the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) reported that throughout the world, 2.2 billion 
passengers were carried 3.7 trillion passenger kilometres by air during 2005 (FAA, 
2007a).  In August 2007, ICAO predicted an average growth in scheduled air travel 
(measured in the number of passenger kilometres flown) of 4.6% per year until 2025 
(ICAO, 2007).  
 
Although advances in aircraft and cabin design have taken place over the years, aviation 
accidents do still occur.  
 
1.3. Aviation accidents 
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) defines an aviation accident as  
‘an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place 
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until 
such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which: 
 
a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:  being in the aircraft, or 
direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become 
detached from the aircraft, or direct exposure to jet blast, (except when the 
injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or 
when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available 
to the passengers and crew; or 
 
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which: adversely affects the 
structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and 
would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component, 
(except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, 
its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, 
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antennas, tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft 
skin;) 
 
Or c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible’ (ICAO, 2001, p. 1-1). 
 
This is in comparison to an incident, which is defined as ‘an occurrence, other than an 
accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the 
safety of operation’ (ICAO, 2001, p. 1-1). 
 
1.3.1 Accident statistics  
Recent statistics published by the UK DfT (2007) show that air travel is the safest form 
of transport in terms of the number of fatalities per passenger kilometre when compared 
with travel by car, van, bus/coach or rail. It is noted that fatality rates for water travel 
were similar to those of air (DfT, 2007). Research conducted by the Flight Safety 
Foundation and Boeing Commercial Airplane Group reviewed accidents that occurred 
on large jet aircraft between 1987 and 1996 and divided them into the different phases 
of flight (Mathews, 1997). The review identified that the highest percentage of accidents 
occurred during final approach and landing (accounting for 22.9% and 21.7% 
respectively), with takeoff accounting for the second largest percentage at 14% 
(Mathews, 1997).  
 
Over a 25 year period (1959-1996), Mathews (1997) identified that hull loss aviation 
accidents (defined as those accidents that result in the aircraft being destroyed) have 
fallen from 27 accidents per million departures to 1.5 per million departures. Most of 
this decline occurred within the 1960s with the accident rate remaining fairly stable 
since 1970. 
 
Although the accident rate has remained stable over this period, Mathews (1997) and 
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB; 2001) highlight that if the number of 
flights dramatically increase over the next 12 to 15 years as predicted, the actual number 
of accidents will rise. This information is important as often it is the frequency of 
accidents that members of the public reflect on (as opposed to the accident rate) which 
may lead to public uncertainty regarding the safety of air travel (Mathews, 1997; Muir, 
2000). 
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If an aircraft sustains an impact, a number of factors will determine if the accident is 
survivable. These factors include the forces associated with the impact, the extent of the 
impact on the cabin fuselage and the restraints used by the occupants (Johnson, 1984; 
NTSB, 2001). Even if the impact is deemed survivable, occupant survival is not 
guaranteed and will depend on the environmental conditions following the impact 
which may require occupants to rapidly evacuate the aircraft. The most critical threat to 
occupant survivability following an accident or incident is the threat from a post-crash 
fire. The European Transport Safety Council (ETSC) in 1996 stated that ‘statistical 
trends clearly show that fire substantially decreases the chance of surviving an aircraft 
accident’ (p. 8). Due to the threat from fire, extensive research and development is 
undertaken in three main areas of activity – in the first instance to prevent the fire from 
developing, secondly to contain the fire and thirdly, if a fire has developed, to evacuate 
all occupants (CAA, 1991).  
 
1.3.2. Types of accident 
Aircraft accidents are typically classified into one of three categories: fatal/non 
survivable, non-fatal/survivable and technically/partially survivable.  
 
A fatal or non-survivable accident is one in which none of the occupants (passengers 
or crew) survives. An example of this category was the on board explosion and 
subsequent loss of the aircraft fuselage of the Pan American World Airways Boeing 747 
over Lockerbie, Scotland. This accident in December 1988 resulted in the loss of all 243 
passengers and 16 crew on board and 11 individuals on the ground (AAIB, 1990). An 
example of a fatal or non-survivable accident involving a smaller transport aircraft was 
the accident during final approach of a DHC-6-300 in 2001 at Saint Barthélémy in the 
Leeward Islands in the Caribbean. A fire erupted as the aircraft made contact with the 
ground, with the degree of impact resulting in no survivors amongst the three crew and 
17 passengers. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact and the fire (BEA, 2001). 
 
A non-fatal or survivable accident is one in which all of the occupants (passengers and 
crew) survive. A recent example of this type of accident was the Air France Airbus 340 
that overran the runway and came to a standstill 1090 feet beyond the end of the runway 
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in Toronto, Canada in August 2005. All 297 passengers and 12 crew members 
evacuated the aircraft in under two minutes prior to a post crash fire destroying most of 
the fuselage (TSB, 2005). A second example is the accident as a result of a problem 
with deploying the landing gear on board a Jetstream 41 in June 2005 (South African 
CAA, 2005). There were three crew and only 13 passengers on board, and fortunately as 
the flight crew knew they had an abnormal state with the aircraft both the flight and 
cabin crew briefed passengers in advance of the landing. There were no injuries to any 
of the occupants (South African CAA, 2005). 
 
A technically survivable or partially survivable accident is one in which some (at 
least one) of the occupants (passengers and crew) survive. An example of this category 
of accident occurred at Los Angeles airport in the United States in February 1991. A 
Boeing 737 that was landing at the airport collided with a Fairchild Metroliner that was 
waiting for take off clearance from the same runway. Both aircraft were destroyed as a 
result of the impact and the post crash fire. All 10 passengers and two crew on board the 
Metroliner died in the accident, along with 20 passengers and two crew from the Boeing 
737 (NTSB, 1991).  
 
An example of a technically survivable accident involving a smaller transport aircraft is 
the Comair operated Bombardier CL-600-2B19 aircraft that encountered difficulties at 
Lexington in Kentucky in August 2006 (NTSB, 2006). Whilst manoeuvring onto the 
runway to proceed with take off, the aircraft travelled onto the incorrect runway from 
that instructed. The error was not detected and the aircraft ran out of runway prior to 
taking off, impacting with a number of trees. On board the aircraft there were 50 
occupants with all but one passenger, who sustained serious injuries, perishing in the 
accident. The impact, which resulted in a separation of the fuselage, and the post crash 
fire destroyed the aircraft (NTSB, 2006).  
 
Of importance to the current study on cabin safety was the finding from the Lexington 
accident that seven passengers died due to thermal injuries and 10 occupants (including 
the cabin crew member) died as a result of inhaling smoke or soot, with 
thermal/inhalation injuries also a combination factor in the death of a further eight 
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occupants (NTSB, 2006). As the accident report highlights, this suggests that a number 
of the occupants survived the initial impact, but were not able to evacuate the cabin 
prior to being overcome by the products of the post crash fire, although the NTSB 
(2006) notes that it is not known how long the cabin environment remained survivable. 
 
1.4. Cabin safety research 
A range of strategies is employed to reduce and eliminate air travel related fatalities. 
These include the introduction of measures and procedures to avoid the accident or 
incident occurring and then to protect occupants if such an event does arise (NTSB, 
2001). Areas of aviation safety focused on protecting occupants in the event of an 
accident include work into impact protection, fire protection and evacuation.  It is 
acknowledged that some accidents, although preventable, are not survivable, so the aim 
of cabin safety research is to protect occupants in the event of a survivable accident and 
to put measures in place to ensure that occupants can evacuate the aircraft in a rapid and 
efficient manner. The NTSB (2001, p. 19) following a review of accident survivability 
concluded that ‘the large number of people who survive even the most serious accidents 
emphasises the importance of work aimed at ensuring that crash survivors can safely 
remove themselves from the accident aircraft’. Although no two accidents are identical, 
information and knowledge from one event allows cabin safety researchers to construct 
a picture of the contributing and influencing factors by drawing on the similarities and 
differences from each event.  
 
The ETSC in 1996 estimated that approximately 90% of aircraft accidents are 
survivable or technically survivable. Cherry (2007, p. 8) highlights that even though 
extensive research and development have led to safety improvements within aviation 
‘the growth in air traffic has resulted in the number of fatalities in “survivable and fire 
caused” accidents remaining at an almost constant level.’ Cherry (2007) states that 
research and development into safety improvements must continue, and although 
attributed to a number of causes, there are approximately 350 to 400 lives lost each year 
in “survivable and fire caused” accidents. 
 
The importance of ensuring that the aircraft cabin can be evacuated quickly was also 
emphasised by Trimble in 1996, who conducted a review of 74 survivable accidents that 
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occurred during 1966 and 1985 where fire was a factor in the accident. Of the accidents 
studied, 31% of the occupants died, with 65% - 82% of those fatalities due to the effects 
of fire (Spietal and Hill (1988) in Trimble, 1996).  
 
This is a critical area for cabin safety as it is tragic for an occupant to have survived an 
impact or technical failure with the aircraft, only to perish as they were not able to 
evacuate the aircraft quickly and effectively. This outcome has occurred during a 
number of accidents including during a collision between a Beechcraft 1900C and a 
King Air at Quincy airport in Illinois in 1996. All 12 occupants on board the Beechcraft 
and the two pilots of the King Air survived the initial impact but were overcome by 
smoke from the post crash fire. The difficulty experienced by the Beechcraft pilots in 
opening the airstair door and the delay in fighting the fire were highlighted by the 
accident investigators as ‘contribut[ing] to the severity of the accident and the loss of 
life’ (NTSB, 1997, p54). 
 
Although extensive research has been conducted in cabin safety, even as recently as 
October 2007, at the International Fire and Cabin Safety conference the importance of 
engaging in research within the area of fire and cabin safety was raised.  Courtney 
(2007) emphasised during the conference that the aviation world is not static, with 
continual developments and changes and as a result research and analysis of the relevant 
issues should continue. Engaging in research to assist the regulatory process and the 
need for ongoing exploration was also emphasised in the opening address by Morin 
(2007, p. 8) who stressed the importance of engaging in research, stating that ‘solid 
research is the basis of sound regulations – regulations must be data driven...’ Morin 
(2007) also emphasised that the ‘outcome’ of the accident and evacuation involving the 
Airbus 340 at Toronto in 2005 was not a ‘miracle’ ‘…but regulations based on solid 
research is what made it possible’ (p. 22). Cherry (2007, p. 2) further emphasised this 
point through an analysis of worldwide aviation accidents as although ‘the accident 
record has improved markedly over recent years…now is not the time to take our foot 
off the pedal’.  
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1.5. Aircraft evacuation 
An emergency evacuation is an event where it is deemed that there is a need for the 
occupants of the aircraft to leave the aircraft in a rapid manner, due to a potential threat 
to survival. Evacuations are typically defined as planned or unplanned. If crew are 
aware of the need to evacuate the cabin in advance and have sufficient time (although 
this may only be a period of a few minutes) to review the standard emergency 
procedures and inform passengers of the actions they must take on landing, the 
evacuation is defined as planned (NTSB, 2000). During this time the crew are likely to 
provide passengers with information on the brace position they must adopt, they may 
reseat passengers in the vicinity of the exits and place cabin crew near the overwing 
exits (if there are more than the minimum number of crew on board). The crew will also 
ensure that passengers have their seatbelts fastened and that they are aware of the 
location and operation of the emergency exits. Unplanned evacuations differ from 
planned, as in these circumstances neither the crew nor the passengers have much time 
to prepare for the evacuation (NTSB, 2000). During an unplanned evacuation, 
passengers are reliant on the instructions of the crew, the information from the pre-
departure safety briefing, their previous knowledge and their behavioural responses at 
the time. 
 
1.5.1. Evacuation certification 
Federal Aviation Regulations Part 25 (CFR FAR 25) and the European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA) regulations (CS-25) relate to all transport category aircraft. Transport 
category aircraft are defined by the FAA as ‘jets with 10 or more seats or a maximum 
takeoff weight of greater than 12,500lb or propeller-driven airplanes with greater than 
19 seats or a maximum take off weight greater than 19,000lb’ (FAA, 2007b, p. 1).  
 
For aircraft with a seating capacity of more than 44 passengers, regulation 25.803 
requires all new aircraft designs to conduct and pass an emergency evacuation 
demonstration. However a demonstration of the evacuation capability of smaller 
transport aircraft with fewer than 44 passenger seats is not required by the regulators. 
The criteria and procedures for the emergency demonstrated are stipulated in CS-25 
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(EASA); FAR 25 (CFR); CAR 525 (Transport Canada) Appendix J and are summarised 
below.  
 
The number of passengers for the certified maximum seating capacity must be present 
on board, with a representative sample of different passenger ages and sex. The number 
of cabin crew on board is determined by the operating rules under which the 
certification application relates. All exits must be set to the take off and landing 
position, with each member of cabin crew located in their assigned crew seat prior to the 
start of the demonstration. The cabin and the surrounding area must be in “dark of 
night” conditions, with illumination provided only by the emergency lighting installed 
on the aircraft. Prior to the demonstration commencing, carry-on baggage, blankets and 
other passenger belongings totalling approximately half the actual capacity for the 
aircraft must be placed at a number of sites in the cabin aisles and exit access as a form 
of minor obstructions (CS-25 (EASA), FAR 25 (CFR); CAR 525 (Transport Canada) 
Appendix J).  
 
During the demonstration, only 50% of the available exits on the aircraft may be used, 
with the used exits representative of all emergency exits on the aircraft. Usually one exit 
in each pair is used. The evacuation is deemed complete once all passengers and crew 
have left the aircraft. To pass the evacuation demonstration, all crew and passengers 
need to evacuate to the ground within 90 seconds (FAR 25 CFR /CS-25 EASA, 
Appendix J). 
 
With regards to the evacuation demonstration, the NTSB (2000) argued that ‘in the 
interest of providing one level of safety, all passenger-carrying commercial airplanes 
and air carriers should be required to demonstrate emergency evacuation capabilities’ 
(p. 77). The NTSB felt strongly about this issue which led them to recommend to the 
FAA that they should ‘require all newly certificated commercial airplanes to meet the 
evacuation demonstration requirements prescribed in Title 14 Code of Federal 
Regulations Part 25, regardless of the number of passenger seats in the airplane’ (2000, 
p. 80). To date, no change has been made to the requirement for evacuation certification 
demonstrations for newly designed aircraft irrespective of the seating capacity. 
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Therefore there is no current requirement for the evacuation capability of a smaller 
transport aircraft with fewer than 44 passenger seats to be demonstrated.  
 
In 2000, the NTSB published a review of 46 aircraft evacuations that took place within 
the United States. During the course of their 16 month study (between September 1997 
and June 1999), the NTSB reported that ‘on average, an evacuation for the study cases 
occurred every 11 days’ (NTSB, 2000, p. 15). Although an evacuation occurrence once 
every 11 days in the United States may sound a high figure, in comparison, the NTSB 
state that in 1998 Part 121 scheduled aircraft made ‘an average of 336,328 departures 
[…] every 11 days’ (NTSB, 2000, p. 15). In addition many of these evacuations are 
likely to be precautionary, rather than imminently life threatening.  
 
1.5.2. Actual evacuations 
The evacuations in the NTSB review involved 2,651 passengers and 195 crew who were 
on board 18 different aircraft types operating under Part 121 regulations. Of the 46 
evacuations, 31 were categorised as unplanned, 14 occurred after crew planning, with 
an unknown level of crew planning prior to one evacuation (NTSB, 2000). The NTSB 
analysis highlights the high number of unplanned evacuations which emphasises the 
importance of appropriate cabin and equipment design and passengers knowing what to 
do in advance of the evacuation.  
 
Of the occupants involved in the evacuations 92% of the occupants were uninjured, 6% 
suffered minor injuries and 2% suffered serious injuries. Injuries as a result of the 
accident or the evacuation were sustained in 18 of the 46 accidents reviewed. In the 18 
cases 208 passengers and 13 crew sustained injuries, and 10 passengers and one crew 
member were killed. The NTSB note that 65 of the minor injuries, 45 of the serious 
injures and all 11 of the fatalities occurred in the accident that occurred at Little Rock, 
Arkansas. Two of the fatalities at Little Rock were linked to the evacuation, with one 
fatality due to smoke inhalation and another due to thermal assault whilst evacuating. 
Six of the serious injuries at Little Rock were attributed to passengers leaving the 
aircraft wing, either via the slide or dropping down to the ground when the slide was not 
in place. 
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Fortunately the rate of serious accidents each year is low, however evacuations whether 
precautionary or not occur more frequently, so scientific investigation must continue to 
ensure all occupants are able to evacuate in a rapid and orderly manner. Information 
gained from emergency evacuations, including those that are deemed precautionary, is 
crucial to enhancing our understanding of such events. This information can then be 
used to determine areas of further investigation and research, as well as providing data 
to support regulatory change.  
 
1.6. Behavioural responses to emergencies 
There is a great deal of variability in individual responses in the event of an evacuation, 
with responses influenced by the individuals’ prior experience and the environment. 
Muir, Bottomley and Marrison (1996) and Galea (2003) propose that there is no one 
behavioural response and evidence has been provided for a range of behaviour 
responses. These behavioural responses range from the completion of the required 
actions in a timely and effective manner, through to behavioural inaction, or even 
aggressive behaviour towards other occupants (Galea, 2003).  
 
1.6.1. Panic 
Panic is considered to be an irrational and counterproductive response. Quarantelli 
(1954, p. 267) defines panic ‘as an acute fear reaction marked by a loss of self-control 
which is followed by non social and non rational flight’. Quarantelli further suggests 
that panic occurs when an individual feels trapped and ‘powerless’, the view of panic 
occurring when routes towards exits are impeded is also suggested by Edwards and 
Edwards (1990).  
 
However Muir et al (1996) and Galea (2003) argue that the term panic has been used 
incorrectly within some commentary of passenger behaviour in aviation accidents as 
any behaviour that is ‘ostensibly irrational and uncontrollable’ has been defined as panic 
(Muir et al, 1996, p. 58). It is suggested that “true” panic occurs very rarely during such 
events as the behaviour exhibited by passengers in a life threatening situation may 
actually be rational in the situation that is perceived and experienced (Muir et al, 1996 
and Galea, 2003).  
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1.6.2. Behavioural inaction 
Behavioural inaction is displayed when the individual does not respond to the unfolding 
situation - in essence there is no behavioural response (Johnson, 1984). Behavioural 
inaction has been highlighted as a behavioural response during aviation emergencies by 
a number of authors within the field (Becker, 1973; Johnson, 1984; Galea, 2003 and 
Leach 2004). 
 
Johnson (1984) during an interview with an elderly couple (the Ables), who were 
onboard the B747 taxing at Tenerife in 1977 when it was hit by another B747 that had 
commenced take off, encountered an example of behavioural inaction. Due to a 
childhood experience of being involved in a building fire, Mr Able always made himself 
aware of the exit locations and familiar with the safety information on board the aircraft. 
After the impact he began to make his way towards an exit, telling his wife to follow 
him. It was reported that at first she made no effort to move, until he spoke to her again. 
Mrs Able reported that as they made their way towards the exit, they observed a number 
of passengers just sitting in their seats. Johnson (1984, p. 34) concluded that ‘the Ables 
said that many more people could have survived this accident had they simply moved 
from their seats and gone to the exits’.  
 
Leach (2004, p. 540) through an analysis of 11 marine and aviation accidents puts 
forward the idea that passenger behavioural responses can be separated into one of three 
groups. The first group are those who calmly respond to the event and are able to make 
‘relatively unimpaired’ decisions and carry them out (approximately 10-15% of 
individuals). The second and largest group, comprising of approximately 75% of 
individuals, are ‘stunned and bewildered’ by the events around them, and the final 
group of approximately 10-15% of individuals will display a ‘high degree of 
counterproductive behaviour’, which may include confusion or anxiety. This analysis 
leads Leach to conclude a high prevalence of behavioural inaction is reported in 
emergency situations by survivors or bystanders. 
 
Behavioural inaction is important to address due to the detrimental effect on 
survivability, with Johnson (1971, p. 43) suggesting that it is one of ‘the most 
maladaptive of behaviours in situations which require a series of quick, correct, 
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avoidance responses to assure survival’. Having knowledge about what to do, prior 
training or being directed by a knowledgeable member of crew may reduce the 
maladaptive behaviour of behavioural inaction (Johnson, 1971). The importance of 
addressing behavioural inaction through training, practice and equipment usability is 
further highlighted by Leach (2004) who suggests that the ‘systems for escape, 
evacuation and rescue are designed on the assumption that people will be proactive in 
the face of danger’ (p. 539). 
 
1.6.3. Flight or fight response 
The flight or fight behavioural response as proposed by Lazarus (1966, cited in Muir et 
al (1996)) is evident when an individual perceives a threat to their survival and takes 
action to fight or remove themselves from the situation. This behavioural response has 
been reported in relation to passenger behaviour in emergency situations (Johnson, 
1984; Leach, 2004), with Galea (2003) commenting that reports have shown that in 
such situations passengers have been observed undoing their seatbelts and ‘fleeing’ the 
area. The immediate situation and the individual’s perception will influence the extent 
to which this behaviour is displayed (Muir et al, 1996).  
 
1.6.4. Affliative behaviour 
Affliative behaviour is a concept proposed by Sime (1985) and is characterised by 
individuals moving towards the familiar in situations where a threat is perceived. The 
notion of movement during an evacuation towards a familiar exit (i.e. the boarding 
door) was developed from Sime’s analysis of occupant behaviour during evacuation 
from the built environment, although was transferred by some to the aviation domain. 
Some evidence for this behaviour was presented by Schaeffer (1994) whose analysis of 
exit usage during aircraft evacuation suggested that exits towards the front of the 
aircraft were used more often and this ‘may stem from a general tendency to proceed 
through the door through which they boarded’ (Schaefers, 1994, p. 80). However, this 
notion of moving towards the boarding door has since been challenged by Galea (2003) 
as a ‘myth’ following an extensive study of passenger exiting behaviours during aircraft 
evacuations. Galea argues that Schaefers’ analysis did not consider where the 
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participant was seated prior to the evacuation and it may have been that the forward 
exits were the nearest available exits during the evacuation. 
 
Galea (2003) suggests that although exit bypass (that is passing a useable exit to use an 
alternative exit) has been observed during evacuations, it must not be assumed that this 
is because occupants are heading towards the boarding door, as there may be other 
factors that have led to the bypassing of the exit. Galea (2003) suggests that affliative 
behaviour has been observed on board but more in instances of passengers gathering 
their personal belonging from the overhead lockers and from under the seats prior to 
moving towards the exits in an evacuation. 
 
1.6.5. Anxiety 
Another behavioural response reported in the literature during emergency situations 
(including aircraft evacuation) is passengers reporting signs of anxiety. Egressing from 
an aircraft in the event of an emergency requires the passenger to complete a number of 
tasks, with authors commenting that the performance in completing these tasks is 
related to the level of anxiety or stress the individual is experiencing (Johnson, 1984; 
Galea, 2003). This relationship between levels of stress and anxiety and performance is 
curvilinear and known as the Yerkes-Dodson law. This law postulates that when low 
levels of stress are present, learning is not facilitated, which Johnson suggests may be 
why many passengers do not attend to the safety briefing. As levels of stress increase to 
moderate, performance is improved, however, when stress levels are high, individuals’ 
performance on both simple and complex tasks is reduced. Johnson (1984, p. 24) argues 
that ‘the optimal level [of stress] lies somewhere in between’.  
 
During an analysis of passenger behaviour the simple task of undoing the seatbelt is 
highlighted by Galea (2003) as one task that degrades when high levels of anxiety are 
experienced. The relationship between anxiety and performance highlights the 
importance of  giving passengers detailed information about what they are required to 
do in advance of an emergency situation. High stress levels may be present at the time 
of the emergency and if new information is delivered as the emergency situation is 
developing, passengers may experience difficulties in comprehending the information.   
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1.6.6. Non-adaptive group behaviour 
Mintz (1951) argues that non-adaptive group behaviour has been demonstrated during 
situations where there is an ‘unstable reward structure’ (p. 151) such as emergency 
situations. The research involved a simulated laboratory experiment whereby a number 
of cones were placed in a bottle with a narrow opening and groups of individuals were 
required to each remove a cone from the one bottle at the same time. In order to add a 
degree of pressure on the individuals they were told the task should be completed within 
a time limit, with financial incentives used to motivate the volunteers. From the results 
of the experiment Mintz suggests that when all occupants work together and cooperate 
‘there is no conflict between the needs of the individual and those of the group’ (1951, 
p. 151). However when a small number of individuals no longer cooperate with the 
group (as may be the case when access to exits is limited) ‘a conflict between the needs 
of the group and the selfish needs of the individual then arises’ (Mintz, 1951, p. 151). 
 
The influence of competitive and collaborative behaviour has been demonstrated during 
simulated emergency evacuations by Muir, Marrison and Evans (1989). Muir et al 
developed a new technique to manipulate the motivation to escape of the individual 
participants during simulated evacuations from an aircraft cabin. Groups of participants 
were recruited to participate in either competitive or collaborative evacuations. Those 
participants recruited to a collaborative evacuation were each paid a standard attendance 
fee for participating in the trials and were instructed to evacuate as quickly as possible. 
However, those participants who were recruited to attend a competitive evacuation were 
informed that in addition to the standard attendance payment of £10, they would be 
offered a bonus payment of £5 for each one of the four trials in the session if they were 
within the first 50% of participants to evacuate the cabin (Muir et al 1989). Muir et al 
(1996) suggest that this is an important behaviour to acknowledge as the behaviour of 
competing individuals may conflict with the objectives of the overall group.  
 
1.6.7. Other reported behavioural responses 
Other behavioural responses reported by cabin safety specialists include disorientation, 
both physiological – due to the environmental conditions within the cabin (such as the 
presence of smoke, fire and gases) and situational - where the occupant is disoriented in 
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the first instance by the events around them and takes some time to orientate themselves 
(Galea, 2003). Depersonalisation has been proposed by Noyes and Kletti (1977) as an 
‘adaptive mechanism’ exhibited by some individuals in the event of experiencing a life 
threatening event, which is defined by ‘alterations in the experience of time, emotion, 
sensation, volition, reality, memory, attachment, and space’ (p. 383). Individuals report 
that they become detached from the events around them and feel as though they are 
onlookers to the events, rather than being actively involved. Galea (2003, p. 133) has 
also reported evidence for ‘social bonding behaviours’ where companions will seek 
each other out prior to evacuating the cabin and altruistic or unselfish behaviour where 
passengers may come to the aid of other passengers, even if this help puts them at risk.  
 
In summary a range of behaviours has been reported by passengers in an emergency. 
Galea (2003) states that research and analysis has shown that ‘the passenger has a very 
good chance of surviving’ and by behaving in a ‘reasonable and thought-out manner’ 
‘…can help increase his or her chance of survival’ (p. 128).  
 
1.7. Factors influencing survival 
In 1972 Edwards (cited in Edwards and Edwards (1990)) proposed the human factors 
SHEL model as a means of explaining the different components of a system and the 
interactions between these components within the aviation domain. The model has then 
been used as a means of identifying the factors that may influence passenger survival in 
the event of an emergency. The model highlights four main components – software, 
hardware, environment and liveware, however consideration should not just be given to 
the components in isolation but also in combination, as interactions in the components 
will occur. Edwards and Edwards propose that the “system” will contain some form of 
hardware, be that a piece of equipment or a structure - in this case the hardware is the 
aircraft cabin or elements within it such as the exits. Edwards and Edwards identify that 
in order for the system to operate effectively operating procedures and protocols will be 
required, along with any overriding regulations. These elements are the software which 
allows the hardware to operate. In the case of the Type III exit, the software will include 
the regulations regarding the size and shape of the exit and aperture and the information 
that must be required by the passenger in terms of exit operation. The hardware and 
software is then all activated, controlled, managed or maintained by individuals who 
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interact with the system whom Edwards and Edwards refer to as the liveware. The 
liveware – i.e. in this case the passengers and crew must also interact effectively 
together, as well as with the other elements of the system. Finally, the liveware must 
interact with the hardware and software with the constraints of the environment (the 
final component in the model). This may be the area the aircraft or the exit operates in, 
but also the social operating context. All the elements of the system must work together 
to ensure safe operation, with human factors research focussing on the interaction of the 
liveware with the other elements of the system and each other (Edwards and Edwards, 
1990).   
 
The seminal work of Snow, Carroll and Allgood (1970) identified a number of factors 
that influence occupant survival during an emergency evacuation of an aircraft. The 
categories proposed by Snow et al can be interpreted in light of SHEL model as 
proposed by Edwards (1972). Snow et al placed the factors into one of four categories – 
configurational (Hardware), procedural (Software), environmental (Environment) and 
biobehavioural (Liveware) as shown in Table 1 (Snow et al, 1970, p. 1). 
 
The model proposed by Snow et al (1970) has been extended by Muir (2004). In 
addition to the interior configurational factors, procedural factors, biobehavioural 
passenger factors and the environmental conditions, Muir suggests that crashworthiness 
and fire protection and evacuation aids also influence passenger survival in aviation 
accidents. Crashworthiness and fire protection factors include developments in the 
strength of the occupant seats and fire resistant materials as examples. There has also 
been extensive development in evacuation aids such as exit signs and floor proximity 
lighting (Muir, 2004).  
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Table 1: Factors influencing survival adapted from (Snow et al, 1970, p.1). 
Category Description  
Configurational Configurational factors are the ‘standard features of [the] 
occupant environment controlling access to exits and evacuation 
flow rates’ Examples include the aisle width and the number, 
type and location of the exits. 
Procedural Procedural factors are the ‘regulatory and training practices of 
crew and other non-passenger rescue personnel which influence 
evacuation procedures.’ Examples include the cabin crew 
training and the standard operating/emergency procedures of the 
airline.  
Environmental Environmental factors are the ‘features of the occupant space 
and outside the aircraft which control survivability and 
evacuation time.’ Examples include the presence of fire and 
smoke, the level of lighting and the weather outside the aircraft. 
Biobehavioural Biobehavioural factors are the ‘biological, psychological and 
cultural attributes of individual passengers which influence 
agility and behaviour.’ Examples include the sex, age and fitness 
level of the passengers.  
 
1.8. Aircraft exits 
Aircraft exits for obvious reasons ‘are among the most important systems on board the 
aircraft’ (Schaefers, 1994, p. 72). There are a number of different exit types on 
commercial aircraft which vary in size and location. The largest exit is a floor level 
Type A which must be at least 42” in width and 72” in height and the smallest is a Type 
IV exit which is a non-floor level exit usually located in the centre of the cabin and must 
be at least 19” in width and 26” in height (CS-25.807 (EASA); FAR 25.807 (CFR); 
CAR 525.807 (Transport Canada)).   
 
1.8.1. The Type III exit 
The Type III exit is another non-floor level rectangular-shaped exit that is also located 
in the centre of the cabin either above or below the wings depending on the type of 
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aircraft. Type III exits are installed on smaller transport aircraft or large single aisle 
aircraft with a maximum seating capacity of up to 299 seats (CS-25.807) The minimum 
dimensions of a Type III must be 20” in width and 36” in height, with the corner radii 
no greater than 7”. The step up to the exit inside the aircraft must be no greater than 20” 
and if positioned over the wing the step down outside the exit must be not greater than 
27” (CS-25.807 (EASA), FAR 25.807 (CFR) and CAR 525.807 (Transport Canada).  
Due to their location on the aircraft Type III and Type IV exits are often referred to as 
overwing exits.  
 
Traditional Type III exits differ in their mode of operation to floor level exits in that 
once they are released, the hatch plug is not attached to the fuselage and will fall into 
the cabin. The passenger is required to check the status of the area outside the aircraft 
and if deemed safe open the exit. The operating process first requires them to release the 
hatch by pulling down on the release handle which is located at the top of the hatch. The 
hatch plug then has to be brought inside the cabin, manoeuvred and rotated in the space 
adjacent to the exit and disposed of into a location whereby it does not impede egress. 
This location differs across operators and regulatory authorities. In the UK the Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA) guidance is for the hatch to be placed outside the aircraft, 
whereas the FAA permits operators to opt for the exit to be disposed of outside or inside 
the aircraft. 
 
The usage of Type III exits by passengers during aircraft evacuations was analysed by 
Galea (2003). Using data contained within the Aircraft Accident Statistics and 
Knowledge (AASK) database, Galea (2003) reviewed the passenger usage from the 
exits located in different areas of the aircraft cabin. The analysis used evacuation data 
from aircraft with three pairs of exits – forward, mid cabin and aft, where at least one 
exit in each pair was available for evacuation. Galea (2003) concluded that a trend 
towards passengers using the central mid cabin exits was apparent, as this was the 
nearest available exit for many passengers, suggesting that ‘this is a disturbing trend as 
the mid exits are the smaller Type-III passenger operated hatch exits’ (p. 148). 
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The prevalence of passenger usage of the Type III exit was also reported by Schaefers 
in 1994, who following a review of exit usage from 73 accidents between 1961 – 1992 
concluded that overwing exits were used in approximately every five or six accidents 
out of 10 and by 30% of the occupants from wing engined aircraft in the dataset and 
50% of the occupants from tail engined aircraft. 
 
Although much smaller than floor level exits and ‘certified for a relatively small number 
of passengers’ accident reports and analyses have shown that the overwing exits can be 
used as a key egress route, with usage by a high number of passengers during some 
evacuations (CAA, 2004, GR No. 3, Appendix 1, p. 3). This underlines the importance 
of passengers being able to evacuate through them effectively. 
 
1.8.2. Exit operator 
Regulations require that a member of cabin crew is situated at each floor level exit (CS-
25.785 (EASA); FAR 25.785 (CFR); CAR 525.785 (Transport Canada)) as these are 
viewed as the primary egress routes in the event of an emergency. During the majority 
of flights a member of the travelling public will be seated adjacent to an overwing exit. 
Some airlines with additional crew on board will allocate a member of cabin crew to 
control the evacuation at the Type III exit(s). However as the cabin crew are strapped in 
during take off and landing in other areas of the cabin, it is likely that the passenger will 
attempt to operate the exit prior to the crew arriving in the vicinity. It is also possible 
that the crew member will experience difficulty in moving to the centre of the cabin and 
may disrupt the evacuation flow due to the presence of other passengers. These 
difficulties were highlighted in the accident involving a Boeing 737 at Los Angeles in 
1991. One member of cabin crew reported that after the impact ‘she attempted to make 
her way to the overwing exits in accordance with company procedure. Because of the 
number of passengers moving aft, she was only able to advance forward to the seats at 
rows 19 and 20 on the left’ (NTSB, 1991, p. 38). During this accident the cabin crew 
member was only able to move a maximum of four rows forward, which was still a 
considerable distance from the Type III exit row, so may not have been able to offer as 
much assistance as desired to the exit operators.  
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Cabin crew are highly trained and professional individuals, whose initial and recurrent 
training syllabus is governed by regulation. With regards to exit operation, crew have to 
undergo initial and recurrent training in the preparation and operation of the type of 
emergency exits on the aircraft they are certified to fly on. The regulations state that this 
training must occur every three years, although anecdotal evidence from some airlines 
suggests that due to the importance of exit operation during an emergency situation, 
some organisations conduct cabin crew recurrent training in exit operation every year.  
However, passengers who are seated next to the overwing exits are unlikely to have 
ever experienced operating an emergency exit prior to being required to do so in the 
event of an emergency. Passengers seated in the exit row are not required to undergo 
any training and are given only a visual screening by the airline staff and the cabin crew 
regarding their ability to open the exit. Passengers are provided with some information 
on exit operation within the safety information, however the form of this information 
differs from airline to airline. 
 
1.8.3. Evacuations involving the Type III exit 
Perhaps the most cited accident in cabin safety literature involving the Type III exit is 
the evacuation that occurred following an uncontained engine fire onboard a British 
Airtours Boeing 737 at Manchester Airport in the UK in 1985 (AAIB, 1988).  
 
1.8.3.1. Summary of the accident 
On the early morning charter flight to Corfu there were 131 passengers and six members 
of crew (including two on the flight deck). During takeoff, the left engine suffered an 
uncontained engine failure, which punctured a fuel tank access panel on the wing. This 
allowed fuel to leak which subsequently ignited. The flight crew heard a ‘thud’ and 
aborted the take off. The flight crew informed the cabin crew via the cabin address 
system that an emergency evacuation may be required via the exits on the right hand 
side of the aircraft (AAIB, 1988). As the pilots turned the aircraft off the runway a wind 
of seven knots transferred the fire onto the fuselage. The fire took hold on the fuselage, 
penetrating the cabin swiftly, allowing smoke to enter the cabin prior the aircraft 
coming to a stop. The aircraft was destroyed by the fire, with 55 occupants (53 
passengers and two members of cabin crew) losing their lives (AAIB, 1988). The 
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accident report states that ‘the major cause of the fatalities was rapid incapacitation due 
to the inhalation of the dense toxic/irritant smoke atmosphere within the cabin, 
aggravated by evacuation delays caused by a door malfunction and restricted access to 
the exits’ (AAIB, 1988 p. 2).  
 
The findings of the investigation stated that the Manchester accident should have been a 
survivable accident. There were no impact forces or occupant injuries from the initial 
aborted take off and the aircraft was still at a well-equipped airport, with rescue 
personnel arriving within 30 seconds of the aircraft stopping (AAIB, 1988).  
 
1.8.3.2. Survival aspects 
The internal conditions were so severe that some passengers left their seats prior to the 
start of the evacuation. When the aircraft had come to a stop the purser attempted to 
open the right hand exit at the front of the cabin, but the slide pack caught on the exit 
frame. The purser then went across the galley to the exit on the left hand side of the 
cabin and opened this exit and inflated the slide without incident. This exit was made 
available 25 seconds after the aircraft had come to a halt. The purser, recognising the 
need to make available as many exits as possible, returned to the R1 door and was able 
to make the exit available for egress one minute and 10 seconds after the aircraft had 
stopped (AAIB, 1988).  
 
The environmental conditions inside the aircraft at Manchester were severe, with the 
cabin filling with thick, black smoke ‘which induced panic amongst passengers’ (AAIB, 
1988, p. 48) and passengers moving into the aisle prior to the aircraft stopping and the 
exits being opened. Conditions in the cabin were so extreme that passengers who had 
made it into the aisle were struggling to move towards the exits, with some passengers 
collapsing in the aisle (AAIB, 1988). 
 
1.8.3.3. The use of the Type III exit 
The female passenger sitting next to the right Type III (overwing) exit, at the instigation 
of other passengers, attempted to open the exit by pulling on the armrest located on the 
lower half of the exit hatch. The individual sat in the centre seat of the row, stood up 
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and pulled the handle at the top of the hatch allowing the hatch to fall into the cabin. 
The hatch, weighing 48lbs, trapped the female passenger in her seat, which required the 
male passenger in the seat row behind to remove the hatch and place it onto an empty 
seat in his row. The exit was made available 45 seconds after the aircraft had come to a 
stop. The accident investigation team reported that the passenger adjacent to the Type 
III exit ‘was not familiar with the door opening procedure and unaware if the door was 
hinged at the top, bottom, left or right, or if it would come straight off’ (AAIB, 1988, p. 
50).  
 
Due to the fire, the overwing exit at the left hand side of the cabin was not opened and 
neither exit at the rear of the aircraft was available for evacuation, leaving only three of 
the six exits in use. Of the 78 passengers who were able to evacuate the aircraft, 17 left 
via the forward left hand exit, 34 via the forward right hand exit and 27 through the 
Type III exit including an infant and a child in arms (AAIB, 1988). Although the Type 
III exit has historically been considered an egress route for a minimal number of 
passengers, during the evacuation at Manchester, the Type III exit was the nearest 
available exit for 76 passengers. Information from accidents has shown that in some 
evacuations the central overwing exits may in fact be the nearest available exit for most 
passengers.  
 
1.8.3.4. Blockages at the Type III 
At Manchester the Type III exit and the area inside the cabin adjacent to the exit 
experienced blockages throughout the evacuation. The area around the Type III ‘became 
a mass of bodies pushing forward to the exit’ (AAIB, 1988, p. 51), with a passenger 
sitting in the exit seat row reporting that the available space between the seats in the exit 
row was not sufficient for evacuation. The limited space at the exit was also reported by 
another passenger who was originally sitting towards the rear of the aircraft (AAIB, 
1988). The overwing exit was blocked during the evacuation with ‘people’s bodies 
lying half-in and half-out of the aircraft’ (AAIB, 1988. p. 51). The importance of 
ensuring passengers can evacuate through the exit quickly was emphasised at 
Manchester when passengers who were, at the start of the accident, located in the area 
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of the cabin where the environmental conditions were extreme were able to move 
towards the centre of the cabin only to be overcome by the smoke (AAIB, 1988). 
 
Following on from the Manchester accident, one of the key questions was why were all 
the occupants unable to evacuate the aircraft prior to being overcome by the 
environmental conditions (AAIB, 1988). The Boeing 737 successfully completed its 
regulatory full scale certification trial in 1970 with 130 passengers and five crew 
evacuating via the exits on the left hand side of the aircraft in 75 seconds (AAIB, 1988), 
however when a rapid evacuation was required at Manchester difficulties in the 
evacuation process occurred.  
 
1.9. Research involving access to the Type III exit 
Since the evacuation at Manchester, one area of focus of aircraft evacuation research 
has been the Type III overwing exit. The majority of the experimental research has been 
conducted at Cranfield University in the United Kingdom or at the FAA Civil 
Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) in Oklahoma City in the United States.  
 
The regulations regarding access to the Type III exit at the time of the Manchester 
accident (described in section 1.8.3.1) only required the seatback to be clear of the 
projected exit opening and therefore it was acceptable for a passenger seat to be located 
adjacent to the exit (as was the case on the Manchester aircraft).  In addition, the right 
hand armrest was mounted on the hatch, but would move with the hatch out of the 
egress path. To move through the aperture, passengers would climb onto the seats in the 
exit row. This seating configuration was widely used within industry with ‘testing 
show[ing] that this did not slow down the evacuation’ (CAA, 1991, p. 11). Following 
Manchester the investigation team concluded that the limited space available at the exit 
resulted in difficulty with exit operation and egress, which lead the UK CAA  to issue 
Airworthiness Notice 79 issue 1 (CAA, 1986) which required operators to alter the 
seating configuration adjacent to the Type III exit. Operators were given two options. 
Option one was to reconfigure the seats to increase the space available for egress 
through the exit. The seat adjacent to the exit could not be positioned further forward 
than the projected centre line of the exit with a vertical projection of at least 10” [that is 
‘the minimum vertically projected distance between seat rows or between a seat and any 
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fixed structure forward of the seat (Quigley, Southall, Freer, Moody and Porter, 2001, 
pi)]. Option two was to remove the outboard seat in the exit row which created two 
passageways to the exit. The movement of the seatbacks adjacent to the exit were also 
restricted to prevent obstructions along the passageway leading to the exit (CAA, 1991). 
Concurrently the CAA also commissioned a programme of research at Cranfield 
University to investigate access to the Type III exit. Figure 1 shows the measurement of 
vertical projection, with a vertical projection of 10” shown in the figure.  
 
Vertical projection 
Figure 1: A 10” vertically projected passageway leading to the Type III exit (adapted from 
CAA (2004), GR No 3, Appendix 1, p. 3). 
 
1.9.1 Cranfield University research 
A research programme conducted by Muir et al (1989) was initiated by the UK CAA to 
investigate passenger behaviour in aircraft evacuations. The experimental programme 
had two main objectives, firstly, to investigate the influence of passageway width at the 
bulkhead leading to Type I floor level exits on evacuation times, and secondly (and 
more important to the current context), to investigate the width (in terms of vertical 
projection between the seat rows) and the space available in the access row to the Type 
III overwing exit. These objectives were formed as a result of information gathered 
from the Manchester accident investigation.  
 
Seven different seating configurations at the overwing exit were tested, with trials 
conducted in both collaborative and competitive conditions. As previously discussed in 
Section 1.5, this motivational protocol involved offering incentive bonus payments to a 
percentage of the first passengers out of the cabin during competitive trials to encourage 
them to move rapidly towards the exits. In the Muir et al series of trials, bonus payments 
were offered to the first 50% of occupants to evacuate the cabin. The tested seating 
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configurations were: (A) a vertical projection of 3” between the seat rows at the exit, 
with minimal recline and forward motion of the outboard seat. This configuration was 
the minimal distance allowable by CAA and FAA regulation at the time of the 
Manchester accident, (B) the same 3” vertical projection as in condition (A), but with no 
movement of the seatbacks in the exit row. Condition C involved two routes to the exit 
due to the removal of the outboard seat. The vertical projection at each seat row to the 
exit was 6”. This was one of the conditions allowable within AN79 (issue 1). During 
conditions D, E and F, the vertical projection between the seats was increased to 13” (an 
AN79 configuration), 18” and 25” respectively. For the final tested configuration 
(condition G) a full row of seats was removed resulting in a vertical projection of 34”.  
 
Groups of 60 passengers were recruited to participate in a series of evacuation trials 
from a Hawker-Siddeley Trident (3B) aircraft that was located on the Cranfield 
University airfield. Each condition was tested eight times utilising the competitive 
methodology (where bonus payments were given to the first 50% of participants to 
evacuate on each trial), with the exception of condition B which included four 
competitive trials and four collaborative trials (where a flat rate attendance payment was 
given to all participant irrespective of the order in which they evacuated the cabin). To 
remove the individual variance of the hatch operator on participants’ evacuation times, 
one of two trained researchers operated the hatch during all trials.  
 
Due to the bonus scheme in operation, only the data from the first 30 participants to 
evacuate through the exit were included in the analyses, as it was felt that participants in 
the second half of the competitive trial may have stopped competing towards the exit. 
Muir et al (1989) concluded that there was a significant effect attributable to seating 
configuration on the mean evacuation times for the 30th participant to evacuate the cabin 
in both competitive and collaborative conditions. When detailed analyses across each 
condition were conducted the time taken to evacuate was slower in the 3” vertical 
projection than any other seating configuration. During the competitive evacuations as 
the vertical projection between the exit seat rows was increased from 3” to 25”, the time 
taken for the first 30 passengers to evacuate was reduced, along with the number of 
blockages (Muir et al, 1989). However when a full row of seats were removed 
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increasing the vertical projection from 25” to 34”, participants were slower in 
evacuating as the increased distance allowed more participants into the exit row at the 
same time which subsequently resulted in exiting delays (Muir et al, 1989).  
 
When the data from the competitive and collaborative conditions were combined, the 
two exit row configurations regulated by AN79 were shown to significantly improve the 
speed at which the occupants could egress through the Type III exit when compared to 
the configuration permissible prior to AN 79 (Muir et al, 1989). Although the rates at 
which the participants evacuated through the overwing exit when the seat rows were 
configured at 13”, 18” or 25” were not significantly different from each other, Muir et al 
(1989, p. 20)  concluded that a vertical projection at the passageway of 18” ‘would 
appear to be the optimum’. 
 
Following on from the Muir et al study, the CAA commissioned a further study to 
investigation the influence of the passageway configuration at the Type III exit on 
evacuation in conditions of poor visibility simulated via the introduction of non-toxic 
smoke (Muir, Marrison and Evans, 1990). Four passageway configurations were tested 
at the overwing exit, with groups of 30 participants evacuating in only a collaborative 
manner (due to ethical and participant safety issues linked to evacuation in conditions of 
non-toxic smoke). Each group of participants completed two evacuations, one through 
the Type I and one trial through the Type III exit, with data available from a total of 254 
participants. The trial procedure was similar to that of Muir et al 1989 to allow 
comparison of the data.  
 
The information from the Type III aspect of the study is of relevance here, with four 
seating configurations tested, each on two occasions. The seatbacks in the exit row were 
restricted during all trials. The test conditions were (A) an AN79 configuration with the 
outboard seat removed and two 6” vertically projected passageways; (B) an AN79 
configuration with a single vertically projected passageway width of 13” (the AN79 
minimum was 10”); (C) a vertically projected passageway width of 18” and (D) a 
vertically projected passageway width of 34”. 
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Mean times for the thirtieth participant to evacuate on each trial showed some variation, 
however no statistically significant differences between the four seating configurations 
were reported, although the report authors questioned whether this was due to the 
limited number of evacuations in each condition (Muir et al, 1990).  
 
In conclusion, Muir et al (1990) recommended increasing the sample size to allow 
statistical testing of the findings and based on the current knowledge a vertically 
projected distance between the seat rows to the Type III exit of between 13” and 25” 
would provide the optimum evacuation rate.  
 
Based on the recommendations of Muir et al (1990), Muir, Bottomley and Hall (1992) 
were commissioned to undertake a further evacuation study to investigate the influence 
of reduced visibility and cabin configuration adjacent to the exit (with identical seating 
configurations to Muir et al, 1990) on evacuation. During this series of trials, 
participants were motivated through the introduction of financial incentives to the first 
75% of participants to encourage competitive behaviour.  
 
The results suggested that the 6” vertically projected passageways with the outboard 
seat removed (OSR) resulted in the slowest evacuation, with the 13” vertically projected 
passageway condition leading to the fastest times (although the report authors do note 
the relatively high standard deviation for this condition suggesting a degree of 
variability in the times from each trial). Inferential analysis (with the outliers removed) 
suggested a statistically significant difference between the seating configurations for the 
first 30 participants to evacuate the cabin. The reanalysis suggested that evacuations via 
the dual 6” passageways were significantly slower than the other configurations tested 
and for the most part, a larger vertical projection was associated with faster evacuation 
rates (Muir et al, 1992).   
 
1.9.2 Civil Aero Medical Institute research 
On release of AN79 in the UK, the Northwest Mountain Region of the FAA in the 
United States commissioned CAMI to undertake a study to assess the configurational 
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changes in AN79 at the Type III exit in relation to the current minimum requirements as 
documented within the FARs.  
 
The study conducted by Rasmussen and Chittum (1989) investigated the influence of 
four different seating configurations at the Type III exit on flow rates through the exit 
and exit preparation. The seating configurations were (A) a 6” vertically projected 
passageway, which was the minimum distance allowable by the FARs at the time. The 
seat in the exit row was as far forward as possible and the seat forward of the exit was 
as far aft as possible, without either seat infringing on the exit opening. Condition B 
included a 10” vertically projected passageway width, which was the CAA minimum 
under AN79 with the seat in front of the exit not impeding the aperture and the exit row 
seat no further forward than the centre of the exit. In condition C the distance between 
the seat rows at the exit was increased to 20”, with a 5” seat encroachment of the aft 
seat into the exit opening. The final tested condition placed the exit seat row centrally to 
the exit, with the OSR (Rasmussen and Chittum, 1989).   
 
Using mean times per subject to exit as the dependent variable (exit operation times 
were removed from the analysed data), a significant difference between seating 
configurations was shown.  Further analyses revealed egress was quicker when there 
was a 20” vertical projection or the outboard seat was removed compared to the 6” 
vertically projected passageway. There was also a significant difference between the 
10” vertical projection and the OSR conditions (Rasmussen and Chittum, 1989).  
 
Based on the findings of Rasmussen and Chittum (1989) and the accident at Los 
Angeles in 1991 involving a collision between a Boeing 737 and a Metroliner, a notice 
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) was released by the FAA. The notice informed air 
carriers that regulations would be altered to require the passageway width at the 
overwing exit to be increased from the current 6” to 20”, with the aft seat encroachment 
distance of the exit opening of no more than 5” (NTSB, 2000). On receiving this 
proposed change, industry questioned the degree to which the increase in space was 
required. As a result of this consultation, a further study was commissioned (McLean, 
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Chittum, Funkhouser, Fairlie and Folk, 1992) to further explore the pathway width and 
seating configuration at the Type III exit. 
 
Four groups of 39 participants evacuated in four seating configurations in a 
counterbalanced repeated measures design to account for experience, motivation and 
fatigue. The four seating configurations were each tested four times: condition A 
involved the cushion of the aft exit seat infringing the exit opening by 5” and the 
seatback on the forward exit seat positioned 5” forward of the exit opening. This 
resulted in a 20” vertically projected exit passageway width. Condition B was 
comparable to condition A; however the seat forward of the exit was moved aft so that 
the seatback was level with the exit opening and broken forward by 15 degrees. The aft 
seat row was located 5” forward of the exit opening, creating a 10” vertically projected 
exit passageway. For condition C – a 10” vertically projected passageway was 
configured (as in configuration B), however the cabin was configured as a 3 x 2 seating 
configuration, with the double seating units on the side of the cabin where the exit was 
situated. Finally two Type III exits were installed for condition D, with the centre lines 
of the exits 29” apart. 3 x 3 seating units were installed throughout the cabin, except 
adjacent to the exit where seating doubles were positioned, with the outboard seat 
removed. This created three 6” passageways to the exits (McLean et al, 1992). 
 
Due to the different approaches to exit operation adopted by different exit operators, 
McLean et al (1992) felt that total group egress time was not a suitable measure to 
assess the impact of the seating configurations at the exit. Data were extracted on exit 
operation time (the time from the start of the evacuation until the operator entered the 
exit aperture) and the time taken for the third participant to egress through the exit until 
the 37th participant passed through the aperture as it was felt that this would provide 
data on a continuous evacuation flow (McLean et al, 1992). 
 
The 20” passageway with a single exit (configuration A) resulted in the quickest egress 
time, exit removal time and flow rates whereas configuration B with a 10” passageway 
resulted in the slowest egress time. Egress times in configuration C (with two seats 
adjacent to the exit) were lower than those in configuration B. It was concluded that 
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evacuation time through the overwing exit was ‘highly dependent on the ergonomic 
restrictions encountered around the exit hatch opening’ (McLean et al, 1992, p. 5). 
McLean et al (1992) concluded that the findings were consistent with those of 
Rasmussen and Chittum (1989) and added further information to our knowledge of the 
influence of seating configuration on evacuation. The results from the descriptive 
statistics presented by McLean et al (1992) highlighted the importance of providing a 
wider exit row passageway, although the authors do stress that difficulties may still be 
experienced if the ‘available space exceeds individual passenger needs’ (McLean et al, 
1992, p. i). 
 
Even though only descriptive analyses were conducted on the data, as opposed to 
inferential statistics (a fact also highlighted by the NTSB in 2000), a regulatory change 
was issued by the FAA in 1992 which required operators to increase the distance 
between the seats at the overwing exit to 20”. After this ruling the Air Transport 
Association and a number of air carriers appealed the regulation as they felt a 
passageway width somewhere between 6” and 20” may provide an equivalent level of 
safety performance (NTSB, 2000). As a result of this appeal another series of trials were 
commissioned by the FAA and conducted by McLean, George, Chittum and 
Funkhouser (1995). The research programme investigated two independent variables - 
the influence of exit row passageway widths (6”, 10”, 13”, 15” and 20” vertically 
projected) and the seat encroachment distance (5”, 10” and 15”) on egress through a 
Type III overwing exit.   
 
Participants were split into two groups of 37 based on their age (participants in group 
one were aged 18 to 40 and those in group two were between 40 and 62 years) and 
evacuated the simulator on each occasion in these groups. A repeated measures design 
was employed with each group of participants evacuating the simulator in each 
condition, which resulted in 30 evacuations. 
 
In order to minimise participant experience with evacuating through an aircraft 
emergency exit and practice effects, the research team allowed participants to practice 
egressing through the Type III exit on two occasions with no seat assembly in place 
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prior to the actual test evacuation. Competitive cooperation between participants was 
encouraged, along with optimum performance across all trials, by offering a bonus to 
the quickest three participants across all trials, with professional cabin crew in place to 
encourage a rapid evacuation (McLean et al, 1995). One member of crew was located in 
the outboard seat in the row in front of the exit and on the call to evacuate the crew 
member stood up, turned to face the exit and encouraged passengers through the exit 
(McLean et al, 1995). Although this procedure was done to encourage efficient 
evacuation, the majority of airlines do not place a member of crew in the vicinity of the 
overwing exit at the start of the evacuation as regulations only require crew at floor 
level exits. 
 
The authors did note that some trials had to be removed from the analysis (although it is 
not clear which conditions the trials were in) due to changes in the cabin crew 
commands, which resulted in these trials becoming an evaluation of seat stepping 
performance rather than seat placement (McLean et al, 1995). 
 
Using the group evacuation time for the first 35 participants to evacuate (the data from 
the last two participants were excluded as their location at the back of the queue may 
have influence their behaviour), a significant effect was reported for passageway width, 
seat encroachment distance and participant group (McLean et al, 1995). Participants 
were slower to evacuate when the vertical projection between the seats was at 6” or 10” 
compared to when the seats were positioned with a vertically projected distance of 13”, 
15” or 20” McLean et al, 1995). In addition, a significant difference was reported for the 
maximum seat encroachment distance but no significant difference was found for the 
mid and minimum seat encroachment distances. Finally, the “older” participant group 
were significantly slower in evacuating than the younger group. The authors concluded 
that the ‘narrow passageways and/or large encroachments of the seat into the area of the 
exit opening delay[ed] egress significantly’ (McLean et al, 1995, p. i). With regards to 
the passageway configuration, McLean et al recommended a 13” passageway with a 10” 
seat encroachment distance (the mid distance tested) ‘would be the most restrictive 
configuration allowable to obtain evacuation performance essentially equivalent to that 
obtained with the 20-inch passageway offset 5-inches’ (McLean et al, 1995, p. 9). 
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The findings of the McLean et al (1995) study resulted in the FAA issuing an exemption 
to the 20” rule and a further NPRM in January 1995. This amendment allowed the 
carriers to install a 13” passageway width at the overwing exit (NTSB, 2000). This 
rulemaking by the FAA has though been questioned by the NTSB due to some design 
and procedural elements of the research. This led the NTSB to recommend further 
experimental work, which the FAA initiated CAMI to complete. 
 
This subsequent study was reported in 2002 by McLean, Corbett, Larcher, McDown, 
Palmerton, Porter and Shaffstall is the most recent published work on access to the Type 
III exit. The extensive research programme was commissioned by the FAA in an 
attempt to finally resolve the issues linked to access to Type III exits. 
 
Four independent variables were tested in a factorial design. The crucial variable (both 
for the McLean investigation and the present study) was passageway configuration at 
the Type III exit, which was tested at four conditions – a 20” vertical projection, with 5” 
aft seat encroachment, a 13” vertical projection, with 10” aft seat encroachment, a 10” 
vertical projection, with 14” aft seat encroachment and dual 6” passageways with the 
outboard seat removed.  
 
The other independent variables included the location of the disposed Type III hatch. 
This was tested in two conditions. Exit operators either received safety information 
showing the hatch disposed of inside the aircraft on the exit row seat or outside the 
aircraft (McLean et al, 2002). Other tested variables were participant motivation which 
was tested in two conditions. After boarding the simulator all participants were briefed 
according to the motivation condition during the trial. Participants in the low motivation 
(co-operative) trials were informed that there had been an accident and the aircraft was 
on fire and they had to get out of the cabin as quickly as possible. During other trials, a 
high passenger motivation (competitive) was introduced. Participants were provided 
with the same information as the low motivation group but in addition were informed 
that double pay would be provided to the first 25% of the participants to exit the cabin 
across all the trials in the session. The motivational payments were made across all the 
trials in the session in an attempt to maintain the competition between individuals 
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throughout the session. The final independent variable was participant group density. 
This was tested at three levels – low (30 participants), medium (50 participants) and 
high (70 participants).  
 
The authors reported that the variables were selected for inclusion as previous studies 
have highlighted their effects on evacuation and specifically their influence on 
passageway configuration, which was the key variable of interest. The experimental 
design was quite complex involving 2,544 participants across 48 experimental groups 
with ‘motivational level […] nested within subject group density, which was distributed 
uniformly across passageway configuration nested within hatch disposal location’ 
(McLean et al, 2002, p. 2). In order to address both participant naivety, as would be the 
case in an emergency situation, and differences in individual performance, analyses 
were conducted on the first trial only (naïve participants) and all trials conducted in a 
session in a repeated measures design. 
 
Due to the differences in group numbers (one of the independent variables), evacuation 
time data from the first trial (48 in total) for the first 30 passengers were analysed, with 
no significant differences attributable to the independent variables, which included 
vertical projection at the exit. A multiple regression analysis using the independent 
variables and individual participant characteristics (height, waist size, gender and age) 
was conducted on the individual participant evacuation times (defined as the time from 
one participant exiting through the aperture until the time the next participant was 
through the exit). The multiple regression revealed that participant waist size accounted 
for the most variance, followed by gender and then age. Neither participant height nor 
any of the independent variables added further to the regression model. McLean et al 
concluded that this was an important finding as it ‘was the first evidence that the 
individual subject characteristics were significantly more important to the evacuation 
outcomes than were the independent variables’, accounting for 32% of the variance 
(2002, p. 16). Although an important finding, it is argued that industry, cabin safety 
researchers and human factors specialists have no control over the individual human 
characteristics on board the aircraft and therefore cannot regulate in the area. Therefore 
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it is still of utmost importance that research is conducted into factors influencing 
evacuation over which the industry have some control.  
 
An analysis of covariance reported a significant interaction between passageway 
configuration and hatch disposal location. The interaction suggested that increased 
evacuation times were evident with the 13” passageway width at the exit row when the 
hatch was disposed of inside the cabin, whereas when the hatch was disposed of outside, 
increased evacuation times were evident when there was a 10” passageway width 
(McLean et al, 2002). Further analysis of the video footage assisted in adding 
explanation to this finding and this was due to the exit hatch being dislodged from the 
intended position inside the cabin during some of the trials when the vertical projection 
was at 13”. 
 
As during the McLean et al (2002) study, the authors were focused on the effect of 
passageway configuration and the results from these two trials were due to a ‘partial 
obstruction of the exit caused by improper hatch disposal’ the evacuation times were 
adjusted to remove the influence of the obstruction. By adjusting the results from these 
trials the results were aligned with those obtained from the other trials in the 13” seating 
configuration. The significant effect of the 13” vertical projection and significant 
interactions between the passageway configuration and both hatch disposal and group 
density were no longer apparent, leaving ‘only the egress times from the 10” 
passageway configuration with outside hatch disposal location as being significantly 
different from the rest’ (McLean et al, 2002, p. 23).  
 
McLean et al (2002, p. 32) conclude that the ‘effects showed clearly that, of the single 
passageway configurations employed, only the 10” passageway configuration produced 
ergonomic restrictions significant with respect to egress performance, specifically for 
older, wider, and taller subjects’. These results ‘attest again to the inability of the 10” 
passageway configuration to provide an egress route that is as effective or as efficient as 
the other configurations for a significant portion of the flying population’ (McLean et al, 
2002, p. 32). Although the results from this study have been presented as reported by 
McLean et al (2002), some of the analyses are questionable as individual egress times 
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were used as the dependent variable measures which were not independent from each 
other. This infringes one of the assumptions of parametric statistical tests. That said, the 
McLean et al (2002) study suggested that in a larger single aisle cabin configuration, a 
10” vertically projected passageway leading to the Type III exit results in delays to 
passenger evacuation. However as the study was only required to address evacuation 
from larger cabins, it is not known if these findings relating to vertical projection at the 
exit row generalise to smaller transport aircraft and specifically cabins with two seats 
either side of the main aisle and less headroom.    
 
1.10. Current regulatory position on access to Type III exits  
Following the experimental testing at Cranfield University into the effects of the exit 
row configuration on evacuation, the UK CAA issued version 3 of AN79 in March 1989 
(CAA, 1989) (issue 2 was released by the CAA in 1987 to include Type IV with the 
airworthiness notice). Issue 3 of AN79 is still the current issue and has since been 
incorporated into Generic Requirement 3 within CAP 747 ‘Mandatory Requirements for 
Airworthiness’ (2004). CAP 747 is applicable to all UK registered aircraft with a 
passenger capacity of 20 or more. 
 
In order to comply with the UK regulations, operators can opt for one of two seating 
configurations at the Type III exit. If a single passageway to the exit is present, the exit 
seat row must be configured so that no part of the seat is further forward than the centre 
line on the exit, with the forward seat row positioned to allow a passageway 
configuration of either 10” vertically projected or at least as wide as half the width of 
the exit hatch (whichever is greater). An alternative configuration with two passageways 
to the exit can be used, with space equivalent to the removal of the outboard seat next to 
the exit and a minimum distance between the seat rows of both passageways of at least 
6” vertical projected. All movement in the seatbacks along the passageway must be 
prevented (CAA, 2004). 
 
United States and Canadian regulations on access to the Type III exit are applicable to 
aircraft with a passenger capacity of at least 60 seats (FAR 25.813 (CFR), CAR 525.813 
(Transport Canada)). Where there are seating doubles on the side of the aircraft where 
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the Type III exit is located, regulations require a vertically projected passageway width 
of at least 10” and where there are triple seat assemblies in place, a vertical projection of 
20” is required. The FARs also stipulate that ‘the centerline of the required passageway 
width must not be displaced more than 5 inches horizontally from that of the exit’ (CFR 
14, 25.813, (c)(i)). A second option is available to the operator if preferred, through the 
creation of two passageways to the exit that have a vertically projected width of at least 
6” and an unobstructed space next to the exit which is the width of a passenger seat and 
encompasses the exit opening (outboard seat removed) (CFR 14, 25.813). 
 
FARs also regulate that for aircraft with at least 20 passenger seats, the projected exit 
opening must be clear of obstructions, with no interference from other aspects of the 
cabin furniture (CFR 14, 25.813). For aircraft with fewer than 20 passenger seats ‘minor 
obstructions in this region’ are permissible ‘if there are compensating factors to 
maintain the effectiveness of the exit’ (CFR 14, 25814, (2)(ii)). 
 
In 1999, the Cabin Safety Harmonisation Working Group (CSHWG) were assigned by 
the FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee to address issues surrounding 
access to Type III and IV exits. It was intended that members of the group (which 
comprised of experts from the United States, Canada and Europe) would provide 
guidance that would assist the FAA with rulemaking activities (FAA, 1999). During 
their initial assignment, the group investigated access to the Type III exit. 
Based on the current FAA regulations, the then JAA rules (the JAA has now become 
EASA) and the research findings available at the time, the CSHWG proposed that on 
aircraft with a seating capacity of 20 seats or more, where there were two seats abreast 
of the aisle the vertical projection at the exit row should be a minimum of 10”. Where 
there are three seats either side of the main aisle, either a single passageway to the exit 
with a vertical projection of 13”, with at least 10” of the passageway within the exit 
aperture area was proposed or a dual passageway configuration with the outboard seat 
removed and two 6” vertical projected passageways (FAA, 2002). To date there has not 
been a change in the EASA and FAA regulations on access to the Type III exit, 
although some exemptions have been awarded to US airlines allowing a 13” vertical 
projection (FAA, 2002). Although recommendations were made by the CSHWG, the 
specific research studies that were used to inform the recommendations are not clear in 
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the information that is in the public domain. Specifically, publicly available data are 
limited on evacuation from smaller transport aircraft, including cabins with two seats 
either side of the main aisle.  
 
1.11. Aim of the thesis – evacuation from smaller transport aircraft 
As stated in Section 1.1 the main aim of the overall thesis was to explore evacuation 
from smaller transport aircraft. The issue of evacuation from smaller transport aircraft is 
of relevance as these aircraft have a narrower fuselage, and therefore less cabin width 
and lower headroom. Throughout this review of the literature, there has been limited 
reference to smaller transport aircraft and the link between the area of study and the 
literature may be questioned, however there is a simple reason for this. That is, there is 
limited cabin safety and evacuation research into evacuation from smaller transport 
aircraft. The majority of the publicly available research on evacuation, and specifically 
on Type III exits to date, has been conducted in cabins with a larger interior 
configuration, where there are three seats either side of the main aisle. As a result of this 
imbalance in the research, relatively little is known about whether research findings 
from trials conducted in a larger interior configuration will generalise to aircraft with a 
smaller interior configuration. This programme of research was undertaken with a view 
to gaining knowledge and informing regulatory activity on evacuation from smaller 
transport aircraft and to provide further data when considering if regulations for large 
transport aircraft are also applicable to small transport aircraft. 
 
In addition, full scale evacuation demonstrations are not required by current regulations 
for aircraft with fewer than 44 seats as set out by many regulators including EASA, the 
FAA and Transport Canada. This research also responds to an issue raised by the NTSB 
in 2000 who felt that the evacuation demonstration should apply to ‘all newly 
certificated commercial airplanes… regardless of the number of passenger seats in the 
airplane’ (2000, p. 80). To date, no change has been made to the requirement for 
evacuation certification trials for newly designed aircraft. This view was reiterated by 
R.G.W. Cherry and Associates who conducted a study into the factors influencing 
evacuation from smaller transport aircraft in 2006a.  As previously highlighted and 
confirmed by R.G.W. Cherry and Associates  ‘the majority of evacuation research has 
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been directed toward larger transport airplanes’, coupled with the fact that evacuation 
certification trials are not required for passenger carrying aircraft with fewer than 44 
seats, mean that ‘the significant factors in evacuation from smaller transport airplanes 
are less generally understood’ (2006a, p. 7) 
 
This thesis contains four experiments that investigate passenger evacuation and the 
operation of the Type III exit from smaller transport aircraft. The first experiment 
investigated passenger evacuation through the Type III exit and the potential influence 
of the interior configuration and the space available at the exit on the rate at which 
passengers evacuate through the exit. Due to the limited research it was not known if the 
interior configurational features associated with smaller transport aircraft (i.e. a 
narrower fuselage which results in less cabin width and less headroom) would influence 
evacuation through the Type III exit. In addition, the amount of space available at the 
Type III exit has been shown to be of important to evacuation speed in large single aisle 
aircraft and it was not known if the width of the passageway configuration at the exit 
would also be of importance in smaller transport aircraft.  
 
Experiments Two and Three then focussed on the individual exit operator and potential 
improvements to Type III exit operation as accidents and experimental research have 
shown difficulties can be experienced by operators. Difficulties in operation of the Type 
III exit have been shown in large single aisle aircraft and it was not known if the same 
difficulties would also be experienced in smaller transport aircraft. Experiment Two 
investigated the influence of the interior configuration, a modification to the exit 
operating handle mechanism and the exit operator’s briefing on the time taken to 
operate the exit. The modification to the exit operating handle was selected as this was 
amenable to a retrofitting programme and operator briefings are relatively simple to 
alter within an airline.  
 
Experiment Three then investigated a major modification to the Type III exit 
mechanism on exit operation time. The modification, which was the installation of an 
automatically disposed hatch,  had been shown to be of benefit in reducing the time 
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taken to make the exit available in a large single aisle aircraft and it was not known if 
the benefits would also be seen in exit operation from smaller transport aircraft.  
 
Finally Experiment Four examines the effect of the placement location of the disposed 
hatch from a traditional Type III exit on passenger evacuation. As this was an initial 
experiment into the issue, evacuation trials were only conducted in a smaller transport 
aircraft. It was felt that due to the restricted space available in an aircraft of this type, 
the influence of the placement of the hatch may have more of an impact than on larger 
aircraft.  
 
This section has outlined the progression of the four experiments in the thesis, with the 
focus throughout exploring evacuation issues associated with smaller transport aircraft. 
The next section provides the objectives of Experiment One including the rationale for 
the inclusion of the variables.  
 
1.12. Objectives of Experiment One 
Based on the requirements for data on evacuation from smaller transport aircraft, one of 
the objectives of Experiment One was to investigate the effect of the interior 
configuration on evacuation. In order to compare the data obtained, tests were also 
conducted in a large single aisle interior configuration, with three passenger seats either 
side of the main aisle.  
 
One area of extensive research in large single aisle cabins has been the influence of the 
passageway width and access to the Type III exit on evacuation. Vertical projection at 
the Type III exit is known to influence passenger evacuation through the overwing exits 
on larger transport aircraft (Muir et al, 1989; 1990; 1992; Rasmussen and Chittum, 
1989; McLean et al 1992; 1995). In addition, the recommendations made by the Cabin 
Safety Harmonisation Working Group to the FAA suggested that on aircraft with two 
seats either side of the main aisle and at least 20 passenger seats, the access to the Type 
III exit should be at least 10” vertically projected and where there are three seats either 
side of the main aisle, either a single passageway to the exit with a vertical projection of 
13” or dual passageways with two 6” vertical projected passageways and the outboard 
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seat removed (FAA, 2002). However, as previously highlighted, it is not clear where the 
data used to form these recommendations came from.  As a result it was decided to also 
investigate passageway width within this study in order to determine if the issue was 
also of relevance to smaller transport aircraft.  
 
Although other research programmes have investigated vertical projection in large 
single aisle cabins, only two studies have included vertical projections of 10” and 13” 
within the same experiment. One of these was the McLean et al (2002) study which also 
investigated three other variables in addition to vertical projection. The results had also 
not been published when Experiment One was designed. In addition neither of the 
previous studies with these vertical projections were conducted within the Cranfield 
University evacuation simulator, which was the test facility for the current experiment. 
As a result of the considerations, evacuation trials in both large single aisle and smaller 
interior configurations were conducted as it was not felt appropriate comparisons could 
be made with existing data.  
 
In summary, the specific objectives of Experiment One were to investigate the influence 
of the interior configuration (either a small or large single aisle interior configuration) 
and passageway width at the Type III exit (either a 10” or 13” vertical projection) on 
evacuation and passenger perception of the evacuation.  
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2.0. Method: Experiment One 
 
2.1. Methodological considerations 
2.1.1. Cabin simulator 
With any aircraft evacuation trials an appropriate balance between participant safety 
(both physically and psychologically) and the realism of the experimental scenario has 
to be reached. By conducting the trials in a controlled environment it allows the 
researcher to manipulate the variables of interest, whilst still maintaining control of the 
experiment to minimise the risks. To enhance the realism of the experiment, the cabin 
simulator and experimental procedure (i.e. the inclusion of a pre-flight safety briefing 
demonstration and safety card) were made as realistic as possible. In addition 
participants were not briefed about the specific evacuation scenario in advance, as 
would be the case during an unplanned real evacuation.  
 
The objectives of the experiment were to explore issues surrounding evacuation from 
smaller transport aircraft and, as a result, evacuation trials were conducted with the 
cabin simulator configured as either a small transport aircraft or a large single aisle 
aircraft. The issue of evacuation from smaller transport aircraft is of relevance as these 
aircraft have a narrower fuselage and therefore less cabin width (which is linked to the 
number of seats abreast that can be installed), and lower headroom.  
 
When the test facility was configured as a large single aisle interior configuration, 
seating triples were placed either side of the main aisle and the bases of the overhead 
lockers were 64.5” from the ground to represent typical aircraft interiors of this type. 
For some of the evacuations the facility was modified to represent some of the key 
internal features of a smaller transport aircraft. The overall width of the fuselage was 
narrowed and the seating triples were replaced by seating doubles to represent an 
internal configuration with two seats either side of the main aisle. In addition the bases 
of the overhead lockers were lowered to 54.5” from the floor. It is acknowledged that in 
making these modifications from a large single aisle aircraft to a small transport aircraft, 
essentially two variables were manipulated – the seating configuration and the 
headroom available. However in order to enhance the ecological validity of the 
 43 
experiment and the representativeness of the test facility in relation to current aircraft 
types, a methodological comprise was made as both changes were made in combination 
and not in isolation.  
 
2.1.2. Sampling 
A non-probability convenience sampling method was used to recruit participants. It is 
acknowledged that this method of sampling may have introduced some bias as 
participants self-selected to volunteer for the evacuation trials. 
  
2.1.3. Co-operative (collaborative) methodology 
Two types of motivational methodology developed by Muir et al (1989) have been used 
with aircraft evacuation research – the co-operative approach or the competitive 
approach (these approaches have been described in Section 1.6.6). Both methodologies 
have been used successfully within a number of research programmes. Where a 
competitive methodology has been used, passenger behaviours have been akin to those 
reported during life threatening emergencies, whereas behaviours witnessed during 
simulated co-operative trials have been similar to those recorded during aircraft 
certification trials and precautionary evacuations.  
 
The co-operative approach, which has been used widely in evacuation research, was 
selected for this experiment in line with the sponsor’s requirements. When undertaking 
any aircraft evacuation research, participant safety has to be the primary consideration. 
As experimental trials had previously not been conducted in a small interior 
configuration, there was limited knowledge on the behaviours that might be observed, 
so a collaborative methodology was used in the first instance. There is also the risk that 
an evacuation trial may have to be stopped by a member of the research team due to 
concerns for participant safety and a result no data are collected. This may be more 
likely when a competitive methodology is used. Although only a secondary 
consideration in this experiment, due to the limited number of trials in each condition, 
the risk of this happening was minimised through the use of a co-operative approach. As 
a result of these considerations a co-operative approach was selected. .  
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It is acknowledged that with a co-operate methodology participants may not be as 
motivated to evacuate as quickly as possible, so a number of strategies were put in place 
to enhance the urgency to evacuate. Previous research studies have used two 
alternatives when employing a co-operative methodology. Studies have either offered 
all participants a flat rate attendance fee or offered all participants a flat rate attendance 
fee and in addition a group bonus, payable to all members of the group, if all group 
members evacuate within a time limit. The time limit is not specified to the participants. 
By providing the added bonus to the group to evacuate as quickly as possible, it is 
hoped the degree of urgency will be increased. The attendance fee plus the additional 
group bonus was offered in this experiment. In addition, the cabin crew were trained to 
behave in an assertive manner when issuing commands and directions. This is in line 
with the findings and Muir and Cobbett (1996) who reported that simulated evacuations 
with assertive cabin crew were significantly faster than those with no assertive cabin 
crew. Finally, anecdotal evidence from previous experimental programmes has also 
shown that participants can be motivated to evacuate as quickly as possible via the 
researcher’s briefing in advance of the trials. This additional motivational strategy was 
used in the experiment.  
 
It was hoped that by using a group bonus co-operative methodology and the additional 
motivational strategies, participants would be encouraged to evacuate as quickly as 
possible, whilst minimising the risks to participant safety.  
 
2.2. Ethical and safety considerations 
The experiment was conducted in accordance with the code of conduct and ethical 
guidelines of the British Psychological Society (BPS, 2006).  An ethics proposal was 
submitted to, and approved by the Human Factors Department Ethics Committee prior 
to the experimental trials taking place. Participant safety was a primary consideration 
throughout the research programme. Participants were advised of the appropriate 
clothing to wear for the test session (which were trousers, a long sleeved top and 
trainers or flat pumps and socks). All participants were recruited with regard to medical 
criteria, which had been approved by the ethics committee.  
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2.3. Research design 
Experimental trials were conducted to investigate the influence of the interior 
configuration and vertical projection at the Type III exit on evacuation and exit 
operation. This resulted in a 2 x 2 factorial design. To remove practise and learning 
effects, it was decided to use independent measures, with each group of participants 
recruited to participate in only one evacuation trial.  
 
2.3.1. Independent variables 
There were two independent variables in the experiment. The first was the interior 
configuration, which was tested either in a small interior configuration or in a large 
single aisle interior configuration. The second independent variable was the passageway 
width at the Type III exit. This was tested at either 10” or 13” vertically projected at the 
exit row.  
 
2.3.2. Dependent variables 
The rate at which participants evacuated the cabin was the dependent variable from the 
evacuation trial. Evacuation performance timings were extracted from the time coded 
video footage of the trials, measured to one tenth of a second. The time taken to 
evacuate was taken from the Captain’s command to evacuate which was “Undo your 
seatbelts and get out!” until the last participant had both feet on the wing. 
Participant rating scales were also collected from a post evacuation questionnaire 
designed specifically for evacuations through the Type III exit. A copy of the 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. The questionnaire asked participants to rate 
various aspects of their evacuation experience using a seven point Likert type scale and 
these responses were then used as dependent variables. The other questions on the 
questionnaire asked participants to provide qualitative comments about their experience.  
 
2.3.3. Experimental schedule 
The experimental schedule, showing how the 24 evacuation trials were run in the four 
test conditions, is given in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Experimental schedule 
 Interior configuration 
Passageway width Large interior 
configuration 
Small interior 
configuration 
10” vertical projection Six groups Six groups 
13” vertical projection Six groups Six groups 
 
2.4. Participants 
Twenty four independent groups of up to 20 members of the public (plus reserves) were 
recruited as participants. Volunteers who had previous experience of operating a Type 
III exit were excluded from taking part. Each group was required to take part in a single 
evacuation, and participants were permitted to take part in one session only. 
 
Participants were recruited via local and regional advertising. A sample of a recruiting 
advertisement is provided in Appendix B. Participation was restricted to people who 
were aged between 20 and 50, and who weighed no more than around 15 stones/95.25 
kg. Participants were advised that they should be normally fit and healthy, and not 
excessively overweight. For safety reasons participants with any of the following 
medical conditions were restricted from taking part: heart disease, high blood pressure, 
fainting or blackouts, diabetes, epilepsy or fits, deafness, chronic back pain, ankle 
swelling, depression, anxiety, other nervous/psychiatric illnesses, fear of enclosed 
spaces, fear of heights, fear of flying, brittle bones, asthma, bronchitis, breathlessness, 
chest trouble, allergy, lumbago sciatica, or any other serious illness.  
 
Participants were sent a confirmation letter outlining their booking. A sample copy of a 
confirmation letter is provided in Appendix C.   
 
2.5. Equipment/materials 
2.5.1. Test Facility 
The test facility for the experiments was the Boeing 737 cabin simulator located within 
the School of Engineering, Cranfield University in the United Kingdom. The facility 
was fitted with four functioning exits. In the starboard side of the fuselage there were 
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two Type I exits (one at the front and one at the rear) and a fully functional Type III exit 
in the centre of the cabin. In the port side of the fuselage there was one service door at 
the rear of the cabin. The Type III exit was used for all evacuations.  
 
A control station was located at the front of the cabin simulator. The control station was 
fitted with a personal computer used to operate the lighting system, a video monitor 
which displayed an image of the interior of the cabin and an audio system which was 
used to play the audio tracks. Three infra-red cameras were located in the test facility. 
One camera was outside the Type III exit, one camera was positioned internally directed 
at the Type III exit and one was positioned along the main aisle.  
 
Some evacuation trials were conducted in a large interior configuration, with three seats 
either side of the main aisle, to represent a larger single aisle transport aircraft (i.e. 
Boeing 737/Airbus 319). For other trials, the facility was modified to represent a small 
transport aircraft with two seats either side of the main aisle (i.e. the Bombardier CRJ 
series and the ATR-42 aircraft as examples). For tests in the larger interior 
configuration, seating triples were set at a seat pitch of 29”, equivalent to a vertical 
projection of between 3 – 4”. The bases of the overhead lockers were 64.5” above the 
cabin floor.  
 
For the small interior configuration tests, the fuselage was narrowed by installation of a 
false wall down the port side. The overhead lockers were fitted with false bases to lower 
the ceiling and reduce the headroom available. The bases of the overhead lockers were 
54.5” above the cabin floor. Seating doubles from an Embraer 120 regional jet were 
modified to fit floor mounted seat track, rather than the side of the fuselage wall. The 
existing seat track was relocated so that the Embraer doubles could be secured. These 
seats were placed at a vertical projection of 3.5”, to be equivalent to tests conducted in 
the larger interior configuration. 
 
The other modification to the test facility during the experiment was the width of the 
passageway at the Type III exit, which was tested at either a 10” or a 13” vertical 
projection at the exit passageway. 
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Photographs of the cabin in both the large and small interior configurations are provided 
in Appendix D. All trials were conducted in “simulated” daylight down one side of the 
cabin. 
 
2.5.2. Materials 
Participants were provided with a clipboard that contained all the paperwork for the 
trials. The trials materials included a volunteer information sheet (a copy is provided in 
Appendix E), which contained details of the health and safety provisions, confidentiality 
and anonymity, insurance cover, and payment. A volunteer consent and medical 
clearance form was also provided. This form asked participants about any pre-existing 
psychological or physical conditions and also asked them to provided informed consent 
for participating in the evacuation trials. A copy of this form is provided in Appendix F. 
 
A demographic questionnaire was also used to gather background information on the 
participant (a copy can be found in Appendix G), along with a post evacuation 
questionnaire (as shown in Appendix A). It is noted that only some of the questions on 
the demographic questionnaire were of relevance to the current experiment and the 
remainder were included at the request of the sponsor. Those that were specifically of 
interest to the current experiment were those that gathered data on the characteristics of 
the sample. The post evacuation questionnaire asked participants about their experience 
of the evacuation and included information on the difficulty of moving down the aisle to 
reach the exit row, the difficulty of moving between the seats at the exit row, and the 
difficulty of moving through the exit and out of the aircraft. Participants were asked to 
provide a difficulty rating for each of these elements on a seven point scale where 1 was 
very easy and 7 was very difficult. The post evacuation questionnaire also asked 
participants about any physical features within the cabin that had helped or hindered 
their evacuation. Participants were asked to provide open responses to these questions 
where applicable. Other questions were included on the post evacuation questionnaire at 
the request of the sponsor, however these were not of relevance to the current 
experiment and have not been analysed.  
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2.6. Procedure 
2.6.1. Pre-trial procedure 
On arrival, members of the research team greeted all participants. Each participant was 
issued with a bib detailing their volunteer number, and provided with a clipboard 
containing the trial materials.  
 
Participants were asked to read and complete the trials paperwork and have their height 
and weight measured by the research team. Each participant was asked to complete the 
medical questionnaire (see Appendix F), and was interviewed by an occupational health 
nurse or first aider in order to receive clearance to take part in the trials.  
 
The test facility was checked by the nurse/first aider prior to each trial. Participants 
were asked to remove loose jewellery before boarding the cabin simulator. During the 
trials there were always four members of the research team on the simulator platform. 
At least two members of the research team were inside the cabin (one acting as cabin 
crew), with another researcher and the nurse/first aider located directly outside the 
operational exit. The researcher on the wing was instructed to move the Type III exit 
hatch out of the path of the participants (for safety reasons), and marshal them to a place 
of safety. The nurse/first aider and all members of the research team were equipped with 
emergency alarms, and instructed to sound them if any participant was believed to be at 
risk of injury.  
 
On completion of the check-in procedure, the lead researcher briefed participants. This 
briefing contained details of the background of the research, information relating to the 
conduct of the trial, and a demonstration of the emergency stop alarm. A transcript of 
the briefing is provided in Appendix H.  
 
2.6.2. Trial procedure 
2.6.2.1. Seating  
On completion of the pre-trial briefing, the cabin crew boarded participants in the cabin 
simulator. Participants were assigned to seats within the cabin as they arrived at the 
testing session. The participant in the seat adjacent to the Type III exit was always male 
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(seat 3a in the small interior configuration and seat 7a in the large interior 
configuration), although all other seat allocations were random.  
 
2.6.2.2. Safety briefings 
Once seated, the member of cabin crew provided a safety briefing which included the 
location of the exits, and demonstrations of the use of seatbelts and oxygen masks. In 
addition, the participant seated next to the Type III exit received an individual minimal 
briefing on their emergency duties. This briefing highlighted that the participant was 
sitting next to an emergency exit, that they may be required to open the exit in the event 
of an emergency and where they could find additional safety information on the exit 
operation procedure. Transcripts of both of these briefings are provided in Appendix I. 
 
2.6.2.3. The call to evacuate 
When the safety briefings were complete, the cabin crew completed a check of the cabin 
and ensured that all participants had their safety belts fastened. The trials were to 
simulate an emergency evacuation on take off. Shortly after the cabin crew had checked 
the cabin a pre-recorded evacuation scenario was played. This included a period of 
engine noise (lasting approximately 30 seconds), followed by an announcement from 
the Captain to “Undo your seat belts and get out!” A transcript of the evacuation 
scenario is contained in Appendix J.   
 
2.6.2.4. Cabin crew actions 
At the end of the Captain’s announcement the cabin crew member, who was located at 
the front of the cabin, commanded passengers to open and move towards the Type III 
exit. Passengers were urged to move quickly throughout the evacuation. The cabin crew 
member used assertive, concise, positive commands, in accordance with the findings of 
Muir and Cobbett (1996). The evacuation was deemed complete when all passengers 
had evacuated the cabin.  
 
2.6.3. Post-trial procedure 
On completion of the post-evacuation questionnaire, participants were thanked, 
debriefed and paid. Finally, participants were provided with a thank you letter 
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containing contact details for the research team. A copy of this letter is provided in 
Appendix K.   
 
2.7. Analysis 
The video footage was edited and a time code was added. Data were then extracted from 
the video footage to allow the calculation of the dependent variable. All performance 
evacuation data, along with the quantitative responses from the post evacuation 
questionnaires were entered into SPSS version 14 for quantitative analysis.  
 
Qualitative comments provided in response to the open questions on the post evacuation 
questionnaire were collated on a question-by-question basis and have been used to add 
depth to the quantitative results.  
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3.0. Results: Experiment One 
 
3.1. Sample 
A total of 439 participants took part in the testing programme, 274 were male (62.4%), 
162 were female (36.9%), with three participants not answering the question. Four 
hundred thirty five participants (99.1% of the sample) provided their age at the time of 
the testing session. Participants’ ages ranged from 20 to 54 years, with a mean age of 
28.9 years, and a standard deviation of 7.8 years. Forty-two participants were left 
handed (9.6%), 381 were right handed (86.8%), 13 were ambidextrous (3%), with three 
participants (0.7%) of the sample not answering the question. Most participants had 
flown previously on a commercial flight (425 participants, or 96.8%), and one 
participant reported having made a previous emergency evacuation. 
 
3.2. Completed evacuations 
All planned evacuations were successfully completed, with no reported injuries. A 
number of participants failed to attend the session, resulting in fewer than 20 
participants in some evacuations.  
 
3.3. Descriptive results 
 
Table 3 details the summary descriptive data for each group during each trial. Data are 
provided on the experimental condition, the number of participants within the group, the 
evacuation latency period, the overall evacuation time and the calculated evacuation 
rate. All mean times and mean participant ratings have been rounded up to one decimal 
place.
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Table 3: Summary evacuation data for each group 
Group Cabin Configuration Vertical 
Projection 
Number of 
participants 
Evacuation 
latency (seconds)1 
Overall 
evacuation time 
(seconds)2 
Evacuation rate 
(pax per minute)3 
Gp1 Large 13” 19 10.2 29.3 56.5 
Gp 2 Large 13” 16 11.8 31.2 46.4 
Gp 3 Large 13” 18 7.2 26.3 53.4 
Gp 4 Large 10” 18 8.2 28.5 50.2 
Gp 5 Large 10” 18 13.7 37.5 42.9 
Gp 6 Large 10” 20 9.4 30.6 53.8 
Gp 7 Small 13” 17 10.6 28.7 53.0 
Gp 8 Small 13” 20 10.0 27.4 65.5 
Gp 9 Small 13” 17 9.8 29.3 49.2 
Gp 10 Small 13” 15 8.8 23.5 57.1 
Gp 11 Small 13” 15 10.4 26.8 51.2 
                                                 
1
 The latency time was taken from the call to evacuate to the second foot of the first participant was placed on the simulator wing.  
2
 The overall evacuation time was taken from the call to evacuate to the second foot of the last participant was placed on the simulator wing.  
3
 Calculated using the formula n-1/t, where n is the number of participants and t is the time between the second foot of the first participant was placed on the simulator 
wing and the second foot of the last participant placed on the simulator wing. 
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Group Cabin Configuration Vertical 
Projection 
Number of 
participants 
Evacuation latency 
(seconds) 
Overall evacuation 
time (seconds) 
Evacuation rate 
(pax per minute) 
Gp 12 Small 13” 15 8.9 24.0 55.6 
Gp 13 Small 10” 20 7.9 32.8 45.8 
Gp 14 Small 10” 17 7.0 28.8 44.0 
Gp 15 Small 10” 20 9.6 31.7 51.6 
Gp 16 Small 10” 19 10.9 32.2 50.7 
Gp 17 Small 10” 20 9.2 28.6 58.8 
Gp 18 Small 10” 20 12.2 34.9 50.2 
Gp 19 Large 10” 18 11.9 32.2 50.2 
Gp 20 Large 10” 19 14.3 33.4 56.5 
Gp 21 Large 10” 19 8.8 27.6 57.4 
Gp 22 Large 13” 19 13.1 36.5 46.2 
Gp 23 Large 13” 18 10.8 31.1 50.2 
Gp 24 Large 13” 20 7.8 30.7 49.8 
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3.4. Participant evacuation rates 
Mean evacuation rates for the participants to evacuate through the Type III exit in each 
condition are given in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Mean evacuation rates (passengers per minute) for participants to egress 
through the Type III exit in each condition. 
 Interior configuration Total 
Passageway width Large Small  
10” vertical projection 51.8 (sd 5.3) 50.2 (sd 5.2) 51.0 (sd 5.1) 
13” vertical projection 50.4 (sd 4.0) 55.3 (sd 5.8) 52.8 (sd 5.4) 
Total 51.1 (sd 4.6) 52.7 (sd 5.7)  
 
As can be seen in Table 4, there is some variation in the evacuation rates due to the test 
condition. A factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the data which 
revealed no statistically significant differences attributable to the interior configuration 
F(1,20) = 0.59, p=0.43 or vertical projection F(1,20) = 0.77, p=0.39 on evacuation rates. 
There was also no significant interaction between the interior configuration and vertical 
projection on evacuation rates F(1,20) = 2.43, p=0.14. 
 
3.5. Perceived difficulty of the evacuation 
In order to investigate passengers’ perceived difficulty of the evacuation procedure, data 
obtained from a selection of questions on the post-evacuation questionnaires were also 
analysed. One question on the post evacuation questionnaires related to the difficulty of 
moving down the aisle to reach the exit row. The mean ratings provided in response to 
this question are given in Table 5.  
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Table 5: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for moving down the aisle to reach the exit row in each condition.  
 Interior configuration Total 
Passageway width Large Small  
10” vertical projection 2.7 (sd 1.5) 2.6 (sd 1.3) 2.7 (sd 1.4) 
13” vertical projection 2.4 (sd 1.3) 2.3 (sd 1.3) 2.3 (sd 1.3) 
Total 2.6 (sd 1.4) 2.5 (sd 1.3)  
 
Data were entered into a factorial ANOVA. The results which revealed a significant 
effect for vertical projection F(1,415) = 7.34, p=0.01. Participants evacuating in the 10” 
vertically projected passageway conditions reported that it was significantly more 
difficult to move down the aisle to reach the exit row, compared to those evacuating in 
the 13” vertically projected passageway as is evidenced by their higher difficulty scores 
in Table 5. There was no statistically significant difference attributable to the interior 
configuration F(1,415) = 0.50, p=0.49 or any significant interaction between the interior 
configuration and vertical projection F(1,415) = 0.00, p=0.97. 
 
Participants were asked on the post-evacuation questionnaire the difficulty of moving 
between the seats at the exit row. The mean ratings provided in response to this question 
are given in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for moving between the seats at the exit row in each condition.   
 Interior configuration Total 
Passageway width Large Small  
10” vertical projection 3.6 (sd 1.7) 3.0 (sd 1.4) 3.3 (sd 1.6) 
13” vertical projection 2.6 (sd 1.5) 2.5 (sd 1.4) 2.6 (sd 1.4) 
Total 3.1 (sd 1.7) 2.8 (sd 1.4)  
 
The data were entered into a factorial ANOVA which revealed a significant effect for 
the interior configuration, F(1,427) =5.89, p=0.02, and a significant effect for vertical 
projection, F(1,427) = 23.09, p=0.00. Participants evacuating in the large interior 
configuration reported that it was significantly more difficult to move between seats in 
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the exit row than those who evacuated in the small interior configuration. In relation to 
vertical projection, participants evacuating in the 10” passageway condition reported 
that it was significantly more difficult to move between seats in the exit row than in the 
13” passageway condition. There was no statistically significant interaction between the 
interior configuration and vertical projection F(1,427) =3.46, p=0.63. 
 
The post-evacuation questionnaire asked participants to rate the difficulty of moving 
through the exit and out of the aircraft. The mean ratings provided in response to this 
question are given in Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for moving through the exit and out of the aircraft in each condition.   
 Interior configuration Total 
Passageway width Large Small  
10” vertical projection 3.6 (sd 1.6) 3.0 (sd 1.4) 3.3 (sd 1.5) 
13” vertical projection 3.1 (sd 1.4) 3.1 (sd 1.5) 3.1 (sd 1.4) 
Total 3.3 (sd 1.5) 3.0 (sd 1.5)  
 
The data were entered into a factorial ANOVA which revealed a significant effect for 
the interior configuration F(1,429) = 4.01, p=0.46 and a statistically significant 
interaction between the two variables F(1,429) = 4.49, p=0.04. Participants evacuating 
in the large interior configuration reported that it was significantly more difficult to 
move through the exit and out of the aircraft than in the small interior configuration as 
evidenced by their higher difficulty scores. A significant interaction was also reported 
with participants perceiving it as easier to evacuate with the 10” passageway when the 
interior configuration was smaller than when the interior configuration was larger. 
Figure 2 shows the significant interaction between the interior configuration and vertical 
projection on mean difficulty ratings of moving between the seats in the exit row.  
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Figure 2: The interaction between interior configuration and vertical projection on 
the perceived difficulty rating for moving between the seats in the exit row. 
 
As Figure 2 suggests where the passageway to the exit is narrow, the shorter it is, the 
easier participants perceive the evacuation to be. There was no statistically significant 
difference in perceived difficulty of moving through the exit and out of the aircraft due 
to vertical projection at the Type III exit, F(1,429) = 3.01, p=0.08.  
 
3.6. Headroom in the cabin 
In addition to the rating scales, participants were asked about any factors that had 
hindered their evacuation. Of particular interest to the current experiment was the 
number of comments related to the headroom in the cabin. Only four comments in the 
large interior configuration related to this:  
“The overhead cabin being too low over the exit” (Participant 312, large interior 
configuration with 13” passageway) 
 
“The overheads were quite low and I had to watch my head as I went over the seat” 
(Participant 2218, large interior configuration, with 13” passageway) 
 
“I knocked my head on the overhead compartment as in the panic I forgot it was there” 
(Participant 615, large interior configuration with 10” passageway) 
 
“Hit head of the overhead bag store” (Participant 619, large interior configuration, 
with 10” passageway) 
 
However, in the small interior configuration, there were many more participant 
comments about the overhead lockers and the limited headroom hindering their 
evacuation. A selection is provided here: 
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“The ceiling was too low over the passenger seats” (Participant 710, small interior 
configuration with 13” passageway) 
 
“Height of the ceiling under the storage bins” (Participant 1006, small interior 
configuration with 13” passageway) 
 
“Overhead bins were very low and I had to duck quite a lot” (Participant 1015, small 
interior configuration with 13” passageway) 
 
“The height above my seat - headroom was very small even though I am short, and so I 
could not jump up and move as quickly as I would have liked - now was there room to 
climb over the seat” (Participant 1502, small interior configuration with 10” 
passageway) 
 
“Guy at the door was too tall to stand and this made door removal difficult” 
(Participant 1707, small interior configuration with 10” passageway) 
 
“The luggage cabinets were too low!” (Participant 1720, small interior configuration 
with 10” passageway). 
 
Although not reflected in the rate at which participants evacuated the cabin, the 
qualitative responses suggest that participants perceived the restrictive headroom in the 
cabin to hinder them during their evacuation.  
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4.0. Discussion – Experiment One 
 
4.1. Interior configuration and vertical projection on evacuation rates 
The results of the experimental trials indicated no effect for interior configuration or 
vertical projection on evacuation rates through the Type III exit. Although in these trials 
the interior configuration and vertical projection at the exit seating row did not influence 
the overall evacuation rate, this may be due to the limited number of passengers on 
board, as any blockages could be quickly resolved. In addition, participants were not 
competing to egress through the exit as there was no perceived threat to survival as is 
possible during a real evacuation or an incentive payment for being one of the first 
participants to evacuate. As there are no other studies that have specifically investigated 
the influence of the interior configuration it is difficult to place these results into the 
wider context.  
 
It is noted that only vertical projections of 10” and 13” at the Type III exit row were 
tested within the current experiment and it is acknowledged that there is not a great 
degree of difference between these widths which may help explain the lack of 
significant differences in evacuation rates. However these vertical projections were 
selected by the sponsor to provide some empirical testing of the proposed regulations 
for passageway access to Type III exits (as recommended by the CSHWG) in a smaller 
transport aircraft interior configuration. It may be that differences in the effectiveness of 
egress through different passageway widths could be established with an investigation 
into other vertical projections. Although there were no differences in evacuations rates 
between 10” and 13”, this does not mean that either of these configurations are the most 
appropriate to include on small or large single aisle aircraft. Overall the previous 
research has suggested that a wider passageway width resulted in the fastest evacuation 
rates. However more recently McLean et al (2002) concluded that the effects of the 
passageway configuration upon evacuation are minimal, but that the 10” passageway 
did impede egress due to the restriction it placed on evacuation. Further work should 
explore evacuation in a smaller transport aircraft (and large single aisle) with other 
distances between the exit row seats in an attempt to determine the optimum 
passageway configuration. 
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4.2. Perceived difficulties during the evacuation 
Although there were no significant differences in evacuation rates attributable to the 
independent variables, some differences were reported by participants on the post 
evacuation questionnaire. A significant difference was perceived by participants in 
moving down the aisle to reach the exit and in moving between the seats in the exit row. 
Participants perceived it to be more difficult when the vertical projection in the exit row 
was configured at 10” compared to when it was at 13”. This suggests that the restrictive 
space of the 10” vertically projected passageway was perceived by participants as 
causing them difficulties as they moved through the exit passageway With regards to 
moving along the aisle, as the passageway width was narrower in the 10” condition, it 
may be that participants were held up in the aisle waiting to move towards the exit and 
perceived this as causing them difficulty.  
 
A significant difference was perceived in moving between the seats in the exit row and 
moving through the exit and out of the aircraft which was attributable to the interior 
configuration. Participants perceived it to be more difficult in the large aircraft interior 
configuration compared to the interior configuration of the small transport aircraft. As 
the larger interior configuration included three seats either side of the main aisle as 
opposed to the smaller interior configuration where there were only two seats, it may be 
moving between the seats was more difficult in the large configuration due to the 
additional length of the passageway. It is unknown why participants perceived moving 
through the exit as more difficult in the large interior configuration, as there was more 
headroom in the larger interior configuration and the exit aperture itself was unchanged 
across the experimental conditions. It may be that as there was more headroom in the 
large aircraft interior configuration, participants had a greater distance to stoop to egress 
through the exit aperture. Participants in the small interior configuration would have 
already been stooped for some of the distance required due to the presence of the 
overhead lockers which impeded their mobility immediately upon entering the exit row 
from the main aisle. As highlighted in Section 2.1.1 consideration was given to 
ecological validity. As the headroom and the number of seats were only tested in 
combination and not in isolation it is not known if this perceived difficulty was due to 
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the number of seats either side of the aisle or the lowered height of the overhead 
lockers.  
 
Finally, when participants were asked to rate the perceived difficulty of moving through 
the exit and out of the aircraft, there was a significant interaction. The results suggest 
that when moving through a narrow passageway (i.e. 10” vertically projected) to use the 
exit and leave the aircraft, it was perceived as more difficult when the seats were three 
abreast of the main aisle and there was more headroom than when they were two abreast 
of the main aisle, with limited headroom. This suggests that when the passageway to the 
Type III exit is narrow, the shorter it is, the easier it is perceived to be.  
 
4.3. Interior configuration 
As discussed in the previous chapter the headroom available in the cabin was reported 
by participants as influencing evacuation efficiency. Interestingly, the quantitative 
rating scales suggested that the large interior configuration was perceived as hindering 
participants moving between the seats in the exit row and out of the exit, whereas in the 
qualitative comments there were numerous comments about the restrictive headroom in 
the smaller interior configuration. In the small aircraft interior configuration, when 
participants were asked about any factors in the cabin that had hindered them a number 
of comments were made regarding the low headroom. These included participants 
banging their heads on the overhead lockers, having to stoop in the exit row and being 
unable to climb over seats due to the overhead lockers. It is noted that only four 
comments related to the headroom at the Type III exit from participants in the large 
aircraft interior configuration where there was more headroom available, whereas there 
were numerous comments relating to the headroom at the exit from participants 
evacuating in the small aircraft interior configuration. Although it may be the combined 
influence of the headroom available and the number of seats either side of the main 
aisle, the qualitative comments have highlighted that participants perceived it to be 
more difficult to evacuate when the headroom is more restrictive.  
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4.4. Summary of Experiment One 
The objectives of the experiment were to investigate the effects of interior configuration 
and vertical projection at the exit row on evacuation rates through the Type III exit in 
both a small transport aircraft interior configuration and large single aisle interior 
configuration. In this experiment, neither of the variables were found to influence 
evacuation rates, however the more restrictive condition of 10” vertically projected at 
the exit row was found to influence the perceived ease of the evacuation. With regards 
to the interior configuration the quantitative rating scales showed that participants 
perceived moving between the seats in the exit row and out of the aircraft as more 
difficult in the larger interior configuration. It is suggested that this may be due to the 
longer seat assembly and that participants would have to stoop further to exit through 
the aperture in the larger interior configuration. In contrast the height of the overhead 
lockers in the small interior configuration was consistently reported in the qualitative 
comments as a hindrance to the evacuation.  It is recommended that further research 
should investigate the interior changes of headroom and seating configuration in 
isolation (i.e. evacuations with either three seats or two seats either side of the main 
aisle and lowered overhead lockers and three seats or two seats with higher overhead 
lockers) to assist in identifying if either variable is more influential during the 
evacuation. It is acknowledged that any effects found in the experiment attributable to 
the interior configuration, the findings cannot be attributed to either the headroom or the 
number of seats abreast alone, but to the combined differences of a typical interior 
configuration of a smaller transport aircraft when compared to a typical large single 
aisle interior configuration. This must be borne in mind when conclusions are drawn.  
  
The next stage of the research programme was designed to investigate the operation of 
the Type III exit in a smaller transport aircraft. Although experimental research has 
explored Type III exit operation in a large single aisle aircraft, there were limited data 
on exit operation in smaller transport aircraft. In addition, a high number of qualitative 
comments were made by passengers in Experiment One which referred to the 
difficulties experienced in evacuating due to the restrictive headroom associated with 
the smaller cabin interior configuration. It was also not known if the smaller interior 
would influence operation of the Type III exit. As a result of these factors it was 
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decided to look at one specific aspect of evacuation from smaller transport aircraft – the 
operation of the Type III exit. 
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5.0. Introduction – Type III exit operation 
 
5.1. Introduction to Experiment Two 
Problems have been reported both during evacuation trials and experimental research 
concerning the operation of the Type III exit, the manoeuvrability of exit hatch and 
disposal of the Type III hatch. From these findings, it is proposed that there are two 
main ways to enhance the performance of the task, which involve either adapting the 
operator to the task or adapting the task to the operator (Grandjean, 1988).  In response 
to the reported difficulties with Type III exit operation, one area of current regulatory 
activity is the Type III exit.  
 
As a result of the difficulties experienced during evacuations through Type III exits, an 
alternative automatic Type III hatch design has been certificated on some next 
generation aircraft. Current regulatory activity is focussed on ensuring appropriate 
access to the Type III exit. The installation of a ‘non-disposable Type III exit design’ 
ensures that the placement of the hatch does not influence access to the exit (FAA, 
2002, p. 6). The current regulatory view is to regulate the installation of an 
automatically disposed Type III exit hatch on ‘new type certified aircraft’ with at least 
41 passenger seats to ensure the access to the exit is not impeded (FAA, 2002, p. 6). 
With an automatically disposed hatch (ADH) Type III exit mechanism, when released 
the hatch is automatically disposed of, as opposed to the exit operator having to dispose 
of the hatch. As the exit hatch remains attached to the fuselage it is disposed of into a 
location where it does not create a potential obstruction to egress both in the 
passageway to the exit and along the main aisle. 
 
The Cabin Safety Harmonization Working Group who made the above 
recommendations further explain that current thinking regarding the scope of the 
regulations is due; ‘primarily on the estimate that smaller aircraft would involve a large 
design and cost penalty for incorporating such a feature’ (FAA, 2002, p. 6). That said, 
the working group ‘recognized that smaller aircraft could benefit significantly and more 
work would be required to make a final decision’ (FAA, 2002, p. 6). 
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As current regulatory activity is leaning towards legislation of the installation of non-
disposable Type III exits on new type certificated aircraft, it was felt that consideration 
should be given to modifications that could potentially be made to the current flying 
fleet of Type III exits, including smaller transport aircraft (i.e. seating configurations 
with two seats either side of the main aisle).  
 
5.2. The operation of the Type III exit 
The operation of the Type III exit is unlike the operating procedure for other commonly 
used exits in other environments and even differs from the operation of other exits on 
board the aircraft. To operate the Type III exit, firstly the passenger is required to assess 
the external conditions to ensure that there are no immediate dangers outside the exit 
such as fire or debris.  
 
As discussed in Section 1.7.1, once released by the passenger the traditional Type III 
plug hatch is not attached to the fuselage and will fall into the cabin. The large and 
heavy hatch plug then has to be manoeuvred and rotated inside the cabin in the space 
adjacent to the exit and disposed of into a location whereby it does not impede egress. 
The location of the disposed hatch firstly must not impede egress for the exit operator 
and then for the other passengers who opt to use the exit. Within the UK the most 
appropriate location for the disposed hatch is deemed to be outside the aircraft, whereas 
other regulators allow the operator to determine if the hatch should be placed inside or 
outside the cabin.  
 
The idea of releasing the hatch from the fuselage, bringing it inside the cabin and then 
manoeuvring it in a limited amount of space to allow it to be ejected outside the cabin or 
placed inside the cabin is unlikely to be intuitive to the passenger. As highlighted in 
Section 1.7.2 the majority of passengers who will be seated next to a Type III exit will 
not have experienced opening an exit such as this before and are likely to have only 
been given minimal verbal and graphical instruction on the process of exit operation. 
However, in the event of an evacuation, if it is determined it is safe to do so the 
untrained passenger will be required to make the exit available for egress in a rapid 
manner in what may be a disorientating and highly stressful environment. Although 
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passengers may receive instruction from a member of cabin crew of the need to open 
this exit, due to the likely location of the trained members of crew, passengers may need 
to make an evaluation of the unfolding situation and react appropriately.  
 
The importance of passengers being able to operate the Type III exit efficiently was 
highlighted during the evacuation of a Boeing 737 in 1984 at Calgary airport in Canada. 
Four exits were used during the evacuations, including one overwing exit that was 
operated by a passenger and used by approximately 40 passengers. The accident report 
concludes that ‘it is also possible to assume that other, less familiar passengers would 
not have opened the overwing exit without supervision or command of a flight 
attendant’ (CASB, 1987, p. 25). It was concluded by the accident investigators that the 
availability of the Type III exit was crucial during the evacuation, as without this exit 
the time taken for all passengers to evacuate is likely to have increased, which may have 
had a dramatic effect on survivability, as the last passengers left the aircraft ‘at about the 
last possible moment’ (CASB, 1987, p. 28).  
 
In summary, the Type III exit has been shown to be an important egress path during 
some evacuations. However, the operation of the Type III exit places both physical and 
comprehension demands on the individual. These demands are likely to be present for 
many exit operators but especially those operators whose physical and behavioural 
responses may have been impaired or influenced by the situation and/or environment 
that is unfolding. The operation of the Type III exit has the potential to be physically 
demanding due to the size and weight of the hatch and the available space in which to 
complete the task. The task may also require a degree of understanding as a result of the 
non-intuitive nature of exit operation and the decision making process both when 
opening the exit and then determining where to dispose of the hatch. Due to the 
demanding aspects of the task, aviation authorities have introduced regulations defining 
the seating policy for passengers in both floor and non-floor exit row seats. 
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5.3. Regulations relating to the Type III exit 
5.3.1. Exit seating allocation 
As mentioned in Section 1.7.2, regulations have been introduced by many authorities 
that limit some passengers from occupying seats in the exit rows. The rationale behind 
this is that during an evacuation these passengers may be required to assist the cabin 
crew or in the case of a Type III exit row, operate the exit. Restrictions on passenger 
seating includes incapacitated passengers, passengers with an impairment that may 
effect their ability to open the exit, minors under 15 years of age, individuals who would 
not be able to complete the tasks without the supervision of another person, individuals 
in custody or family groups with young children (FAR 121.585 (CFR); JAR-OPS 1.280 
(JAA)). Other regulators are less specific with their seating allocation regulations. For 
example stating that seats in exit rows may not be allocated to passengers ‘whose 
presence in those seats could adversely affect the safety of passengers or crew members 
during an emergency evacuation’ (CAR 705.40 (1)(d) Transport Canada). 
 
The FAA regulations provide further detail on the restricted passengers stating that the 
individual must not have a cognitive, visual, aural or communication impairment which 
would prevent them from reading and understanding the instructions, hearing or 
interpreting instructions, operating the exit, or communicating with other passengers. In 
addition individuals must not be allocated an exit row seat if they have limited physical 
movement or strength in any of their limbs. The FAA stipulates that the individual must 
also be able to reach in all directions, to lift, push, pull and manoeuvre the exit, to move 
quickly to the exit and ‘maneuver over the seatbacks to the next row objects the size and 
weight of over-wing window exit doors; to remove obstructions similar in size and 
weight to over-wing exit doors’ (FAR 121.585 (b)(iv) CFR).  
 
To ensure a suitable individual is placed in the exit row seats, operators are required to 
‘screen’ passengers to establish if they fulfil the regulatory criteria. These checks are 
usually made visually and through conversation with the passenger both at check-in and 
the boarding of the aircraft. Prior to boarding the cabin crew will also check with the 
passenger to ensure they themselves feel they can meet the criteria. If airline staff or the 
passenger feels that they do not meet the criteria, the passenger must be relocated and a 
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suitable individual placed in the vacant seat (FAR 121.585 (CFR); JAR-OPS 1.280 
(JAA); CAR 705.40 (Transport Canada)). 
 
The decision to allow a passenger to sit in the exit row is made only by a visual 
observation or brief interaction with the passenger by airline employees. Even though 
there are regulatory restrictions on the passengers that can be placed in seats adjacent to 
the exit, there are still no assurances that these exits will be operated efficiently and 
effectively. The restrictions do not ensure that the hatch operator understands or 
engages with the task they may be required to do (NTSB, 2000) or is physically able to 
complete the tasks that may be required of them. The individual’s ability to complete 
the tasks is not tested until the point at which an evacuation is required. 
 
The consequences in relation to occupant survivability of a delay in the opening of a 
passenger operated exit were highlighted during the evacuation at Los Angeles in 1991 
following a collision with another aircraft on the runway. Four of the six exits on the 
Boeing 737 were opened, including both overwing exits. The location of the fire meant 
that only two passengers were able to egress through the left hand overwing exit before 
the exit became unavailable, with approximately 37 passengers leaving via the right 
overwing exit (NTSB, 1991). The evacuation through the overwing exit was hindered 
by the passenger seated next to the exit who reportedly “froze” prior to opening the exit, 
this suggests that the passenger displayed some form of behavioural inaction. A male 
passenger seated in the seat row behind the exit climbed over the seats, opened the exit 
and assisted the passenger through the aperture. The evacuation through this exit was 
also hindered by two passengers who were involved in an argument at the exit which 
delayed the evacuation (NTSB, 1991). The NTSB felt that these two factors 
‘significantly hampered the evacuation to the extent that additional passengers who may 
have been able to escape did not’ (NTSB, 1991, p. 65). The post accident investigation 
of the cabin located the bodies of a member of cabin crew and ten passengers who were 
in the aisle approximately five feet from the overwing exits, concluding that it is likely 
that they were overcome by the toxic smoke and fumes whilst queuing for the exit 
(NTSB, 1991).  
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5.3.2. Briefing of passengers seated adjacent to Type III exits 
In addition to the restriction on exit row seating, regulators require operators to inform 
passengers sat adjacent to passenger operated exits of the task requirements both 
through a verbal briefing and in written form on the safety card and seatback placard.  
 
5.3.2.1. Pre-flight briefings 
Aviation authorities regulate that during the pre-flight briefing the cabin crew must 
draw passengers’ attention to safety related procedures and on board equipment, this 
includes the emergency exits (FAR 121.571 (CFR); JAR-OPS 1.285 (JAA); CAR 
705.43 (Transport Canada)). The crew should inform passengers of the location and 
operation of emergency exits and any additional relevant information about the use of 
such exits. Passengers seated in exit rows should also be provided with an individual 
briefing on their responsibilities for exit operation, however not all regulators are 
specific about the information that should be included in this individual briefing. An 
example of this can be found in the Canadian Aviation Regulations which state that 
during the pre-flight briefing operators are required to ‘ensure that each passenger who 
is seated next to a window emergency exit is informed by a crew member that the 
window is an emergency exit and is made aware of how to operate that exit’ (Transport 
Canada, CAR 705.43 (5)). As noted in the above quote, there is no suggestion of the 
specific information concerning exit operation that should be included.  
 
5.3.2.2. Safety card and seatback placard 
In addition to the pre-flight briefing, regulators require aircraft operators to provide 
passengers with a safety card that displays graphically the location and operation of all 
types of exits on board the aircraft, including the steps that would be required to open a 
passenger operated exit. This information is also required to be present on seatback 
placards in the exit row (FAR 121.571 (CFR); JAR-OPS 1.285 (JAA); CAR, 725.44 
(Transport Canada)).  
 
The UK CAA further state that the diagrams on the safety card and seatback placard 
should show the operation of the exit, including the movement of the handles, egress 
paths from the exits and if a traditional Type III exit is in situ, to clearly show that the 
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hatch has to be removed by the passenger from the fuselage and the location the 
passenger should place the hatch after removal (CAA, 2006). The FAA regulations on 
exit row seating also provide further detail of the information that should be provided to 
passengers allocated to exit row seats. The FAA state that the safety card should inform 
passengers that they may be required to complete the following tasks:  
‘locate the emergency exit; recognize the emergency exit opening mechanism; 
comprehend the instructions for operating the emergency exit; operate the 
emergency exit; assess whether opening the emergency exit will increase the 
hazards to which passengers may be exposed; follow oral directions and hand 
signals given by a crewmember; stow or secure the emergency exit door so that 
it will not impede use of the exit; assess the condition of an escape slide, activate 
the slide, and stabilize the slide after deployment to assist others in getting off 
the slide; pass expeditiously through the emergency exit; and assess, select, and 
follow a safe path away from the emergency exit’ (FAR 121.585 (CFR)). 
 
Although this is detailed in some areas, the level of depth of information required on the 
actual operation of the exit is not specified.  
 
5.3.2.3. Emergency briefings 
The CAA (2006) states that in the event of a premeditated emergency the passengers 
seated at the Type III exits should be provided with a verbal briefing and informed of 
the location of the pictorial diagrams regarding exit operation on the safety card and 
seatback placard. Guidance information is also provided on the elements of the verbal 
briefing which should include the:  
‘location of the exit; instructions as to when, or if, the exit should be opened; 
instructions for operation of the exits; description of the exit as a removable 
hatch or a hinged exit; guidance as to the weight of the exit hatch and the 
necessity for it to be removed from a seated or standing position; instructions 
for disposal of the exit hatch; necessity to follow any further commands given by 
the cabin crew and; verification that passengers have understood the briefing’ 
(CAA, 2006, Chapter 33, p. 1).  
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The guidance material refers to the verbal briefing procedures in advance of a planned 
emergency and not during the standard pre-flight briefing, even though many 
evacuations are as a result of unplanned emergencies. During the evacuation review 
conducted by the NTSB in 2000, unplanned evacuations were reported as occurring 
more often than planned evacuation and were more likely to occur following a problem 
on take off or landing. The majority of evacuations within the NTSB review were 
unplanned (31 events), with 14 planned and the prior knowledge of the passengers and 
crew was unknown in one case. This highlights the importance of informing passengers 
about the specific tasks, in particular exit operation, they would be required to complete 
in the event of an evacuation during or shortly after take off. In addition, as the 
information provided in the Civil Aviation Publication is defined as ‘of long-term 
interest and essential or useful guidance material’ (CAA, 2006, p. 1), it is not mandatory 
for operators to include the information.  
 
In summary, although the regulations require operators to provide information on exit 
operation both graphically in the form of a safety card and seatback placard and verbally 
to the passengers seated adjacent to the exit, the specific level of detail on exit operation 
is not regulated. 
 
5.4. Difficulties with Type III exit operation 
Accident investigators and cabin safety commentators have reported numerous 
occasions where passengers have experienced difficulties with the operation of the 
traditional Type III exit mechanism. These difficulties have impeded passenger access 
to the exits and led to delays in making the exits available and the subsequent 
evacuation. In some cases these difficulties and delays have had serious and fatal 
consequences for passenger survivability such as the evacuations at Manchester in 1985 
(discussed in Section 1.8.3) and at Los Angles in 1991 (as highlighted in Section 1.8.2).  
 
Prior to discussing difficulties experienced by exit operators, it is of interest to highlight 
some of the difficulties reported with other safety critical tasks. Fennell and Muir 
(1992), during a study to investigate the influence of different types of safety briefings 
on participants’ ability to complete safety related tasks, observed participants 
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experiencing a range of difficulties when asked to don a lifejacket. These observations 
led Fennell and Muir to argue that ‘novel items of safety equipment which are intended 
to be used by passengers should be designed to ensure that the correct method of 
operation is obvious’ (1992, p. 39). Although Fennell and Muir were not referring 
directly to exit operation, it is argued that this item of safety equipment is also novel and 
therefore needs to be designed in such a way that it is intuitive and simple to operate. 
 
Difficulties with the operation of the Type III exit have been widely documented. Exit 
operator difficulties can be broadly divided into those linked to the physical operation of 
the exit and those difficulties relating to understanding the task requirements and are 
discussed in the following sub-sections.  
 
5.4.1. Physical difficulties 
Physical difficulties with operating the Type III exit may be a result of the physical 
parameters (i.e. size and weight) of the hatch, the available space in the exit row (i.e. the 
space available between the seats and the headroom) and the need to fully remove the 
hatch from the fuselage and dispose of it in a safe location. 
 
5.4.1.1. Physical difficulties with exit operation from accidents 
Passengers’ ability to operate Type III exits was discussed by the NTSB in 2000 during 
a review of emergency evacuations within their jurisdiction. Thirteen of the 46 events 
involved the use of the Type III exits, with a total of 36 Type III exits operated. During 
the safety study the NTSB were able to access detailed evacuation information on six 
cases involving Type III exits. Fortunately in two cases, one involving an Airbus 320 in 
Ohio, and another from a Boeing 737 at Nebraska the cabin crew operated the overwing 
exits and reported no difficulties in exit operation. During a third case on board a 
Boeing at Illinois in the United States, it was reported by two passengers involved in 
Type III exit operation that they had not experienced any difficulties. However, in the 
other three evacuations where detailed information was available to the NTSB, 
problems with the Type III exit were reported (NTSB, 2000).  
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During an evacuation of a Boeing 737 at Atlanta, reports suggested that a female 
passenger had not been able to successfully operate the hatch, which resulted in another 
passenger having to complete the task (NTSB, 2000). An exit operator also reported 
difficulties when operating the overwing exit on a Boeing during an evacuation at 
Chicago in the United States. It was reported that physical difficulties were experienced 
with manoeuvring the exit and disposing of the hatch outside the cabin (NTSB, 2000).  
 
Physical difficulties with exit operation were also reported by two passengers who were 
sat next to the overwing exits on the MD-82 aircraft that was involved in an accident at 
Little Rock, Arkansas. The passengers reported that they tried to open the exit hatch but 
were unsuccessful, although these hatches were subsequently operated successfully by 
other passengers.  
 
These examples have highlighted some of the physical difficulties experienced by 
passengers when attempting to operate the Type III exit. In addition, passenger 
difficulties with the comprehension aspects of exit operation have also been reported 
during incidents and accidents and are discussed in the following section. 
 
5.4.2. Comprehension difficulties 
Comprehension difficulties have included passengers not realising that they are 
responsible for exit operation, deciding when to open the exit, understanding how to 
actually operate the exit, and finally, knowing where to dispose of the hatch following 
operation. 
 
5.4.2.1. Comprehension difficulties with exit operation from accidents 
During a review of evacuations from large passenger aircraft registered in Canada, the 
Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) reviewed a total of 21 evacuations; eight 
of which were as a result of fire (TSB, 1995). The 21 evacuations included 2,305 
passengers and 39 crew and resulted in 91 occupant fatalities and 78 serious injuries. Of 
the 91 fatalities, 36 were linked by the TSB to the evacuation (TSB, 1995). 
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Of interest to the current study are the comments made by the TSB relating to the 
operation of the Type III exit. In two of the evacuations, difficulties were reported with 
the operation of this type of exit due to a lack of understanding of the task requirements. 
It seems that in these cases the passenger seated next to the exit was unaware of their 
responsibility for the operation of the exit and had a lack of comprehension of the exit 
operating instructions.  
 
During one evacuation at Regina, Saskatchewan, the TSB were told by another 
passenger that the ‘exit operator’ did not open the overwing exit when they were 
instructed to do so by other passengers and a second passenger who then went to open 
the exit asked another passenger ‘how do you open it?’ (TSB, 1995, p. 14). It was 
reported by the observer that after opening the exit, the passenger left the hatch in the 
exit aperture and did not initially move through the exit.  
 
A second example of a lack of understanding about the exit operation task was reported 
at the evacuation at Kelowna in British Columbia. It was reported by the TSB that the 
passenger seated next to the left overwing exit did not try to operate the exit, either 
before or after instructed to do so by a member of cabin crew. The passenger next to the 
exit operator moved to release the hatch, but could not dispose of the hatch outside the 
cabin due to the limited space as a result of the passenger sat in the seat next to the exit. 
The hatch was left inside the cabin on the seat row assembly but moved onto the floor, 
‘creating an obstruction to egress’ (TSB, 1995, p. 14). Fortunately in this incident a 
member of cabin crew was able to move to the central exit, remove the hatch and 
manage the evacuation through the exit (TSB, 1995). In conclusion the TSB felt that 
although they could not explicitly state that passengers who were seated adjacent to 
these exit were not capable of completing the task, these examples have highlighted that 
not all passengers operate exits in an efficient and timely manner which can ‘result in 
delays in evacuations’ (TSB, 1995, p. 14). 
 
A lack of understanding about the exit operation process was also reported by the NTSB 
(2000). The NTSB as part of a safety study of large aircraft gathered information via 
self-completion questionnaires from passengers who were seated in the exit rows during 
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six evacuations within the United States. Some passengers reported that in the first 
instance they experienced difficulties when making a decision as to whether the 
overwing exit should be opened or not (NTSB, 2000). In one case the auxiliary power 
unit (APU) torched and although the crew informed passengers to remain seated, the 
overwing exit was opened by a passenger. In a second evacuation, the crew ordered an 
evacuation through only the forward exits, however the Type III exit was still operated 
by passengers trying to evacuate (NTSB, 2000). These problems in decision making 
may be due to inattention of the safety briefing and may be resolved by providing a 
personal briefing to exit operators (NTSB, 2000). 
 
In addition to the physical difficulties experienced by some passengers during the 
accident at Little Rock in 1999, another passenger reported that they tried to open a 
third Type III exit ‘by pushing the hatch out of the airplane after pulling the release 
handle’ however this was ineffective (NTSB, 2000, p. 39). The design of the exit 
mechanism on board the MD-82 was a traditional Type III design which required the 
hatch to be taken into the cabin before being manoeuvred and disposed of into a safe 
location. This account suggests that the passenger did not fully understand the operation 
of the exit. 
 
Although difficulties in exit operation were reported by occupants in the evacuations 
studied by the NTSB, the exits in all cases were eventually operated as required (NTSB, 
2000). In three of the four cases where there were problems with exit operation which 
led to evacuation delays, the NTSB did believe that ‘while these delays did not appear 
to result directly in any additional injuries, there exists the potential that future 
difficulties could result in injuries’ (NTSB, 2000, p. 39). A delay in making the Type III 
exit available occurred at Manchester in 1985, with the investigating authority 
concluding that a delay in operating the Type III exits resulted in injuries and fatalities 
to the occupants (AAIB, 1988).  
 
The importance of providing clear comprehensible exit operating instruction and 
ensuring that passengers understand the task requirements was highlighted in an 
accident involving a smaller transport aircraft in 1982. The aircraft landed on a frozen 
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lake, with a post crash fire breaking out. Smoke entered the cabin, resulting in reduced 
visibility during the evacuation. After the evacuation the passengers were asked about 
the safety briefing, with responses including that it was ‘garbled’, the ‘instructions were 
not clear’, one passenger ‘recalled hearing the briefing but could not recall the specific 
instructions’, the information was ‘vaguely recalled’ by another passenger, while 
another passenger stated that they were not able to recall any information (NTSB, 1982, 
p. 8). With regards to exit operation, one passenger reported that ‘he intended to open 
the right rear emergency exit, but did not because there was no time to read the exit 
operating instructions’ (NTSB, 1982, p. 9).  A male passenger seated next to an 
emergency exit, said he did not use it ‘because he thought it was a window and he 
thought he would not fit through its opening. He said that he would have used it 
immediately if he had known it was an emergency exit’ (NTSB, 1982, p. 9). 
 
A lack of passenger knowledge about the safety information was reported during an 
instrument landing systems approach in June 2003 at Brest Guipavas aerodrome in 
France. A CRJ-100 aircraft deviated from normal approach and landed approximately 
2000 meters from the runway. The aircraft collided with objects on the ground and a 
post crash fire occurred (BEA, 2003). The fire subsequently destroyed the aircraft, with 
the effects of the smoke impeding passengers during their evacuation. The Captain was 
killed in the accident, with all the other occupants (three crew and 21 passengers) 
successfully evacuating the aircraft (BEA, 2003). 
 
During the accident, some of the oxygen masks were released within the cabin. It was 
reported that a passenger had stayed in their seat and put on their oxygen mask until 
they were instructed by another passenger to leave the aircraft. It was also reported that 
two passengers moved towards the rear of the cabin until instructed to move forward by 
other passengers, even though the safety information stated that there were no exits at 
the rear of the aircraft (BEA, 2003).  
 
With regards to exit operation, the passenger seated next to the left overwing emergency 
exit was a regular flyer, who opened the emergency exit prior to checking the conditions 
outside. The passenger observed the fire outside the exit and let go of the hatch and 
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moved towards the front of the aircraft. The opening of this exit allowed the fire to enter 
the cabin (BEA, 2003). The accident report stated that ‘the fact that one passenger 
opened an overwing exit, without previously checking that this could be done without 
danger, resulted in the fire violently penetrating the centre of the cabin, thereby 
immediately worsening the evacuation conditions’ (BEA, 2003, p. 99). The report 
concluded that this action did not dramatically influence the outcome due to the reduced 
number of passengers in the rear of the cabin, but the circumstances could have been 
different. This highlights a lack of understanding about the procedures in the event of an 
emergency situation. 
 
Although the actions of the passenger adjacent to the exit may have been due to the 
situation evolving around them, the accident report suggests that it may have been due 
to ‘the fact that few passengers follow the safety demonstrations attentively or read the 
safety instructions’ (BEA, 2003, p. 99). One of the recommendations from the 
investigation was to look into ways of informing passengers through the various media 
of safety information of the checks they must make prior to operating an emergency exit 
(BEA, 2003).  
 
In conclusion, the examples from incidents and accidents have highlighted that 
passengers experience difficulties with understanding the task and physically operating 
the exit, which in turn may increase the time taken to make the exit available and delay 
passenger evacuation. Further work is needed to ensure that passengers are provided 
with the information required to complete the safety critical tasks in the event of an 
evacuation. Work also needs to be done to promote passenger engagement with the 
safety information.  
 
5.5. Improving the Type III exit operation task 
As a result of difficulties experienced by passengers the operation of the Type III exit 
has been the subject of scientific research trials. Research has been directed towards 
identifying factors that influence exit operation and identifying modifications to the task 
or those aimed at adapting the operator to reduce the difficulties experienced.  
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5.5.1. Research into the physical difficulties with exit operation 
During the initial evacuation studies through the Type III exit at Cranfield University 
(Muir et al, 1989), the exit was operated by a trained researcher during all trials to 
remove any influence of exit operation on evacuation through the exit. Even though the 
researchers who operated the exit had undergone training, Muir et al (1989) reported 
that the hatch operators still found that the access to the exit and the space around the 
exit influenced their ability to open the exit. This highlights the complex and difficult 
nature of the physical aspects of the task. It is argued that if trained exit operators find 
operation of the Type III exit difficult, then it must be questioned how effectively 
untrained members of the public will be able to complete the task.  
 
A number of evacuation studies have been conducted into potential improvements to the 
physical aspect of the task in an attempt to adapt the task to the operator and reduce the 
physical difficulties associated with exit operation. These include Fennell and Muir 
(1993) who investigated the influence of exit hatch weight and the seating configuration 
adjacent to the exit on exit operation. The results suggested that when the weight of the 
hatch was reduced to 12.5kg (approximately half the weight of a standard Type III 
hatch) and the distance between the seats in the exit row was tested at 3” and at 13” (to 
simulate configurations allowed pre and post the introduction of AN79), hatch operation 
time was decreased. This finding was consistent whether or not there was an 
incapacitated passenger (simulated by a 50th percentile male dummy) adjacent to the 
exit. These adjustments to the hatch and the available space around the exit were shown 
to be of more benefit to the female hatch operators than the male operators. The study 
authors concluded that both factors ‘are necessary for significant improvements in the 
times taken by passengers to operate the Type III exit’ (Fennell and Muir, 1993, p. iii).  
 
Rasmussen and Chittum (1989) also conducted an investigation into influence of the 
seating configuration in the exit row on passenger operation of the exit. The tested 
seating configurations included three single passageway configurations which were 6”, 
10” and 20” vertically projected and a dual passageway configuration with the outboard 
seat removed The participant sat in the seat adjacent to the exit, unless the outboard seat 
was removed in which case the operator sat in the outboard seats in the seat row aft of 
  80
the exit. A number of ‘passive’ participants (with regards to the operation of the exit) sat 
in the other seats adjacent to the exit (Rasmussen and Chittum, 1989). Using exit 
operation time as the dependent variable (this was defined as when the top of the door 
started to move until the hatch was disposed of and the exit was available for egress), 
Rasmussen and Chittum reported no significant differences due to the seating 
configuration adjacent to the exit, although some differences were reported for hatch 
release time.  
 
Following the results of Rasmussen and Chittum (1989), McLean et al (1992) continued 
the investigation into the effect of seating configuration on exit operation. McLean et al 
tested vertical projections in the exit passageway of 10” (either with a three seat 
assembly or a two seat assembly adjacent to the exit), 20”, or three passageways each 
with a vertical projection of 6” leading to a pair of Type III exits and the outboard seats 
removed. McLean et al (1992) noted that the differences in exit operation were small 
between the three configurations with a single exit.  
 
During the large research programme involving an investigation into passageway 
configuration, group density, participant motivation and hatch disposal location on 
evacuation, McLean et al (2002) also reported on Type III hatch operation. Hatch 
operators (one for each trial in the session) were randomly selected from the group and 
separated from the rest of the participants. Although the rationale for this was justified 
by McLean et al (2002) to ensure that the operators did not discuss hatch operation or 
emergency evacuation with any other participants, it does remove some of the realism 
from the experimental procedure, which was cited as an important factor in the research 
study. Once separated from the other participants, hatch operators were given a visual 
graphical briefing on hatch operation, which included the hatch disposal location – 
inside or outside the cabin (which was dependent on the hatch disposal location 
condition under test).  
 
There was a significant interaction between hatch location and passageway 
configuration, with exit availability taking longer when the hatch operator ejected the 
hatch outside the cabin in the 10” cabin configuration due to the limited space available 
  81
in the exit row (McLean et al, 2002). Surprisingly, there were no significant effects for 
seating configuration, motivation or group density on exit operation (McLean et al, 
2002). 
 
McLean et al (2002) also conducted analyses to investigate the effects of the 
independent variables on the time taken for the first participant to evacuate. This 
measure was used as in some seating configurations it was not the hatch operator who 
left the cabin first, specifically when there were multiple passageways leading to the 
exit. This was done in an attempt to remove the hatch disposal delays that were 
observed during some evacuations.  
 
A significant effect was reported for hatch location, with operation times quicker when 
the hatch was placed inside compared to when it was disposed of outside. There was 
also a significant interaction between hatch location and passageway width (similar to 
the exit availability results (McLean et al, 2002). 
 
The authors note that the results from the first participant out times were comparable to 
those from exit ready to use, suggesting ‘that the time required for removal and disposal 
of the hatch was the primary variable in launching the evacuation flow’ (McLean et al, 
2002, p. 10). This highlights the importance of the Type III exit being opened without 
delay.  
 
McLean et al (2002) also analysed the time taken for the hatch operator to egress 
completely through the aperture onto the winglet. When this performance timing was 
analysed, the effect of the disposal location of the hatch and the interaction between 
hatch location and passageway configuration were no longer found to be significant. 
That said, a significant effect of passageway configuration was reported. The effect 
showed that the narrower the passageway, the longer it took the exit operator to move 
through the aperture. It was reported that the time again increased in the dual 
passageway configuration due to the space between the hatch operator’s seat and the 
exit, the location of the hatch and the passengers using the other passageway (McLean 
et al, 2002).  
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In summary, McLean et al (2002, p. 13) reported that participants were competent at 
completing the hatch operation task. However it was noted that ‘the techniques they 
used for removing the hatch were often inefficient’. Incorrect techniques included using 
the incorrect hand to release the operating handle which resulted in the participant 
experiencing difficulty with manoeuvring the hatch and having to turn counter-
clockwise to be in a position to place the hatch on the exit row seating (McLean et al, 
2002). These examples indicate that the task of exit operation may not be intuitive. 
 
McLean et al (2002) argue that hatch operators are able to follow the instructions 
provided to them on the safety card and are prepared to act on them. However, accident 
reports and experimental studies have highlighted operators do not always complete the 
actions as required, so consideration must be given to the information provided. 
 
In summary, research has investigated physical changes to the hatch (i.e. the weight) 
and to the space adjacent to the exit (i.e. passageway configuration) in an attempt to 
improve Type III exit operation. No other published studies were found that have 
investigated other minor modifications to the exit hatch. 
 
5.5.2. Research into the comprehension difficulties with exit operation 
As a result of their study into hatch operation and the potential improvements that could 
be achieved through increasing the space available in the exit row and reducing the 
weight of the Type III hatch, Fennell and Muir (1993) were able to observe the 
behaviours displayed by hatch operators. Fennell and Muir (1993) noted that 
participants displayed a lack of comprehension into correct hatch operation and disposal 
and as a result proposed that further work should be conducted on providing instruction 
to exit operators.  
 
The recommendations from Fennell and Muir were addressed as part of a research 
project undertaken by Cobbett, Liston and Muir (2001). Cobbett et al investigated the 
possible benefits of providing additional information to exit operators during a pre-
flight briefing on their subsequent ability to operate the Type III exit.  Operators were 
allocated to one of four briefing conditions. Participants were either provided with no 
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specific briefing regarding exit operation, a minimal briefing or a detailed briefing. The 
detailed briefing was either delivered verbally or in a written format dependent on the 
condition under test. The minimal briefing informed the operator that they were sat next 
to the exit, that they were responsible for exit operation and where to find further 
information about the task on the safety information card and seatback placard. The 
detailed briefing involved providing the exit operator with a detailed briefing on exit 
operation. This briefing included all the information in the minimal briefing along with 
in-depth instructions about exit operation. Participants were recruited in groups of three, 
with 56 independent groups involved in the study. In each group were two participants 
of one sex and one participant of the other sex, with the minority sex participant always 
seated in the exit operator’s seat.  
 
Cobbett et al (2001) concluded that providing exit operators with detailed information 
about the operation of the exit assisted them with the task. Increasing the level of detail 
in the briefing also resulted in less hesitation from participants when they were 
instructed to evacuate. Interestingly, Cobbett et al found no effect of the level of 
briefing on the time taken to actually operate the exit - defined as the time from when 
the participant placed their hand on the operating handle until the exit was available for 
use. That said, Cobbett et al reported a significant difference attributable to the level of 
briefing in the overall time to operate the exit, in that the more detail provided in the 
briefing, the quicker the exit was made available for evacuation. Cobbett et al concluded 
that was ‘primarily due to the fact that the more detailed briefings reduced the hesitation 
time taken by participants to start to operate the exit’ (2001, p. 17). 
 
In addition to reducing the time taken to operate the exit, when the detailed briefings 
were delivered (either verbally or in writing), there were more instances of correct hatch 
disposal – that is, outside the cabin. Participants also reported that the exit briefing and 
operating diagrams were perceived as clearer when the detailed briefing was provided 
compared to the minimal briefing. Furthermore, participants rated the verbal briefing as 
clearer than the written briefing.  
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Cobbett et al (2001) suggested that the briefing alerted participants to the fact that they 
were responsible for the operation of the exit in the event of an evacuation and 
encouraged the operator to review the pictorial instructions located on the safety card 
and seatback placard. Interestingly, in the study only 10% of participants self reported 
that they did not review the safety card diagrams on exit operation. All of these 
participants were in the group that did not receive a briefing about exit operation 
(Cobbett et al, 2001). Although a self report measure, which can be subject to 
participants reporting socially acceptable answers, this finding adds further evidence on 
the benefits of additional detailed briefings on exit operation.  
 
In conclusion, providing passengers sat adjacent to the Type III exit with detailed 
information on the process of exit operation, resulted in the exit being made available in 
less time (this was largely attributable to the  reduction in hesitation time), increased the 
likelihood and them correctly disposing of the exit hatch (Cobbett et al, 2001).  
 
Cobbett et al (2001) acknowledged that the briefing task took longer when the verbal 
briefing was delivered, with a mean delivery time of 67 seconds (standard deviation 3 
seconds) compared to the mean delivery time for the minimum briefing of 19.5 seconds 
(standard deviation 3.7 seconds). The time required to complete the individual briefing 
would dramatically increase on aircraft with a pair of Type III exits on either side of the 
fuselage (Cobbett et al, 2001). Examples of aircraft with this exit configuration include 
the Boeing-400, Airbus 320 and Beechcraft 1900. Even though the detailed briefing 
took longer to deliver, the benefits of a reduction in exit operation time far outweigh the 
additional time required, an observation also made by Thomas (2003).  
 
The importance of passengers engaging with and comprehending the safety information 
were highlighted in the McLean et al (2002) trials, who reported that exit operation and 
correct hatch disposal were improved by encouraging passengers of the need to attend 
to the safety card in advance of operation the exit. McLean et al (2002) noted that some 
of the actions adopted by the exit operators were not always the most appropriate given 
the situation. Some operators were observed using the wrong hand on the operating 
handle which then meant they experienced some difficulty with the size and weight of 
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the hatch or difficulty in placing the hatch on the exit row seats (McLean et al, 2002). 
However, McLean et al (2002) suggest that when the exit operators were fully informed 
about what they were required to do ‘they were quite willing to perform as instructed’, 
with the report authors concluding that ‘this circumstance bodes well with regard to 
what can be expected of typical airline passengers who are fully informed about their 
responsibilities when seated adjacent to the Type III overwing exit’ (McLean et al, 
2002, p. 15). McLean et al suggest that although some work has already been 
undertaken, further work on educating passengers on emergency procedures is essential.  
 
McLean et al (2002) further argue that the findings from their extensive study into the 
factors that influence evacuation through Type III exits emphasise a lack of passenger 
understanding in completing the tasks required during an evacuation. McLean et al 
(2002) further state that research should now be conducted to ‘search for better 
information and more effective passenger education and training techniques that will 
lead to safer and more productive emergency evacuations/survival’ (McLean et al, 
2002, p. 34). 
 
The importance of exit operators knowing what they are required to do was further 
emphasised by McLean and Corbett (2004) who suggested that research trial 
participants were able to follow exit operation and hatch disposal instructions when they 
were able to comprehend the task requirements. One way to improve passenger 
comprehension of the task in hand may be to provide them with an in-depth briefing 
about exit operation. McLean and Corbett argue that the results of their trials show the 
importance of passengers being aware of the procedures to follow in the event of an 
emergency, concluding that ‘as passengers become more knowledgeable about the 
emergency environment and what to do when faced with it, less reliance on design 
parameters should be needed to achieve successful evacuation/survival outcome’ 
(McLean and Corbett, 2004, p. 19). 
 
The importance of providing passengers with in-depth information about the actions 
they should do in an emergency has also been highlighted in a number of accidents. One 
example includes providing passengers with in-depth information in advance of an 
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evacuation of an Airbus 320 following a problem with the nose gear. The crew were 
aware of the need to evacuate in advance which allowed them to brief passengers on the 
brace position to adopt and the location of the emergency exits. The passengers were 
located near the overwing emergency exits, with cabin crew placed next to the overwing 
exits ‘to ensure that the exits would be opened quickly’ (NTSB, 2000, p. 54). Following 
the evacuation ‘one passenger indicated “the amount of information and the timing of 
the information was outstanding – no one panicked too much” (NTSB, 2000, p. 54).  
 
The importance of providing a detailed briefing to exit operators prior to take off was 
also highlighted during the evacuation of a Boeing 737 as a result of a runway collision 
with a Fairchild Metroliner at Los Angeles airport in 1991 (NTSB, 1991). During 
interviews with the accident investigators, the passengers in the exit row mentioned the 
briefing that the cabin crew provided before take off. The crew provided this briefing as 
there was a younger looking passenger in the aisle seat in the exit row, with the crew 
wanting to check the passenger was aware of his responsibilities of being seated in an 
exit row. The passenger was actually 17 years old, but as a precautionary measure the 
crew delivered a specific briefing to the passengers seated around the exit row. The 
passengers reported that the information contained in this briefing helped them during 
the evacuation (NTSB, 1991). The NTSB concluded that the exit row briefing delivered 
by the cabin crew ‘probably resulted in more passengers escaping through the overwing 
exits than otherwise would have’ (NTSB, 1991, p. 69) as the briefing ‘increased the 
preparedness of passengers for the evacuation’ (NTSB, 1991, p. 75). 
 
Although research and accident reports have shown the benefits of providing additional 
information to exit operators, further research is required as detailed information is not 
mandatory or delivered by all operators in pre-flight safety information.  
 
5.6. Rationale for Experiment Two 
Research and accident reports have highlighted the difficulty in understanding the 
requirements of the Type III exit task and the benefits of providing detailed information 
to the exit operator. However, the depth of information contained within an individual 
pre-departure briefing is not currently regulated and therefore detailed information may 
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not be provided to the exit operator. As highlighted by the NTSB in 2000 ‘most 
passengers seated in exit rows do not read the safety information provided to assist them 
in understanding the task they may need to perform in the event of an emergency 
evacuation’ (p. 77). This stresses the importance of research to further explore whether 
providing further information on correct operation of the overwing exit verbally to 
passengers assists them during exit operation. Although Cobbett et al (2001) have 
shown the benefits of providing detailed information, further evidence was required to 
assist the regulatory process. In the current experiment the detailed briefing was only 
provided in a verbal form (as opposed to written form) as a result of the findings of 
Cobbett et al (2001).  
 
Secondly, a number of research programmes have investigated a range of modifications 
in an attempt to improve passengers’ ability to operate the hatch efficiently (i.e. seating 
configuration and hatch weight), however to date no published studies have been 
conducted on a modification to the exit operating handle. During the operation of the 
exit, the passenger needs to support and manoeuvre the hatch in the available space 
before disposing of it into an appropriate location. The hatch has an operating handle at 
the top which is initially used to unlatch the hatch and is then used during hatch 
manoeuvring. It also has a recess at the bottom which is used to support the hatch. It 
was proposed to conduct an investigation into whether a minor retrofit modification to 
the operating handle at the top of a traditional Type III exit hatch would afford 
significant time savings to the exit operator. The modification meant that once the 
handle was used as the exit was unlatched, it would remain fixed in the open position 
and function as a fixed and rigid handle. As with any industry there was some resistance 
to major changes to current aircraft features due to the cost and operational implications 
of retrofitting. It was felt that this modification, if beneficial, was relatively minor and 
could be part of a retrofit programme. As part of a retrofit programme the modification 
could potentially be installed on smaller transport aircraft, where the costs of an 
automatically disposed hatch installation are considered to be significantly higher. 
 
It was deemed important to collect data on the benefits of the modification to the 
operating handle and the impact of the exit operators briefing on exit operation from 
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both a large single aisle and small aircraft interior configuration. This would determine 
if there were any potential improvements in exit operation as a result of the modification 
and the level of detail in the briefing, within smaller transport aircraft as well as larger 
single aisle cabins, allowing direct comparisons to be made across the interior 
configurations. 
 
5.7. Objectives of Experiment Two 
The objectives of Experiment Two were to investigate the effects of a minor 
modification to the Type III operating handle mechanism and the level of detail 
contained with the exit operator’s briefing on exit operation. In addition, to provide data 
on the extent to which regulations concerning the Type III exit would apply equally to 
large single aisle aircraft and small transport aircraft, tests were conducted in  small and 
large interior cabins (as in Experiment One). As the focus was on providing data on 
Type III exit operation, individual operator trials were conducted. 
 
In summary, the specific objectives of Experiment Two were to investigate the 
influence of a minor modification to the exit operating handle mechanism (either a 
retracted or a fixed handle), the interior configuration (either a small or large interior 
configuration) and the briefing given to the exit operator (either a minimal or in-depth 
briefing) on the time taken to operate the exit and the operator’s perception of the task.  
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6.0. Method: Experiment Two 
 
6.1. Methodological considerations 
The methodological considerations relating to the cabin simulator and the sampling 
strategy were identical to those in Experiment One, as detailed in Section 2.1. However 
in this experiment, individual participants were recruited to complete the task as 
opposed to groups of participants.  
 
Individual participants were used as the focus of this experiment was on improvements 
to the Type III operation task. By using individuals rather than groups the potential 
influence of the variables on the individual exit operator could be measured without the 
assistance other passengers may provide in task completion. 
 
As the experiment involved individual participants it was not appropriate to use a bonus 
payment system. For this experiment all participants were paid a flat rate attendance fee. 
To add a degree of urgency, during the pre-trial briefing participants were motivated to 
complete the task as quickly as possible.  
 
6.2. Ethical and safety considerations 
As with Experiment One, the experiment was conducted in accordance with ethical 
guidelines and an ethics proposal was submitted to, and approved by the Human Factors 
Department Ethics Committee prior to the research trials taking place. Participant safety 
considerations were reviewed prior to the trials in accordance with Experiment One. 
Ethical and safety procedures as documented in Section 2.2 were followed with two 
exceptions due to the nature of the trials with individual participants. Firstly, as the trials 
involved only individual participants it was deemed that medical provision in the form 
of a first aider would be acceptable rather than an occupational health nurse. Secondly, 
there were only three members of the research team (including the first aider) on the 
simulator platform during the trials. There was one member of the research team inside 
the cabin (acting as cabin crew), with another researcher and the first aider located 
directly outside the operational exit. The actions taken by the research team outside 
were the same as those reported for Experiment One.  
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6.3. Research design 
Experimental trials were conducted to investigate the influence of the exit operating 
handle mechanism, the interior configuration and the Type III exit operator’s briefing 
on Type III exit operation. This resulted in a 3 x 2 factorial design.  
 
6.3.1. Independent variables 
There were three independent variables in the experiment. The first was the exit 
operating handle mechanism on the Type III exit. In one condition, the operating handle 
was not fixed, and therefore the handle retracted into its aperture after exit operation. In 
the second condition, the operating handle was modified, so that it became fixed after 
exit operation. The second independent variable was the interior configuration, which 
was tested in either a large interior configuration or a small interior configuration as in 
Experiment One.  
 
The third independent variable was the briefing delivered to the Type III exit operator. 
In one condition a minimal briefing was delivered which informed the operator that that 
they were sat next to an emergency exit, that they may be required to open the exit in 
the event of an emergency, not to open the exit unless instructed to do so by the cabin 
crew and where they could find additional safety information on exit operation. In the 
other condition operators were provided with an in-depth briefing, which provided 
specific instructions on the physical actions required to open the exit. The briefing also 
included the instruction that the participant was not to open the exit unless a member of 
cabin crew instructed them to do so.  
 
Photographs showing the two conditions of the exit operating handle are shown in 
figures 3 and 4. 
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Figure 3: The Type III 
hatch with the retracted 
(conventional) handle 
mechanism 
 Figure 4: The Type III 
hatch with the fixed 
(modified) handle 
mechanism 
 
6.3.2. Dependent variables 
The time taken to operate the exit was the main dependent variable of interest. Exit 
operation timings were extracted from the time coded video footage of the trials, 
measured to one tenth of a second. For Type III exit operation, two timings were 
extracted in line with those reported in cabin safety literature. The first was reaction 
time, which was the time from the call to evacuate (which was “Undo your seatbelts and 
get out!”) until the moment the Type III exit operator had placed their hand on the 
operating handle. The second was operation time, which was the time taken from the 
moment the exit operator had placed their hand on the operating handle, until the hatch 
had been disposed of and the exit was available for egress. The reaction and operation 
times were summated into the exit availability time which was also used as a dependent 
variable. 
 
Participant rating scales from a post evacuation questionnaire were also collected. A 
copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix L. The questionnaire asked 
participants to rate various aspects of their evacuation experience using a seven point 
Likert type scale. The other questions on the questionnaire asked participants to provide 
qualitative comments about their experience.  
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6.3.3. Experimental schedule 
All participants completed two evacuation trials. Each participant completed an 
evacuation trial in each handle condition (fixed and modified), but only in one internal 
configuration (large or small) and in one briefing condition (minimal or in-depth). This 
therefore led to a mixed design, with two independent group variables (interior 
configuration and operator’s briefing) and one repeated measures  variable (operating 
handle mechanism). The order in which participants completed the trials was 
counterbalanced to avoid practise and learning effects. The experimental schedule, 
showing how the 160 evacuation trials were run in the four test conditions, is given in 
Table 8.  
 
Table 8: Experimental schedule  
 Type III exit operator’s briefing 
Minimal In-depth Interior 
configuration Operating handle mechanism 
 Retracted 
(conventional) 
Fixed 
(modified) 
Retracted 
(conventional) 
Fixed 
(modified) 
Large 20 trials 20 trials 20 trials 20 trials 
Small 20 trials 20 trials 20 trials 20 trials 
 
6.4. Participants 
Eighty individuals were recruited as participants, with each participant individually 
tested. Participants were recruited in line with the guidelines as set out in Experiment 
One. Volunteers who had previous experience of operating a Type III exit were 
excluded from taking part and all participants were permitted to take part in one session 
only.  
 
6.5. Equipment/materials 
6.5.1. Test facility 
As with Experiment One, the test facility for the trials was the Boeing 737 cabin 
simulator. The Type III exit was used for all evacuations in this experiment. The camera 
positions were as Experiment One.  
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During this testing programme, the traditional Type III exit hatch handle was operated 
under the two conditions described within Section 6.3.1. In addition to the operating 
handle conditions, the interior configuration was also manipulated. Trials were 
conducted in either the large interior configuration or in the small interior configuration 
as documented during Experiment One. During all trials “simulated” daylight was 
present down one side of the cabin as in Experiment One. 
 
Photographs of the cabin in both the small and large interior configurations are provided 
in Appendix D, along with the Type III exit and the Type III operating handle in both 
the retracted and fixed conditions in Appendix M  
 
6.5.2. Materials 
As per Experiment One, each participant was provided with a clipboard that contained 
all the paperwork for the trials. The trials materials included a volunteer information 
sheet which was similar to that provided in Experiment One, with specific details 
regarding the number of trials and payment changed for this experiment (a copy from 
Experiment One is provided in Appendix E). A volunteer consent and medical clearance 
form was also provided as per Experiment One (as shown in Appendix F). 
 
The demographic questionnaire used in Experiment One was again used to collect 
background information (a copy can be found in Appendix G). As the focus of this 
experiment was on exit operation, the post evacuation questionnaire used reflected this 
(as shown in Appendix L). An identical post evacuation questionnaire was used after 
trials one and two. The questionnaire asked participants about the extent to which they 
listened to the personal safety briefing and the clarity of the exit operating instructions. 
The questionnaire also asked about their experience of using the Type III exit hatch, 
including unlatching the exit hatch, using the operating handle, opening the exit hatch 
and moving the hatch out of the way. Other aspects of the evacuation process were also 
covered on the questionnaire including the level of difficulty in moving between the 
seats in the exit row and moving through the exit and out of the aircraft. Participants 
were asked to provide a rating for each of these elements on a seven point scale where 1 
was very easy/very clear and 7 was very difficult/very unclear. The post evacuation 
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questionnaire also asked participants about any aspects of the personal briefing that had 
helped or hindered their evacuation and to suggest any improvements to the personal 
briefing. Finally participants were asked about any physical features within the cabin 
that had helped or hindered their evacuation. Participants were asked to provide open 
responses to these questions where applicable. Other questions were included on the 
post evacuation questionnaire at the request of the sponsor, however these were not of 
relevance to the current experiment.  
 
6.6. Procedure 
6.6.1. Pre-trial procedure 
On arrival, members of the research team greeted and checked in each participant. 
Participants were then provided with a volunteer number and a clipboard containing the 
paperwork for the trials. The pre-trial procedure was similar to Experiment One, with 
the exception that there was only one participant in each session.  
 
6.6.2. Trial procedure 
6.6.2.1. Seating 
On completion of the pre-trial briefing, the cabin crew member accompanied the 
participant to the cabin simulator. Each participant was assigned to the seat adjacent to 
the Type III exit for each trial.  
 
6.6.2.2. Safety briefings 
Once seated, the member of cabin crew provided a safety briefing, as described in 
Experiment One. In addition, the participant received an individual briefing on their 
emergency duties. The content of the briefing was dependent on the experimental 
condition under test as documented in section 6.3.1. Transcripts of both of these 
briefings are provided in Appendix N. 
 
6.6.2.3. The call to evacuate 
Once the safety briefings were complete, the cabin crew checked the cabin and ensured 
that the participant had their safety belt fastened. Shortly after the cabin check a pre-
recorded evacuation scenario was played to simulate an evacuation on take off; one 
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scenario was played during trial one and a different scenario was played during trial 
two. Both evacuation scenarios included a period of engine noise (approximately one 
minute and 40 seconds during trial one and 20 seconds during trial two), followed by an 
announcement from the Captain to “Undo your seat belts and get out!” The transcript of 
the evacuation scenarios are contained in Appendix O.   
 
6.6.2.4. Cabin crew actions 
At the end of the Captain’s announcement the cabin crew member, who was located at 
the front of the cabin, commanded the passenger to open the Type III exit and evacuate 
the aircraft. The cabin crew member using assertive, concise, positive commands, in 
accordance with the findings of Muir and Cobbett (1996) urged participants to move 
quickly throughout the evacuation. The evacuation was deemed complete when the 
passenger had evacuated the cabin. 
 
6.6.3. Post-evacuation questionnaires 
After evacuating, participants were asked to complete a post-evacuation questionnaire. 
This questionnaire had been designed specifically for evacuations through the Type III 
exit. A copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix P. Whilst the participant 
completed the post-evacuation questionnaire, the Type III hatch was altered for the 
second trial. On completion of the questionnaire, participants re-boarded the cabin 
simulator and the procedure was completed for the second trial  
 
6.6.4. Post-trial procedure 
On completion of the second evacuation trial and post-evacuation questionnaire, each 
participant was thanked, debriefed and paid. Finally, each participant was provided with 
a thank you letter containing contact details for the research team (as provided in 
Experiment One and shown in Appendix K).   
 
6.7. Analysis 
The video footage was edited and a time code was added. The exit operation times were 
extracted from this footage. All performance exit operation data, along with the 
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quantitative responses from the post evacuation questionnaires were entered into SPSS 
version 14 for quantitative analysis.  
 
Qualitative comments provided in response to the open questions on the post evacuation 
questionnaire were collated on a question-by-question basis and have been used to add 
depth to the quantitative results.  
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7.0. Results: Experiment Two 
 
7.1. Sample 
A total of 80 participants took part in both phases of the testing programme. Fifty 
participants were male (62.5%) and 30 participants were female (37.5%). Participants 
provided their age at the time of the testing session. Participants’ ages ranged from 21 to 
49 years, with a mean age of 30.1 years, and a standard deviation of 7.8 years. Eleven 
participants were left handed (13.8%), 67 were right handed (83.8%) and one 
participant was ambidextrous (2.5%). Most participants had flown previously on a 
commercial flight (78 participants, or 97.5%), and one participant reported being 
involved in an actual emergency evacuation (1.3%). 
 
7.2. Completed evacuations 
In total, all 160 planned evacuations were conducted. There were no reported injuries or 
participant withdrawals.  
 
7.3. Inferential statistics 
In all inferential statistical tests, interior configuration, operating handle mechanism and 
Type III operator’s briefing were entered as independent variables, and either the 
evacuation performance measure or the questionnaire ratings were entered as the 
dependent variable. All mean times and mean participant ratings have been rounded up 
to one decimal place. 
 
7.4. Time taken to make the Type III exit available 
The mean reaction times for participants are provided in Table 9.  
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Table 9: Mean Type III exit reaction time (in seconds) in each condition. 
 
Type III exit operator’s briefing and Operating handle 
mechanism 
 
 In-depth briefing Minimal briefing  
Interior Retracted Fixed  
 
Retracted Fixed  
 
Interior 
Large 2.5 (sd 0.6) 2.9 (sd 1.4) 4.4 (sd 1.0) 4.6 (sd 1.5) 3.6 (sd 1.5) 
Small 3.2 (sd 1.1) 3.5 (sd 1.0) 5.0 (sd 2.0) 4.8 (sd 1.4) 4.1 (sd 1.6) 
Briefing 3.0 (sd 1.1) 4.8 (sd 1.6)  
 Total retracted mechanism Total fixed mechanism  
 3.8 (sd 1.6) 4.0 (sd 1.6)  
 
As can be seen in Table 9, there is some variation in the reaction times due to the test 
condition. The data were entered into a mixed model ANOVA which revealed a 
significant effect of interior configuration on reaction times F(1,76) = 4.53, p=0.04. 
Participants reacted quicker in the large interior configuration than when in the small 
interior configuration as shown in Table 9.  In addition, there was also a significant 
main effect on reaction times due to the Type III exit operator’s briefing, F(1,76) = 
46.37, p=0.00. Participants reacted quicker when the in-depth personal briefing was 
delivered than when the minimal personal briefing was delivered. 
 
There was no significant effect for operating handle on reaction times F(1,76) = 0.87, 
p=0.35, and no significant interactions between any of the variables.  
 
The second Type III exit performance measure extracted was exit operation time. The 
mean exit operation times for participants are provided in Table 10.  
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Table 10: Mean Type III exit operation time (in seconds) in each condition.   
 
Type III exit operator’s briefing and Operating handle 
mechanism 
 
 In-depth briefing Minimal briefing  
Interior Retracted Fixed  
 
Retracted Fixed  
 
Interior 
Large 8.1 (sd 3.8) 7.6 (sd 3.1) 12.2 (sd 5.5) 11.3 (sd 5.3) 9.8 (sd 4.9) 
Small 8.7 (sd 3.1) 10.9 (sd 6.2) 11.9 (sd 9.3) 11.3 (sd 6.7) 10.7 (sd 6.2) 
Briefing 8.8 (sd 4.4) 11.7 (sd 6.8)  
 Total retracted mechanism Total fixed mechanism  
 10.2 (sd 6.1) 10.3 (sd 5.6)  
 
 
As can be seen in Table 10, there is some variation in exit operation times due to test 
condition. The data were entered into a mixed model ANOVA which  showed a 
significant effect for Type III exit operator’s briefing on exit operation times F(1,76) = 
7.95, p=0.01. Participants operated the exit quicker when the in-depth personal briefing 
was delivered than when the minimal personal briefing was delivered as shown in Table 
10.  There were no significant effects for interior configuration F(1,76) = 0.81, p=0.37 
or operating handle mechanism F(1,76) = 0.00, p=0.95 on exit operation times, and no 
significant interactions between the variables.  
 
The final Type III exit performance measure used was the overall time to make the exit 
available. The overall exit availability times are provided in Table 11.  
 
Table 11: Mean Type III exit availability time (in seconds) in each condition. 
 
Type III exit operator’s briefing and Operating handle 
mechanism 
 
 In-depth briefing Minimal briefing  
Interior Retracted Fixed  
 
Retracted Fixed  
 
Interior 
Large 10.6 (sd 3.9) 10.5 (sd 3.3) 16.6 (sd 6.1) 15.9 (sd 6.3) 13.4 (sd 5.8) 
Small 12.0 (sd 3.0) 14.4 (sd 6.1) 16.9 (sd 10.2) 16.1 (sd 7.4) 14.8 (sd 7.3) 
Briefing 11.9 (sd 4.5) 16.4 (sd 7.2)  
 Total retracted mechanism Total fixed mechanism  
 14.0 (sd 6.9) 14.2 (sd 6.3)  
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As can be seen in Table 11, there is some variation in exit availability times due to test 
condition. The data were entered into a mixed model ANOVA which revealed  a 
significant effect attributable to the Type III exit operator’s briefing on exit availability 
times F(1,76) = 16.45, p=0.01. Participants made the exit available quicker when the in-
depth personal briefing was delivered than when the minimal personal briefing was 
delivered as shown in Table 11.  There were no significant effects for interior 
configuration F(1,76) = 1.64, p=0.20 or operating handle mechanism F(1,76) = 0.59, 
p=0.81 on exit availability times, and no significant interactions between the variables.  
 
7.5. Perceived difficulty of the Type III exit 
In order to investigate passengers’ perceived difficulty of the task, data obtained from a 
selection of questions on the post-evacuation questionnaires were also analysed. One 
question on the post evacuation questionnaire related to the extent to which participants 
listened to the personal briefing provided by the cabin crew. The mean difficulty ratings 
are provided in Table 12.  
 
Table 12: Mean participant attention ratings (where 1 was no attention and 7 was full 
attention) for listening to the personal briefing in each condition.   
 
Type III exit operator’s briefing and Operating handle 
mechanism 
 
 In-depth briefing Minimal briefing  
Interior Retracted Fixed  
 
Retracted Fixed  
 
Interior 
Large 7.0 (sd 0.0) 6.8 (sd 0.4) 6.8 (sd 0.4) 6.7 (sd 0.7) 6.8 (sd 0.4) 
Small 6.7 (sd 0.6) 6.7 (sd 0.6) 6.2 (sd 1.3) 6.5 (sd 1.0) 6.5 (sd 0.9) 
Briefing 6.6 (sd 0.9) 6.8 (sd 0.5)  
 Total retracted mechanism Total fixed mechanism  
 6.7 (sd 0.8) 6.7 (sd 0.7)  
 
 
The data were entered into a mixed model ANOVA which revealed a significant effect  
for interior configuration on perceived attention ratings of listening to the personal 
briefing F(1,74) = 4.59, p=0.04. Participants reported paying more attention to the 
safety briefing in the large interior configuration than in the small interior configuration 
as shown in Table 12.  
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There were no significant effects for operating mechanism F(1,74) = 0.01, p=0.92 or 
Type III exit operator’s briefing F(1,74) = 3.41, p=0.07 on perceived attention ratings 
for listening to the personal briefing, and no significant interactions between any of the 
variables.  
 
Participants were asked to rate the clarity of the exit operating instructions during the 
personal briefing. The mean clarity ratings are provided in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Mean participant clarity ratings (where 1 was very clear and 7 was very 
unclear) for the clarity of exit operating instructions during the personal briefing in 
each condition.   
 
Type III exit operator’s briefing and Operating handle 
mechanism 
 
 In-depth briefing Minimal briefing  
Interior Retracted Fixed  
 
Retracted Fixed  
 
Interior 
Large 1.8 (sd 0.9) 1.7 (sd 0.6) 2.5 (sd 1.7) 2.7 (sd 1.8) 2.1 (sd 1.4) 
Small 1.9 (sd 1.3) 2.3 (sd 1.8) 2.5 (sd 1.6) 2.4 (sd 1.6) 2.3 (sd 1.6) 
Briefing 1.9 (sd 1.2) 2.5 (sd 1.6)  
 Total retracted mechanism Total fixed mechanism  
 2.2 (sd 1.4) 2.2 (sd 1.5)  
 
 
The data were entered into a mixed model ANOVA which revealed a significant effect 
of Type III exit operator’s briefing for perceived clarity ratings of the exit operating 
instructions provided during the personal briefing, F(1,76) = 5.20, p=0.03. Participants 
reported that the exit operating instructions were clearer in the in-depth briefing than 
those provided during the minimal briefing as shown in Table 13.  
 
There were no significant effects for operating mechanism F(1,76) = 0.23, p=0.63 or 
interior configuration F(1,76) = 0.18, p=0.68 and no significant interactions between 
any of the variables.   
 
The difficulty of unlatching the exit hatch was addressed on the post evacuation 
questionnaire. The mean difficulty ratings are provided in Table 14.  
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Table 14: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for unlatching the exit hatch in each condition.   
 
Type III exit operator’s briefing and Operating handle 
mechanism 
 
 In-depth briefing Minimal briefing  
Interior Retracted Fixed  
 
Retracted Fixed  
 
Interior 
Large 2.0 (sd 1.1) 2.0 (sd 1.1) 2.5 (sd 1.5) 2.3 (sd 1.3) 2.2 (sd 1.3) 
Small 2.1 (sd 1.4) 1.9 (sd 1.0) 2.9 (sd 1.7) 2.8 (sd 1.8) 2.4 (sd 1.5) 
Briefing 2.0 (sd 1.1)  2.6 (sd 1.6)   
 Total retracted mechanism Total fixed mechanism  
 2.4 (sd 1.5) 2.2 (sd 1.3)  
 
 
The data were entered into a mixed model ANOVA which revealed a significant effect 
of Type III exit operator’s briefing on perceived difficulty ratings for unlatching the exit 
hatch F(1,76) = 4.70, p=0.03. When the minimal briefing was delivered, participants 
perceived unlatching the hatch as more difficult compared to when the in-depth briefing 
was delivered as shown in Table 14.  
 
There were no significant effects for operating mechanism F(1,76) = 1.20, p=0.28 or 
interior configuration F(1,76) = 0.66, p=0.42 and no significant interactions between 
any of the variables. 
  
Participants were asked to rate the difficulty of using the exit operating handle during 
exit operation. The mean difficulty ratings are provided in Table 15. A mixed design 
ANOVA  conducted on these data revealed no statistically significant effects  
attributable to operating mechanism F(1,75) = 2.66, p=0.11, interior configuration 
F(1,75) = 0.02, p=0.88 or Type III exit operator’s briefing F(1,75) = 1.78, p=0.19 on 
difficulty ratings. In addition, there were no significant interactions between any of the 
variables.  
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Table 15: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for using the exit operating handle in each condition. 
 
Type III exit operator’s briefing and Operating handle 
mechanism 
 
 In-depth briefing Minimal briefing  
Interior Retracted Fixed  
 
Retracted Fixed  
 
Interior 
Large 2.1 (sd 1.2) 2.1 (sd 1.0) 2.2 (sd 1.0) 2.4 (sd 1.4) 2.2 (sd 1.1) 
Small 1.8 (sd 1.1) 2.2 (sd 1.4) 2.2 (sd 1.2) 2.7 (sd 1.7) 2.2 (sd 1.4) 
Briefing 2.0 (sd 1.2)  2.4 (sd 1.3)   
 Total retracted mechanism Total fixed mechanism  
 2.1 (sd 1.1) 2.3 (sd 1.4)  
 
 
Participants were asked to about the difficulty of opening the exit hatch. The mean 
difficulty ratings are provided in Table 16. A mixed model ANOVA conducted on these 
data revealed no statistically significant effects  attributable to operating mechanism 
F(1,76) = 0.63, p=0.43, interior configuration F(1,76) = 1.77, p=0.19 or Type III exit 
operator’s briefing F(1,76) = 1.17, p=0.28 on difficulty ratings. In addition, there were 
no significant interactions between any of the variables. 
 
Table 16: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for opening the exit hatch in each condition.   
 
Type III exit operator’s briefing and Operating handle 
mechanism 
 
 In-depth briefing Minimal briefing  
Interior Retracted Fixed  
 
Retracted Fixed  
 
Interior 
Large 2.9 (sd 1.4) 2.9 (sd 1.6) 2.8 (sd 1.2) 2.9 (sd 1.4) 2.9 (sd 1.4) 
Small 3.1 (sd 1.9) 2.8 (sd 1.6) 3.3 (sd 1.2) 4.0 (sd 1.7) 3.3 (sd 1.6) 
Briefing 2.9 (sd 1.6) 3.2 (sd 1.6)  
 Total retracted mechanism Total fixed mechanism  
 3.0 (sd 1.5) 3.1 (sd 1.6)  
 
The difficulty of moving the hatch out of the way was also included on the 
questionnaire. The mean difficulty ratings are provided in Table 17.  
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Table 17: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) of moving the hatch out of the way in each condition.   
 
Type III exit operator’s briefing and Operating handle 
mechanism 
 
 In-depth briefing Minimal briefing  
Interior Retracted Fixed  
 
Retracted Fixed  
 
Interior 
Large 4.8 (sd 1.6) 5.3 (sd 1.5) 5.0 (sd 1.5) 4.8 (sd 1.6) 5.0 (sd 1.5) 
Small 5.2 (sd 2.0) 4.8 (sd 2.1) 5.2 (sd 1.5) 5.3 (sd 1.6) 5.1 (sd 1.8) 
Briefing 5.0 (sd 1.8.) 5.0 (sd 1.5)  
 Total retracted mechanism Total fixed mechanism  
 5.0 (sd 1.6) 5.0 (sd 1.7)  
 
 
The data were entered into a mixed model ANOVA which revealed a significant 
interaction in difficulty ratings for moving the hatch out of the way between interior 
configuration, handle mechanism and Type III exit operator’s briefing F(1,76) =4.89, 
p=0.03. 
 
There were no significant effects for operating mechanism F(1,76) = 0.07, p=0.79, 
interior configuration F(1,76) = 0.16, p=0.70 or Type III operator’s briefing F(1,76) = 
0.01, p=0.92. In addition there were no other significant interactions between the 
variables. 
 
7.6. Perceived difficulty of the evacuation 
Participants were asked to rate the difficulty of moving between the seats in the exit 
row. The mean difficulty ratings are provided in Table 18.  
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Table 18: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for moving between the seats in the exit row in each condition.   
 
Type III exit operator’s briefing and Operating handle 
mechanism 
 
 In-depth briefing Minimal briefing  
Interior Retracted Fixed  
 
Retracted Fixed  
 
Interior 
Large 1.9 (sd 1.3) 1.7 (sd 0.9) 2.0 (sd 1.1) 1.8 (sd 0.8) 1.8 (sd 1.0) 
Small 3.0 (sd 1.9) 2.7 (sd 1.6) 3.0 (sd 1.6) 2.8 (sd 1.6) 2.9 (sd 1.7) 
Briefing 2.5 (sd 1.7)  2.4 (sd 1.4)   
 Total retracted mechanism Total fixed mechanism  
 2.5 (sd 1.6) 2.2 (sd 1.4)  
 
 
The data were entered into a mixed model ANOVA which revealed a significant main 
effect of interior configuration on perceived difficulty of moving between the seats in 
the exit row F(1,75) = 13.44, p=0.00. Participants perceived that moving between the 
seats in the exit row was more difficult in a small interior configuration than in a large 
interior configuration as shown in Table 18.   
 
There were no significant effects for operating handle mechanism F(1,75) = 2.31, 
p=0.13 or Type III exit operator’s briefing F(1,75) = 0.05, p=0.83 on perceived 
difficulty ratings of moving between the seats in the exit row. In addition, there were no 
significant interactions between any of the variables. 
 
Finally participants were asked to rate the difficulty of moving through the exit and out 
of the aircraft. The mean difficulty ratings are provided in Table 19. 
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Table 19: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for moving through the exit and out of the aircraft in each condition.   
 
Type III exit operator’s briefing and Operating handle 
mechanism 
 
 In-depth briefing Minimal briefing  
Interior Retracted Fixed  
 
Retracted Fixed  
 
Interior 
Large 2.9 (sd 1.4) 2.8 (sd 1.5)  3.0 (sd 1.2) 2.8 (sd 1.1)  2.9 (sd 1.3) 
Small 3.6 (sd 1.7) 3.4 (sd 1.6)  3.3 (sd 1.7) 4.2 (sd 1.1)  3.6 (sd 1.7) 
Briefing 3.2 (sd 1.6) 3.3 (sd 1.5)  
 Total retracted mechanism Total fixed mechanism  
 3.2 (sd 1.5) 3.3 (sd 1.5)  
 
 
The data were entered into a mixed model ANOVA which revealed a significant main 
effect of interior configuration on perceived difficulty of moving through the exit and 
out of the aircraft F(1,75) = 7.04, p=0.01. Participants perceived that moving through 
the exit and out of the aircraft was more difficult in a small interior configuration than in 
a large interior configuration as shown in Table 19.  
 
There were no significant effects for operating handle mechanism F(1,75) = 0.65, 
p=0.42 or Type III exit operator’s briefing F(1,75) = 0.25, p=0.62 on perceived 
difficulty ratings of moving through the exit and out of the aircraft. In addition, there 
were no significant interactions between any of the variables. 
 
7.7. Headroom at the Type III exit 
In addition to rating scales participants were asked if there was anything in the cabin 
that had hindered them during their evacuation. As with Experiment One, of particular 
note was the number of comments related to the headroom at the Type III exit. Only 
two comments in the large configuration (both comments made by the same 
participant), specifically mentioned the available headroom and/or overhead lockers. 
The majority of the responses to this question by participants who evacuated in the large 
interior configuration related to the space between the seat(s) in which to manoeuvre the 
exit hatch.  
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“Seats in front too close and overhead lockers and curved side restricting headroom” 
(Participant 14, large interior configuration, in-depth Type III operator’s briefing, with 
retracted (conventional) operating handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“Curved sides and overhead lockers” (Participant 14, large interior configuration, in-
depth Type III operator’s briefing, with fixed (modified) operating handle mechanism, 
trial 2) 
 
However, in the small interior configuration, numerous comments were made about the 
overhead lockers and limited headroom hindering evacuation. It is noted that due to the 
nature of the experimental design, the same participant may have made a comment 
relating to headroom after each trial. A selection of the comments is provided here: 
 
“The boxes above me which hindered my ability to open the door and take it away 
(outside the cabin)” (Participant 41, small interior configuration in-depth Type III exit 
operator’s briefing, with retracted (conventional) handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“Low overhead lockers. Seat position” (Participant 34, small interior configuration, in-
depth Type III exit operator’s briefing, with retracted (conventional) handle mechanism, 
trial 2) 
 
“Overhead lockers” (Participant 32, small interior configuration, in-depth Type III exit 
operator’s briefing, with fixed (modified) handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“The ceiling is too low and the seat where I was seated is too close to the exit door 
(problem with legs)” (Participant 35, small interior configuration, in-depth Type III exit 
operator’s briefing,   with fixed (modified) handle mechanism, trial 2) 
 
“The overhead cabins were very low and, therefore, restricted my movement” 
(Participant 84, small interior configuration, minimal Type III exit operator’s briefing, 
with retracted (conventional) handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“The height of the overhead lockers means I had to bend down, I could not stand 
upright” (Participant 71, small interior configuration, minimal Type III exit operator’s 
briefing,  with retracted (conventional) handle mechanism, trial 2) 
 
“Baggage hold was very low and did not allow much movement” (Participant 79, small 
interior configuration, minimal Type III exit operator’s briefing, with fixed (modified) 
handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“The height of door and height of panel fixed the door with cushion for which I had to 
put the door first on the floor and then pick it up again” (Participant 73, small interior 
configuration, minimal Type III exit operator’s briefing, with fixed (modified) handle 
mechanism, trial 2) 
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7.8. Type III exit operator’s briefing 
The Type III exit operator’s briefing delivered was shown to significantly influence the 
time taken to operate the Type III exit, with participants completing the task faster when 
the in-depth briefing was delivered. Participants were also asked about the personal 
Type III exit operator’s briefing that was delivered. The questionnaire asked if 
participants had found the briefing helpful or unhelpful and why this was the case.  
 
 
Positive comments to the in-depth briefing included reference to the full explanation of 
the exit operating procedure, explaining what participants were expected to do and 
highlighting the individual’s responsibility for exit operation. Participants also reported 
that the information on the specific attributes of the exit, including that once the hatch 
was released it was not attached to the aperture and an indication of the weight of the 
hatch had helped them. 
 
 “Explaining how the door works and what was expected from me” (Participant 30, 
small interior configuration, in-depth Type III operator’s briefing, with retracted 
(conventional) handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“Indication of evacuation instruction and how to open door” (Participant 14, large 
interior configuration, in-depth Type III operator’s briefing, with retracted 
(conventional) handle mechanism, trial 2) 
 
“Clearly stated door operation, fall inwards, weight, no hinges” (Participant 13, large 
interior configuration, in-depth Type III operator’s briefing, with fixed (modified) 
handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“I know that I had to remove the door out of the cabin” (Participant 35, small interior 
configuration, in-depth Type III operator’s briefing, with fixed (modified) handle 
mechanism, trial 2). 
 
Some participants received a minimal Type III exit operator’s briefing, which only 
highlighted to them that they were sitting next to an exit and that they may be required 
to open the exit in the event of an emergency. Comments suggested that the personal 
briefing had highlighted what to do in an emergency, the individual’s responsibility for 
exit operation, basic exit operation, where to find further instructions about exit 
operation and that attention should be given to the safety information. It is noted that 
some participants documented that the personal briefing had provided full instructions 
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about exit operation, however it must be remembered that these participants were not 
aware of the in-depth Type III operator’s briefing provided in the other trials. A sample 
of comments in response to this question included: 
 
“Made me aware of my responsibility to open the exit, so I made sure I had read the 
instructions” Participant 52, large interior configuration, minimal Type III operator’s 
briefing, with fixed (modified) handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“Help[ed] me to pay attention to any notice, and think about the evacuation method in 
advance” (Participant 57, large interior configuration, minimal Type III operator’s 
briefing, with fixed (modified) handle mechanism, trial 2) 
 
“I knew I had to pay more attention on how to open the exit as it could be my 
responsibility to open the exit for an evacuation” (Participant 83, small interior 
configuration, minimal Type III operator’s briefing, with retracted (conventional) 
handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“It provided information on the exit and where to find information on how to use it” 
(Participant 74, small interior configuration, minimal Type III operator’s briefing, with 
retracted (conventional) handle mechanism, trial 2) 
 
As with the safety briefing, if participants felt that the personal briefing had not assisted 
their evacuation, they were asked to explain what aspects were not helpful. Only one 
comment was provided by a participant in the in-depth briefing condition who stated 
that they “already knew the content” (Participant 19, large interior configuration, in-
depth Type III operator’s briefing, with retracted (conventional) handle mechanism, 
trial 2). Six participants who received the minimal Type III operator’s briefing made a 
comment in response to this question. The majority of the comments were related to not 
being given or shown specific information on exit operation including “different thing 
between being told and being shown” (Participant 59, large interior configuration, 
minimal Type III operator’s briefing, with retracted (conventional) handle mechanism, 
trial 1) and “no verbal instruction on how to handle the hatch” (Participant 67, small 
interior configuration, minimal Type III operator’s briefing, with retracted 
(conventional) handle mechanism, trial 2). 
 
Only a minimal number of respondents documented that the minimal Type III exit 
operator’s briefing had not helped their evacuation. It must be remembered that 
participants were not aware of the additional information provided in the in-depth Type 
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III operator’s briefing and so were unable to compare the effect of the two briefings on 
exit operation. In order to gain further information from participants about the Type III 
operator’s briefing, all participants were asked if any improvements could be made to 
the personal briefing such that they would enhance their actions in the event of an 
emergency evacuation.  
 
As the Type III operator’s personal briefing was manipulated across the research, 
participants’ responses have been reviewed in light of the briefing they received. 
Respondents who received the in-depth Type III exit operator’s briefing commented on 
a range of issues, with suggestions for improvement including providing a visual 
demonstration of exit operation (i.e. via video or hand signals) and a demonstration of 
hand placement, providing clear information on the weight of the exit and presenting the 
briefing in different languages depending on the native language of the operator. 
 
“If the operations were demonstrated with hand signals (not actually opening the door) 
or maybe a video clip of an actual removal and evacuation from the door” (Participant 
14, large interior configuration, in-depth Type III operator’s briefing, with retracted 
(conventional) handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“Demonstrate hand placement” (Participant 6, large interior configuration, in-depth 
Type III operator’s briefing, with retracted (conventional) handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“The weight of the emergency exit should be clearly stated on the safety document and 
if possible I should be allowed to carry a weight equivalent to the door of the exit” 
(Participant 18, large interior configuration, in-depth Type III operator’s briefing, with 
fixed (modified) handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“Some travellers are not English native speakers. Therefore the personal briefing must 
be clear for people who do not have good English” (Participant 25, small interior 
configuration, in-depth Type III operator’s briefing, with retracted (conventional) 
handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
Those participants who received the minimal briefing proposed a number of 
improvements to the personal briefing, these included specific information on the way 
the door works, specific instructions on how to operate the door, what to expect from 
exit operation (i.e. that the hatch is not attached to the exit aperture, how to pull the exit 
handles), a demonstration on how the overwing exit works and where to place the hatch 
after operation.  
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“’Demonstrate’ how the emergency exit work[s], or show a video about it” (Participant 
59, large interior configuration, minimal Type III operator’s briefing, with retracted 
(conventional) handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“I expected that the hatch would still be attached to the fuselage after opening (and was 
not going to fall down on my toes)” (Participant 47, large interior configuration, 
minimal Type III operator’s briefing, with fixed (modified) handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“Really emphasize on the heavy metal door that need to be taken out/opened, so that 
passenger gets mentally prepared on the ‘hard heavy’ job of pulling the door out in 
panic situation” (Participant 58, large interior configuration, minimal Type III 
operator’s briefing, with fixed (modified) handle mechanism, trial 1) 
“What to do with the door after it had been released. Reinforce that it should be placed 
outside the aircraft, on the wing” (Participant 71, small interior configuration, minimal 
Type III operator’s briefing, with retracted (conventional) handle mechanism, trial 2) 
 
“A physical demonstration (without actually opening the exit) i.e. which hand to hold 
where; what to expect from the hatch door i.e. it will open towards you; which direction 
to turn etc…” (Participant 68, small interior configuration, minimal Type III operator’s 
briefing, with retracted (conventional) handle mechanism, trial 1) 
 
“If she could specify the complete procedure [for] opening the emergency exit instead 
of pointing [to] the card for [it]” (Participant 73, small interior configuration, minimal 
Type III operator’s briefing, with fixed (modified) handle mechanism, trial 2) 
 
Three comments of interest to the current experiment were made by participants on the 
post-evacuation questionnaire when asked if there were any additional comments that 
they wanted to make about the evacuation trial. The comments were all made by 
participants who received the minimal Type III exit operator’s briefing and are linked to 
the exit operators briefing and the information provided to participants.  
 
“Unclear instruction on how to remove the door was more of a problem than the weight 
[…] of the emergency hatch” (Participant 47, large interior configuration, minimal 
Type III operator’s briefing, with retracted (conventional) handle mechanism, trial 2). 
 
“Maybe a step by step instruction (more clear than on the instruction placard) on how 
to move the door when opening. For example: pull the handle, lift the door, turn and 
throw out of the aircraft. Now it takes to[o] much time to find it out yourself. On the 
instruction placard (card) it looks much simpler” (Participant 77, small interior 
configuration, minimal Type III operator’s briefing, with retracted (conventional) 
handle mechanism, trial 2). 
 
“I now strongly believe more overt instructions regarding where to take the hatch and 
where to store it before an emergency takes place would save time and, therefore, 
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potential injury…” (Participant 67, small interior configuration, minimal Type III 
operator’s briefing, with fixed (modified) handle mechanism, trial 1). 
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8.0. Discussion – Experiment Two 
 
8.1. Exit operator’s briefing on operation time 
The results indicated that exit operator’s briefing had a statistically significant effect on 
Type III exit operation. Participants reacted to the call to evacuate, operated the exit and 
made the Type III exit available for evacuation significantly faster when the in-depth 
exit operator’s briefing was delivered, compared with when the minimal exit operator’s 
briefing was provided. The difference in reaction times attributable to the briefing adds 
further support to the provision of a detailed briefing and supports the findings of 
Cobbett et al (2001). Cobbett et al reported that the more information provided, the less 
the operator hesitated when told to evacuate. Interestingly, this experiment contradicts 
the findings of Cobbett et al who found no significant differences in exit operation time 
(the current experiment found a difference). However these results are in line with the 
Cobbett et al findings that the more information provided, the less time taken by 
operators to make the exit available. The overall conclusion from the Cobbett et al study 
and this experiment is the benefit of providing an individual briefing to the exit operator 
which provides clear and detailed instruction prior them being asked to complete a 
complex task such as Type III exit operation. 
 
The findings from this experiment also support those of McLean et al (2002) who 
suggested that when exit operators are encouraged to engage with the safety material 
and are fully informed of the task they are willing to comply with the task requirements. 
The current experiment suggests that by providing exit operators with an in-depth 
briefing on exit operation, provided them with detailed and specific knowledge about 
the task they would be required to complete.  
 
8.2. Interior configuration on operation time 
There was also a significant main effect of interior configuration on reaction times, in 
that participants reacted quicker to the call to evacuate when seated in the large interior 
configuration than when seated in the small interior configuration. It is however 
suggested that this may be a statistical artefact as the interior configuration should not 
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have influenced the time taken to react to the call to evacuate. There were no significant 
effects attributable to interior configuration on exit operation time or exit availability 
time. However as with the findings of Experiment One, participants reported that the 
limited headroom available in the smaller interior configuration influenced exit 
operation and evacuation efficiency. As there are no other specific studies that have 
investigated the influence of interior configuration on exit operation, it is not possible to 
place these results in a wider context.  
 
8.3. Operating handle mechanism on operation time 
The results indicated no significant effect on reaction time, exit operation time and exit 
availability time attributable to handle operating mechanism. It seems that the 
modification made to the operating handle (which meant the operating handle was fixed 
and could function as a second handle or handhold) had no effect on the time taken to 
operate the Type III exit with either a minimal or in-depth exit operator’s briefing. 
 
No other studies were found that explored the operating handle mechanism or any 
similar minor modification to the Type III exit, therefore placing these results in a wider 
context is difficult. However it is suggested that the modification may have been too 
minor to reduce any of the difficulties associated with the task. As a result it was 
suggested that further research needs to consider the other aspects of the Type III task in 
relation to evacuation efficiency. These may include improving the understanding of the 
task requirements (i.e. how to perform the task, the disposal of the hatch and the non 
intuitive nature of the task) and the physical operation of the exit (i.e. due to the 
physical parameters of the hatch, the available space in which to complete the task and 
the need to fully remove the hatch from the fuselage and dispose of it into an 
appropriate location before exiting). 
 
8.4. Perceived difficulty of the exit operation task 
Overall, when asked to rate the level of difficulty of a number of tasks during the 
operation of the exit, participants did not perceive any significant differences in 
difficulty attributable to the variables of interest. No significant differences in the level 
of difficulty due to operating handle mechanism, interior configuration, Type III exit 
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operator’s briefing or an interaction between the variables were reported for using the 
operating handle, opening the hatch, the weight of the hatch or the size of the hatch. A 
significant difference was reported for unlatching the hatch due to Type III exit 
operator’s briefing, in that participants reported it as more difficult when the minimal 
briefing was delivered than when the in-depth  briefing was delivered. During the in-
depth briefing participants were informed that they were required to pull down the 
operating handle to unlatch the exit and therefore may have been more prepared for the 
task. There were no significant effects for unlatching the hatch attributable to interior 
configuration, operating handle mechanism or any significant interaction.  
 
8.5. Perceived difficulty of evacuating 
The results revealed that when participants were asked to rate the perceived difficulty of 
moving between the seats in the exit row, there was a significant difference in difficulty 
ratings due to the interior configuration. Participants rated it as more difficult in the 
small configuration than in the large configuration. This result is likely to be due to the 
restricted amount of headroom within the smaller interior configuration. It was noted 
that there were no statistically significant differences in the difficulty ratings due to 
Type III exit operator’s briefing, operating handle mechanism, or any interaction 
between the variables. Finally when questioned about the difficulty of moving through 
the exit and out of the aircraft, participants rated the task as more difficult when in the 
small interior configuration than when in the large interior configuration. There were no 
significant differences in difficulty ratings attributed to Type III exit operator’s briefing, 
operating handle mechanism or any interaction between the variables. It may be that the 
reduced headroom available in a smaller interior configuration led to participants’ 
perceiving the task of moving between the seats in the exit row and through the exit and 
out of the aircraft as more difficult. This supports the perceptions of evacuees during 
Experiment One, who perceived the limited headroom associated with smaller transport 
aircraft to hinder their evacuation.  
 
8.6. Perceptions of the Type III exit operator’s briefing 
When questioned on the clarity of the exit operating instructions, there was a significant 
effect for Type III exit operator’s briefing. Participants reported that the exit operating 
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instructions were clearer when the in-depth operator’s briefing was delivered than when 
the minimal operator’s briefing was delivered. This result is not surprising as the in-
depth exit operator’s briefing contained explicit details about the Type III exit operation 
task. These findings are in line with those reported by Cobbett et al (2001) who found 
that the more detail that was provided in the briefing the clearer the participant reported 
the briefing to be.  
 
When asked about the in-depth personal briefing, positive comments included reference 
to the full explanation of the exit operating procedure, information on the specific 
attributes of the exit and information on what the participant was expected to do 
throughout the process. Participants also suggested a number of improvements to the 
personal briefing that included providing a visual demonstration of exit operation (i.e. 
via video), a demonstration of hand placement actually on the hatch and presenting the 
briefing in multiple languages. When asked about the minimal personal briefing, 
participants highlighted that the briefing provided information on what to do in an 
emergency, the individual’s responsibility for exit operation and where to find further 
instructions about exit operation. Although some participants in the minimal briefing 
documented that the briefing provided the information they required for exit operation, 
it must be remembered that these participants were not aware of the content of the in-
depth briefing. 
 
Participants who experienced the minimal personal briefing also proposed a number of 
improvements to the personal briefing. Improvements included information on specific 
details on the way the exit works and instructions on exactly how to operate the exit, 
what to expect from exit operation (i.e. that the hatch is not attached to the exit aperture, 
how to pull the exit handles), a demonstration on how the overwing exit works and 
where to place the hatch after operation. It is noted that all these elements were included 
in the in-depth personal briefing. Importantly, the results relating to the benefits of the 
in-depth briefing as perceived by participants were aligned with the performance data 
on the benefits of the briefing on Type III exit operation times. 
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One potential disadvantage of the in-depth briefing is the time taken to deliver the 
briefing and, as a result, whether operators would support the change. The length of the 
briefing was highlighted by one participant “It is a little bit to[o] long, especially for 
the foreign people which have to stay concentrated. It should be better to summarise 
and point out the important points” (Participant 18, large interior configuration, in-
depth Type III exit operator’s briefing, with fixed (modified) handle mechanism, trial 1). 
It is acknowledged that the in-depth briefing takes longer to deliver than the minimal 
briefing. This point was also made by Cobbett et al (2001) who found it took 
significantly longer for the detailed briefing to be delivered compared to the minimal 
briefing. However as argued by Thomas (2003) and in the current experiment, the 
additional time is justified due to the benefits in exit operation as a result of the in-depth 
briefing. Further work could address if all information in the in-depth briefing is 
required to improve operation time to ensure that the additional time is well spent. 
 
8.7. Perceived difficulties of the interior configuration 
When asked on the post evacuation questionnaire about the personal briefing that was 
provided, there was a significant effect for interior configuration, such that participants 
reported paying more attention to the personal briefing in the large interior 
configuration than in the small interior configuration, although it is not clear why this 
may have been the case and it is suggested that this is a spurious statistical result. 
 
In the small interior configuration, a number of comments were made regarding the low 
headroom, whereas only two comments regarding the headroom at the Type III exit 
were made by participants in the large interior configuration. Participants also noted that 
the limited space between the seats had hindered them during the evacuation and again 
align with the findings of Experiment One.  
 
8.8. Perceptions of the operating handle mechanism 
It is noted that some participants referred to the presence, location, grips or colour of the 
exit hatch handles when asked about factors that helped their evacuation, although no 
comments specifically mentioned the latching/retracting mechanism of the operating 
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handle. Other comments provided by participants related to the ease of operation when 
using the hatch. A handful of participants also mentioned the exit hatch handles when 
asked to comment on any factors related to the exit hatch that had hindered their 
evacuation, although none of the comments related to the operating mechanism of the 
top handle. The majority of comments related to the physical dimensions of the exit 
hatch (i.e. size, shape and weight), the space in which to manoeuvre the hatch (i.e. 
position of seat and the amount of space in the exit row), the procedure for opening and 
disposing of the hatch and the dimensions of the exit aperture. It may be that a more 
major modification to the exit is required to remove the difficulties associated with exit 
operation.  
 
8.9. Summary of Experiment Two 
The objectives of Experiment Two were to investigate the effects of a minor 
modification to the Type III operating handle mechanism and the level of detail 
provided in the personal briefing provided to the exit operator on Type III exit 
operation. In addition the experiment wanted to provide data on the extent to which 
regulations concerning the Type III exit would apply equally to larger single aisle 
transport aircraft and smaller transport aircraft. Therefore tests were conducted in cabins 
with small and large interior configurations. The results from the experiment highlights 
a number of benefits of providing an in-depth exit operator’s briefing in relation to exit 
operation and passenger perception of the evacuation. Overall the influence of the 
modification to the operating handle mechanism and interior configuration did not 
significantly influence exit operation, however the restrictive headroom associated with 
a smaller interior aircraft cabin was perceived by participants as hindering them during 
the evacuation.  
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9.0 Introduction – The Type III exit mechanism 
 
9.1. Introduction to Experiment Three 
Preceding chapters have highlighted a range of difficulties experienced by Type III exit 
operators with the traditional Type III exit design. These difficulties have been linked to 
the physical and the comprehension demands of the task that may be placed on the exit 
operator. The benefits of including ADHs have been addressed within the literature, 
however this has only been in relation to larger aircraft (although to date no regulation 
has been made that requires manufacturers to install an ADH as opposed to a traditional 
‘plug’ Type III exit mechanism). It is not known if the benefits of such a design would 
equally apply to smaller transport aircraft.  
 
9.2. An automatically disposed hatch mechanism 
In order to improve passenger operation of the Type III exit and to ensure that once 
opened the exit hatch does not impede passenger access to the exits or the exit aperture 
the NTSB recommended that the FAA should ‘require Type III overwing exits on newly 
manufactured aircraft to be easy and intuitive to open and have automatic hatch stowage 
out of the egress path’ (2000, p. 80). One area of focus for regulatory activity is the 
Type III exit. Specifically, the issue is on the provision of an exit that once opened does 
not impede passenger access to the exits or the exit aperture on new type certificated 
aircraft (FAA, 1999).  
 
The design and operation of the traditional Type III exit has been questioned by a 
number of cabin safety commentators. The NTSB in 2000 commented that with the 
traditional exit hatch mechanism it ‘is not intuitively obvious that after pulling the latch, 
the hatch is to be turned and either placed on the exit row seats or thrown out the 
opening. The opening and manoeuvring of this exit is also difficult to display 
graphically’ (NTSB, 2000, p. 40). The UK regulator also states that passenger operated 
exits ‘need to be made more effective and is seeking international adoption of radical 
improvements in access to and ease of opening of such exits’ (CAA, 2004, GR No 3, 
Appendix 1, p. 1). 
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As discussed in Section 5.1 an alternative to the traditional Type III exit mechanism is 
an automatically disposed hatch mechanism. As the name suggests with an ADH design 
when the operating handle is released, the operator is not required to dispose of the 
hatch as this process is built into the exit mechanism. The exit hatch is disposed of in 
such a way so that it does not create a potential obstruction to egress, as it remains 
attached to the fuselage.  
 
Fennell and Muir (1993) and Cobbett, Jones and Muir (1997) reported that allowing 
participants to open the traditional Type III exit on a number of occasions – and 
essentially practicing the task, reduced the time taken to operate the exit. In addition, 
participants were able to ‘learn and develop the necessary technique to enable them to 
open the hatch and manoeuvre it in the limited space available’ which included the 
understanding that the hatch should be disposed of outside the cabin (Fennel and Muir, 
1993, p. iii). These findings suggest that the specific procedures involved in correctly 
operating and disposing of the hatch are not intuitive to all passengers when they first 
encounter the exit. Although practice improved the operation of the exit, during an 
evacuation it is highly unlikely that the passenger will have previously operated the exit 
and in a time-critical situation there is no time for delay. 
 
Following a recent review of factors influencing evacuation from smaller transport 
aircraft, R.G.W. Cherry and Associates suggested that with larger and heavier exits 
(Type II and above), ‘it may be preferable that the opening of these exits does not 
necessitate the passenger/flight attendant to lift the hatch and throw it outside’ (2006a, 
p. 27). It is noted that this issue may not only be relevant to exits of the size/weight of a 
Type II exit, as previous chapters have shown passengers experience difficulties with 
exit operation of the Type III exit. Although it is acknowledged that the hatch may not 
be as heavy on a smaller transport regional aircraft, the restrictive space in the cabin and 
the limited headroom may impede passengers in the event of an emergency evacuation. 
The weight and size of the hatch is not regulated, however the Type III exit aperture 
across all aircraft must be at least 20” x 30”, therefore research has to consider the worst 
case scenario.  
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R.G.W. Cherry and Associates also went on to recommend that ‘when space is very 
limited, or the hatch is relatively heavy or large, it might be helpful to have emergency 
exits that are easy to open and do not require much space during opening, such as 
hatches that fall out after the handle is pulled’ (2006a, p. 28). It is therefore proposed 
that the potential benefits of an ADH mechanism should be explored on a smaller 
transport aircraft. Research has already been conducted on the installation of an ADH 
on larger aircraft; however the issue of an ADH on smaller transport aircraft has not 
been widely addressed within the public domain.  
  
9.3. Research into Type III exit mechanisms 
In 1994, the UK CAA commissioned Cranfield University to conduct a programme of 
research into means of improving the operation of the Type III exit and in turn reducing 
the time taken to make the exit available for egress (Cobbett et al, 1997). The specific 
focus of the research programme was on a change to the physical mechanism of the 
Type III exit.  
 
The project involved the generation of different exit mechanism concepts which had to 
comply with a range of criteria. The criteria included that the newly designed exit 
mechanism would support the Type III hatch and that a passenger would be able to open 
the exit and move the hatch out of the way rapidly in the event of an evacuation. The 
mechanism had to comply with current airworthiness regulation, not result in a loss of 
passenger seats and had to maintain the cabin pressure and structural integrity of the 
aircraft. Specific criteria were also included relating to operation of the exit. These 
criteria included that the hatch must remain attached to the fuselage after operation, that 
it must be amenable to retrofitting onto current aircraft and ‘must be simple and obvious 
to operate with a minimum of effort’ (Cobbett et al, 1997, p. 4). One prototype concept 
was deemed to meet all the criteria and was referred to in the study as the ‘upwards 
sliding hatch’, which although results in some reduction in the amount of overhead 
locker space, met all the other criteria and was similar in design to exits that were found 
at the time on a number of aircraft including the Boeing 767, the Hawker Siddeley 
Trident, the McDonnell-Douglas DC19 and MD11 series aircraft (Cobbett et al, 1997).  
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The alternative exit mechanism differed to the traditional Type III exit design. On 
release of the exit operating handle, the hatch moved slightly inwards into the cabin (as 
the hatch was still required to be a plug style exit), but remained attached to the 
fuselage. The passenger was then required to push the hatch upwards where it moved on 
tracks into the overhead locker area towards the top of the fuselage. As the hatch 
remained attached to the fuselage, it removed the need for the operator to physically 
manoeuvre the hatch and resulted in a clear aperture for egress (Cobbett et al, 1997). It 
was hoped that the modified exit mechanism would reduce or remove many of the 
difficulties associated with the operation of the traditional Type III exit. A prototype of 
the upwards sliding hatch concept was then manufactured and tested during simulated 
operation trials, with baseline trials also conducted within the traditional Type III exit 
mechanism.  
 
In addition to the change to the exit mechanism, Cobbett et al (1997) also manipulated 
the seating configuration adjacent to the exit to determine its effect on exit operation. 
Two seating configurations within the scope of AN79 were tested. These were a 13” 
vertical projection between the exit seat rows and two 6” vertical projected passageways 
with the outboard seat removed (OSR). During half of the trials with a 13” vertical 
projection, an incapacitated passenger (simulated by a mannequin) was placed in the 
seat adjacent to the exit, with the participant then occupying the central seat in the 
seating assembly. Ninety-six volunteers participated in the research programme with 
each participant individually completing three trials (Cobbett et al, 1997).  
 
Using exit operation time as the dependent variable (which was defined as the time 
taken from when the participant placed their hand on the operating handle until they had 
placed one foot on the wing), a statistically significant difference attributable to the exit 
mechanism was reported, irrespective of the seating configuration (Cobbett et al, 1997). 
Participants operated the exit quicker with the modified upwards sliding ADH 
mechanism compared to when the traditional Type III mechanism was used. Placing an 
incapacitated passenger next to the exit increased the time taken to operate the exit 
across both exit mechanisms (Cobbett et al, 1997). 
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Although only the Cobbett et al study specifically investigated a change to the exit 
mechanism, there is support within the cabin safety industry as to the benefits of the 
installation of ADHs. During the McLean et al (2002) study previously reported, a 
number of exit operators disposed of the hatch in an inappropriate location. McLean et 
al argue that solutions could be put in place to diminish such events, which would 
include exit mechanism designs that ‘are automatically stowed outside the evacuation 
path upon opening or an operational principle that requires the hatch to be discarded 
outside the airplane when cabin interior configurations more easily promote potential 
exit obstructions (p. 32). 
 
9.4. Boeing’s Next-Generation automatic overwing exit 
The Boeing Company have responded to the need to address the difficulties associated 
with the operation of the traditional Type III exit through the design and development of 
the Next-Generation overwing hatch. This exit mechanism was designed to ‘enhance the 
emergency egress capability’ of the aircraft (Graeber and Mumaw, 1999, p. 15. The 
Boeing Next-Generation exit has utilised a different type of design in that ‘the door 
remains attached to the aircraft…it moves in [due to the plug style exit] and down, then 
it releases out and swings up out of the way’ (Graeber and Mumaw, 1999, p. 15). 
During this process the hatch is still attached to the fuselage by means of top hinges. 
The design of the hatch is such that it ‘opens outwards as passengers would intuitively 
expect’ (NTSB, 2000, p. 40). The Boeing Next-Generation automatic overwing exit is 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5: The Boeing Next-Generation automatic overwing exit  
 Photograph courtesy of Graeber and Mumaw, 1999 in Harris, 
1999, p. 15) 
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As highlighted by Graeber and Mumaw this new design removes both the physical 
elements of the exit operator having to support and manoeuvre the hatch and as the 
hatch remains attached to the fuselage, it removes the other main physical element of 
hatch disposal. It is also argued that as on release of the operating handle the exit swings 
out, the new mechanism removes the understanding about the process of exit operation. 
Graeber and Mumaw cite that during usability trials with naïve operators, operating 
instructions were not required in order for the passenger to understand how the exit 
operated (although as per good practice and regulation, operating instructions are 
provided adjacent to the exit).  
 
The NTSB concluded that the design of the Boeing Next-Generation exit ‘in 
short…eliminates any guesswork about how the exit operates or what to do with the exit 
hatch once it is opened. The Safety Board believes the FAA should require Type III 
overwing exits on newly manufactured aircraft to be easy and intuitive to open and have 
automatic hatch stowage out of the egress path’ (NTSB, 2000, p. 40).  
 
9.5. Rationale for Experiment Three 
Following their remit by the FAA to investigate the issue, the Cabin Safety 
Harmonization Working Group submitted a report to support the introduction of newly 
designed exit mechanisms that ‘shall be designed such that, when opened, the 
hatch/door cannot reduce the size of the exit opening and/or adjacent passageways 
below the required minimum dimensions, nor shall it obstruct the required exit access to 
or from the exit in any way’ (FAA, 2002, p. 6). A number of arguments were put 
forward as rationale by the CSHWG for this proposed change. These included the 
acknowledgement that the traditional Type III exit mechanism could result in operation 
and disposal difficulties, that there was the potential for internal placement of the hatch 
to result in evacuation difficulties and that as one such exit design was already certified 
for use on some aircraft (i.e. the Boeing Next-Generation Type III exit) it was 
reasonable for non-disposal hatches to be required on all newly certified aircraft (FAA, 
2002).  
 
The CSHWG proposed the introduction of non disposing hatches on aircraft with a 
seating capacity of 41 seats and above as they were of the opinion that a more 
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substantial design would be needed for installation on smaller transport aircraft and this 
may incur a higher cost penalty. However it is considered naïve to restrict thinking due 
to further design considerations and development, without establishing any potential 
improvements an ADH might bring to exit operation on a smaller transport aircraft. It is 
interesting to note that the working group themselves concluded that ‘it was also 
recognised that smaller transport aircraft could benefit significantly [from non-
disposable hatch designs] and more work would be required to make a final decision’ 
(FAA, 2002, p. 6). 
 
Based on the regulatory view that additional work was required regarding non-
disposable hatches on smaller transport aircraft, and the consideration of the potential 
benefits that one automatically disposed hatch design could bring, it was decided to 
investigate the influence of an ADH exit design on passenger exit operation from a 
smaller transport aircraft. It is noted that previous work (Cobbett et al, 1997) 
investigated the ADH design on exit operation, however trials were only conducted 
from a large single aisle interior configuration. As the Cobbett et al (1997) was an 
extensive study into the benefits of one ADH mechanism in a large single aisle interior 
configuration and resources were limited in the current experiment, it was decided to 
focus on the benefits of an ADH mechanism in a smaller interior configuration only. 
With a narrower fuselage and lower headroom at the Type III exit, it was considered 
important to investigate Type III operation and evacuation in a smaller interior 
configuration. This was necessary in order to investigate the extent to which regulations 
concerning the Type III exit and the scope of regulations relating to automatically 
disposed hatches would apply to both types of aircraft.  
 
9.6. Objective of Experiment Three 
The objective of Experiment Three was to investigate the effect of one type of ADH the 
‘upwards sliding’ mechanism (as used by Cobbett et al, 1997), referred to in the current 
study as the ‘up and over’ ADH exit mechanism, compared to the traditional ‘plug’ exit 
mechanism in the small interior cabin configuration. Data were to be provided on the 
time taken to operate the exit and the operator’s perception of the task.  
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10.0 Method: Experiment Three 
 
10.1. Methodological considerations 
The methodological considerations relating to the realism of the cabin simulator and the 
sampling strategy were identical to those in Experiment One, as detailed in Section 2.1. 
However in this experiment, as in Experiment Two, individual participants were 
recruited to complete the task as opposed to groups of participants.  
 
After Experiment Two, there was some concern that there was not enough pressure on 
participants to operate the exit and evacuate as quickly as possible. In order to add a 
degree of pressure on the participant to operate the exit and evacuate as quickly as 
possible in this experiment, three ‘stooge’ passengers were also seated in the cabin 
during the evacuations. Unknown to the participant, the ‘stooge’ passengers were 
confederates of the researcher. The ‘stooge’ passengers were seated in seats adjacent to 
the participant, and on the call to evacuate released their seatbelts and moved towards 
the exit. It was anticipated that this would encourage the participant to operate the exit 
as quickly as possible. The other ‘passengers’ did not assist in exit operation.  
 
10.2. Ethical and safety considerations 
Ethical and safety considerations in line with those reported in Experiments One and 
Two were followed. Ethical approval for the experiment was granted.  
 
10.3. Research design 
Experimental trials were conducted to investigate the influence of the Type III exit 
mechanism on exit operation and evacuation. This resulted in a two groups post test 
design.  
 
10.3.1. Independent variables 
There was one independent variable in the research study, the Type III exit mechanism. 
Trials were either conducted with the Type III exit configured as a traditional “plug” 
style exit mechanism or as a modified “up-and-over” automatically disposed hatch exit 
mechanism.  
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10.3.2. Dependent variables 
As during Experiment Two, exit operation timings and questionnaire data were 
collected during the experiment. Exit operation timings were extracted from the time 
coded video footage of the trials, measured to one tenth of a second. All performance 
timings were taken from the Captain’s command to evacuate which was “Undo your 
seatbelts and get out!” For Type III exit operation, several timings were taken. The first 
was hatch release time, which was the time from the call to evacuate (which was “Undo 
your seatbelts and get out!”) until the point at which the exit hatch was released from 
the exit aperture and moved inwards as the operating handle was released. The second 
was operation time, which was the time taken from the point at which the exit hatch was 
released, until the hatch had been disposed of and the exit was available for egress. The 
final timing was exit availability time which was the sum of the release and operation 
times.  
 
Participant rating scales from a post evacuation questionnaire were also collected. A 
copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix P. The questionnaire asked 
participants to rate various aspects of their evacuation experience using a seven point 
Likert type scale. The other questions on the questionnaire asked participants to provide 
qualitative comments about their experience.  
 
10.3.3. Experimental schedule 
Independent measures were used to remove practice and learning effects, it was decided 
to use independent measures, with each participant operating the Type III exit in only 
one condition. The experimental schedule, showing how the eighty evacuation trials 
were run in the two test conditions, is given in Table 20.  
 
Table 20: Experimental schedule 
Type III exit mechanism 
Traditional “plug” exit mechanism Modified “up and over” ADH 
mechanism 
Participants 1-40 Participants 41-80 
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10.4. Participants 
Eighty individuals were recruited as participants, with each participant completing the 
evacuation individually. Each participant was recruited in accordance with the criteria 
specified in Experiment One. In addition as detailed in Section 10.1 there were three 
‘stooge’ passengers in the cabin during the evacuations. 
 
10.5. Equipment/materials 
10.5.1. Test facility 
As with the other experiments, the test facility for the trials was the Boeing 737 cabin 
simulator. The traditional Type III exit mechanism was used for half the trials and the 
modified ADH exit mechanism was used for the remaining trials. The modification 
involved converting the traditional Type III exit mechanism to an “up-and-over” style 
automatically disposed hatch mechanism, as used in previous research (e.g. Cobbett et 
al, 1997). The “up-and-over” hatch slid into the overhead lockers with the aid of a 
spring mechanism, rather than flipping outside against the fuselage. The Type III exit in 
either the traditional or modified exit mechanism was used during all evacuations in this 
programme.  
 
For all tests, the facility was modified into a small interior configuration, as documented 
in Experiment One. The camera positions were as Experiment One. During the trials 
“simulated” daylight was present down one side of the cabin as in Experiment One. 
Photographs of the cabin with both exit mechanisms are provided in Appendix Q.  
 
10.5.2. Materials 
As per Experiments One and Two, each participant was provided with a clipboard that 
contained all the paperwork for the trials. The trials materials included a volunteer 
information sheet similar to that provided in Experiment One with the exception the 
information about the number of trials and the payment details (a copy from Experiment 
One is provided in Appendix E). A volunteer consent and medical clearance form as per 
Experiment One was also provided (as shown in Appendix F). 
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The demographic questionnaire used in Experiment One was again used to collect 
background information (a copy can be found in Appendix G). As the focus of this 
experiment was on exit operation, the post evacuation questionnaire used reflected this 
(as shown in Appendix P). The questionnaire asked participants about their experience 
of using the Type III exit hatch, including findings the operating handle, unlatching the 
exit hatch, using the operating handle, the clarity of the instructions for disposal of the 
hatch, the opening the exit hatch and moving the hatch out of the way. Other aspects of 
the evacuation process were also covered on the questionnaire including the level of 
difficulty in moving between the seats in the exit row and moving through the exit and 
out of the aircraft. Participants were asked to provide a rating for each of these elements 
on a seven point scale where 1 was very easy/very clear and 7 was very difficult/very 
unclear. Finally participants were asked about any physical features within the cabin or 
the exit that had helped or hindered their evacuation. Participants were asked to provide 
open responses to these questions where applicable. Other questions were included on 
the post evacuation questionnaire at the request of the sponsor, however these were not 
of relevance to the current experiment and have not been analysed. 
 
10.6. Procedure 
On arrival, members of the research team greeted and checked in each participant. 
Participants were then provided with a volunteer number and a clipboard containing the 
paperwork for the trials. The pre-trial procedure was the same as Experiment Two.  
 
10.6.1. Pre-trial procedure 
On completion of the pre-trial briefing, the cabin crew member accompanied the 
participant to the cabin simulator. 
 
10.6.2. Trial procedure 
10.6.2.1. Seating 
Each participant was assigned to the seat adjacent to the Type III exit. The three 
‘stooge’ passengers were each assigned a seat in the vicinity of the exit operator. The 
assigned seats were the seat directly next to the Type III operator, the seat directly in 
front of the Type III exit operator and the aisle seat in the Type III exit row on the port 
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side of the cabin. Each ‘stooge’ passenger occupied the seat they were assigned for each 
trial. 
 
10.6.2.2. Safety briefings 
Once seated, a member of cabin crew provided a safety briefing which included the 
location of the exits, and demonstrations of the use of seatbelts and oxygen masks. In 
addition, the participant received a minimal individual briefing on their emergency 
duties, which only highlighted to them that they were sat next to an emergency exit, that 
they may be required to open the exit in the event of an emergency and where they 
could find additional safety information on exit operation. The briefings were identical 
to those provided in Experiment One and can be found in Appendix I.  
 
10.6.2.3. The call to evacuate 
When the safety briefings were complete, the cabin crew checked the cabin.  As the 
trials were to simulate an emergency evacuation on take off, shortly after the cabin 
check a pre-recorded evacuation scenario was played. This included a period of engine 
noise (approximately 30 seconds), followed by an announcement from the Captain to 
“Undo your seat belts and get out!” The scenario was identical to that played during 
Experiment One. A transcript of the evacuation scenario is contained in Appendix J. 
 
10.6.2.4. Cabin crew actions 
At this point, the cabin crew member, who was located at the front of the cabin, 
commanded the passenger to open the Type III exit and move quickly throughout the 
evacuation process. The commands were as those documented in Experiment One. The 
‘stooge’ passengers were instructed to react to the call to evacuate, undo their seatbelts 
and move towards the Type III exit.  
 
As in previous experiments, members of the research team were located outside the exit 
and marshalled the participant to a place of safety. The evacuation was deemed 
complete when the passenger had evacuated the cabin.  
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10.6.3. Post-trial procedure 
After evacuating, the participant was asked to complete a post-evacuation questionnaire. 
A copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix P. On completion of the post-
evacuation questionnaire, the participant was thanked, debriefed and paid. Finally, the 
participant was provided with a thank you letter (as per Experiment One) containing 
contact details for the research team. A copy of this letter is provided in Appendix K.   
 
10.7. Analysis 
The video footage was edited and a time code was added. The exit operation times were 
extracted from this footage. All performance exit operation data, along with the 
quantitative responses from the post evacuation questionnaires were entered into SPSS 
version 14 for quantitative analysis.  
 
Qualitative comments provided in response to the open questions on the post evacuation 
questionnaire were collated on a question-by-question basis and have been used to add 
depth to the quantitative results.  
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11.0. Results: Experiment Three 
 
11.1. Sample 
A total of 75 participants took part in the testing programme (80 experimental trials 
were scheduled, but several participants failed to attend). Fifty-three participants were 
male (70.7%) and 22 were female (29.3%). It is noted that one participant did not 
answer the demographic questionnaire. Participants provided their age at the time of the 
testing session. Participants’ ages ranged from 21 to 46 years, with a mean age of 27.5 
years, and a standard deviation of 5.6 years. Six participants were left handed (8.0%) 
and 68 were right handed (90.7%).  Most participants had flown previously on a 
commercial flight (72 participants, or 96.0%), and no participants reported having to 
make an emergency evacuation. Participants were screened at the recruiting stage to 
ensure that they had no previous experience of operating a Type III exit.    
 
11.2. Completed evacuations 
Thirty-seven trials were conducted in the traditional “plug” exit configuration, and 38 
trials were conducted in the modified “up and over” ADH exit configuration. There 
were no reported injuries. 
 
11.3. Inferential statistics 
In all inferential statistical tests Type III exit mechanism was entered as an independent 
variable and either the exit operation performance measure or the questionnaire ratings 
were entered as the dependent variable. 
 
11.4. Time taken to make the Type III exit available 
The mean hatch release times are provided in Table 21. All mean times and mean 
participant ratings have been rounded up to one decimal place. A t-test conducted on 
these data revealed no statistically significant difference attributable to hatch type 
t(64.77) = 1.76, p=0.08. As Levene’s test for equality of variances was significant, equal 
variances were not assumed and adjusted values have been presented.  
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Table 21: Mean hatch release time (in seconds) in each condition 
Type III exit mechanism 
Traditional “plug” mechanism “Up and over” ADH mechanism 
3.8 (sd 1.0) 3.3 (sd 1.4) 
 
The mean exit operation times are provided in Table 22. 
Table 22: Mean exit operation time (in seconds) in each condition 
Type III exit mechanism 
Traditional “plug” mechanism “Up and over” ADH mechanism 
8.5 (sd 3.7) 2.5 (sd 1.2) 
 
As can be seen in Table 22, the time taken to operate the exit varied by test condition. 
An independent t-test was conducted on the data which revealed a statistically 
significant difference in the time taken to operate the Type III exit between exit types 
t(42.90) = 9.25, p=0.00. As Levene’s test for equality of variances was significant, equal 
variances were not assumed and adjusted values have been presented. Participants 
operated the exit significantly faster in the “up and over” automatically disposed hatch 
condition than they did in evacuations with the traditional “plug” exit mechanism as 
shown in Table 22.   
 
The mean exit availability times are provided in Table 23.  
 
Table 23: Mean exit availability time (in seconds) in each condition 
Type III exit mechanism 
Traditional “plug” mechanism “Up and over” ADH mechanism 
12.2 (sd 4.3) 5.8 (sd 2.1) 
 
As can be seen in Table 23, the time taken to make the exit available for evacuation varies 
by test condition. An independent t-test was conducted on the data which revealed a 
statistically significant difference in the time taken for participants to make the exit 
available for evacuation, due to exit type t(59.11) = 8.24, p=0.00. As Levene’s test for 
equality of variances was significant, equal variances were not assumed and adjusted 
values have been presented. Participants were able to make the exit available faster during 
evacuations where the hatch had an automatic disposal “up and over” mechanism than 
when it was a traditional “plug” style mechanism as shown in Table 23.  
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11.5. Perceived difficulty of the Type III exit 
In addition to the video timings on exit hatch release, operation and availability times, 
data from the post-evacuation questionnaires were also analysed. Specific questions 
were designed that concerned the Type III exit. These related to finding the exit 
operating handle, unlatching the exit hatch, using the exit operating handle, opening the 
exit hatch, the weight of the hatch, the size of the hatch, moving the hatch out of the 
way, and any factors related to the exit hatch that helped or hindered the participant 
during their evacuation.  
 
Participants were asked about the level of difficult in finding the exit operating handle. 
The mean difficulty ratings are provided in Table 24.  An independent t-test conducted 
on these data revealed no statistically significant differences attributable to exit type 
t(72) = 1.06, p=0.30. 
 
Table 24: Mean Type III exit operator difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 
was very difficult) for finding the exit operating handle in each condition.   
 Type III exit mechanism 
Traditional “plug” mechanism “Up and over” ADH mechanism 
1.6 (sd 1.0) 1.3 (sd 0.9) 
 
The perceived level of difficulty in unlatching the hatch was also addressed on the post 
evacuation questionnaire. The mean difficulty ratings are provided in Table 25.  
 
Table 25: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for unlatching the exit hatch in each condition.   
 Type III exit mechanism 
Traditional “plug” mechanism “Up and over” ADH mechanism 
2.2 (sd 1.3) 1.5 (sd 1.0) 
 
As can be seen in Table 25, the difficulty ratings for unlatching the exit hatch varied 
between the test conditions. The data were entered into an independent t-test which 
revealed a statistically significant difference in the difficulty ratings between exit type 
conditions t(66.76) = 2.80, p=0.01. Participants using the traditional “plug” exit, 
reported that it was significantly more difficult to unlatch the exit hatch than those using 
the “up and over” ADH, as evidenced by the higher difficulty rating scores as shown in 
Table 25. 
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The post evacuation questionnaire asked participants to rate the level of difficulty in 
using the exit operating handle. The mean difficulty ratings are provided in Table 26.  
 
Table 26: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for using the exit operating handle in each condition. 
 Type III exit mechanism 
Traditional “plug” mechanism “Up and over” ADH mechanism 
2.0 (sd 0.9) 1.4 (sd 0.8) 
 
As can be seen in Table 26, there is some variation in the mean difficulty ratings 
between each test condition. The data were entered into an independent t-test which 
revealed a statistically significant difference in the difficulty ratings between exit type 
conditions t(71) = 2.93, p=0.01. Participants perceived using the exit operating handle 
as significantly more difficult with the traditional “plug” exit mechanism than with the 
“up and over” automatically disposed hatch as shown in Table 26. 
 
Participants were asked about the level of difficulty opening the exit hatch. The mean 
difficulty ratings are provided in Table 27.  
 
Table 27: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for opening the exit hatch in each condition. 
Type III exit mechanism 
Traditional “plug” mechanism “Up and over” ADH mechanism 
3.0 (sd 1.5) 1.7 (sd 1.1) 
 
As can be seen in Table 27, the mean difficulty ratings of opening the exit hatch varied 
between the test conditions. The data were entered into an independent t-test which 
revealed a statistically significant difference in the difficulty ratings between exit type 
conditions t(71) = 4.36, p=0.01. Participants using the traditional “plug” exit, reported 
that it was significantly more difficult to open the exit hatch than the participants using 
the “up and over”, as evidenced by the higher difficulty rating scores in Table 27. 
 
The post evacuation questionnaire asked participants to rate the clarity of the 
instructions for disposing of the door. The mean clarity ratings are provided in Table 28. 
An independent t-test conducted on these data revealed no statistically significant 
differences attributable to exit type t(66) = 1.20, p=0.23. 
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Table 28: Mean participant clarity ratings (where 1 was very clear and 7 was very 
unclear) for the instructions for disposing of the door in each condition. 
 Type III exit mechanism 
Traditional “plug” mechanism “Up and over” ADH mechanism 
3.9 (sd 2.1) 3.3 (sd 2.1) 
 
The final question analysed from the post evacuation questionnaire related to the 
difficulty of moving the hatch out of the way. The mean difficulty ratings are provided 
in Table 29.  
 
Table 29: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for moving the hatch out of the way in each condition. 
 Type III exit mechanism 
Traditional “plug” mechanism “Up and over” ADH mechanism 
4.9 (sd 1.4) 2.3 (sd 1.7) 
 
As can be seen in Table 29, the mean difficulty ratings for moving the hatch out of the 
way varies by test condition. The data were entered into an independent t-test which 
revealed a statistically significant difference in the difficulty ratings between exit type 
conditions t(68) = 6.98, p=0.01. Participants using the traditional “plug” exit, reported 
that it was significantly more difficult to move the hatch out of the way than the 
participants using the “up and over” ADH, as evidenced by the higher difficulty rating 
scores in Table 29. 
 
11.6. Perceived difficulty of the evacuation 
In order to investigate perceived difficulty of the evacuations, data from a selection of 
questions on the post-evacuation questionnaires were also analysed.  
 
The participants were asked about the difficulty of moving between the seats at the exit 
row on the post evacuation questionnaire. The mean ratings provided in response to this 
question are given in Table 30. An independent t-test conducted on these data revealed 
no statistically significant differences attributable to exit type t(66) = 1.40, p=0.17. 
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Table 30: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for moving between the seats at the exit row in each condition.   
Type III exit mechanism 
Traditional “plug” mechanism “Up and over” ADH mechanism 
2.7 (sd 1.6) 2.2 (sd 1.3) 
 
The post-evacuation questionnaires asked participants to rate the difficulty of moving 
through the exit and out of the aircraft. The mean ratings provided in response to this 
question are given in Table 31.  
 
Table 31: Mean participant difficulty ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very 
difficult) for moving through the exit and out of the aircraft in each condition.   
Type III exit mechanism 
Traditional “plug” mechanism “Up and over” ADH mechanism 
3.0 (sd 1.6) 2.1 (sd 1.3) 
 
The data were entered into an independent t-test which revealed a statistically 
significant difference in the difficulty ratings between exit type conditions t(71) = 2.61, 
p=0.01. Participants perceived moving through the exit and out of the aircraft as 
significantly more difficult with the traditional “plug” exit mechanism than with the “up 
and over” automatically disposed hatch condition as shown in Table 31. 
 
11.7. Type III exit factors that helped and hindered evacuation 
In addition to the rating scales, the participants were asked to state what (if anything) 
related to the Type III exit hatch that had helped or hindered their evacuation. In 
response to any factors related to the exit hatch that helped the evacuation, a number of 
the comments from participants within the traditional “plug” Type III exit mechanism 
condition related to the exit operating handle. Participants reported that it was clear that 
they needed to pull the handle to operate the exit and the location of both handles on the 
hatch assisted them. Whereas a number of participants within the “up and over” 
automatically disposed hatch condition reported that it was the exit hatch mechanism 
itself that helped their evacuation. 
 
Traditional “plug” exit mechanism 
 
 “It looked logical to pull the red handle” (Participant 2, traditional “plug” exit 
mechanism). 
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“The clarity of the lever to pull down to open” (Participant 5, traditional “plug” exit 
mechanism). 
 
“Red handle, intuitive colour for emergencies” (Participant 33, traditional “plug” exit 
mechanism). 
 
“Two handles were quite helpful” (Participant 3, traditional “plug” exit mechanism). 
 
“Where the handles were placed on the exit door” (Participant 11, traditional “plug” 
exit mechanism). 
 
“Up and over” automatically disposed exit mechanism 
 
“Very easy to open, just slid up” (Participant 42, “up and over” ADH). 
 
“Not heavy and slides up. There was no obstruction. And easy to use even for ladies” 
(Participant 57, “up and over” ADH). 
 
“This system is a tremendous improvement on the old disposable exit” (Participant 69, 
“up and over” ADH). 
 
“It was very easy to open the door and the exit operating handle was at the right 
position: neither too high or too low” (Participant 78, “up and over” ADH). 
 
Participants were also asked if any factors related to the exit hatch hindered their 
evacuation. A number of participants who evacuated with the traditional “plug” Type III 
exit mechanism commented on the difficulties they experienced related to the weight, 
size, shape and manoeuvrability of the exit hatch. Whereas in the “up and over” 
automatically disposed exit condition, there were only half as many comments relating 
to exit hatch factors that participants reported hindered them. Participants in this 
condition reported that the step up required to evacuate through the exit had caused 
some difficulties, along with the exit mechanism itself. 
 
Traditional “plug” exit mechanism 
 
 “The size, the weight and the room I had to manoeuvre in” (Participant 6, traditional 
“plug” exit mechanism). 
 
“The weight hindered its removal” (Participant 8, traditional “plug” exit mechanism). 
 
“Exit too big to manipulate in the space available” (Participant 14, traditional “plug” 
exit mechanism). 
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“Up and over” automatically disposed exit mechanism 
 
“High step” (Participant 58, “up and over” ADH). 
 
“The hatch failed to open properly” (Participant 69, “up and over” ADH). 
 
“Hand blocked between fuselage and door, hatch too light” (Participant 62, “up and 
over” ADH). 
 
“Did not know which way door would move. Tried pushing outwards nothing 
happened” (Participant 76, “up and over” ADH). 
 
In addition, the participants were asked to state if any physical features within the cabin 
hindered their evacuation. Participants in both the traditional “plug” exit mechanism 
condition and in the “up and over” automatically disposed hatch condition reported that 
limited headroom at the Type III exit and limited space around the exit and exit row had 
hindered them. 
 
Traditional “plug” exit mechanism 
 
 “The height of the overhead baggage compartments. The room between the rows. The 
size of the exit. (Participant 6, traditional “plug” exit mechanism). 
 
“The lack of headroom” (Participant 8, traditional “plug” exit mechanism). 
 
“The space between the front seat and my seat when I take out the emergency door” 
(Participant 20, traditional “plug” exit mechanism). 
 
 
“Up and over” automatically disposed exit mechanism 
 
“Low ceiling” (Participant 58, “up and over” ADH). 
 
“The space too small” (Participant 60, “up and over” ADH). 
 
“Low overhead cabins” (Participant 64, “up and over” ADH). 
 
“Too small, you have to slightly bend to get out” (Participant 80, “up and over” ADH). 
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12.0. Discussion – Experiment Three 
 
12.1. Type III exit mechanism  
The results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference in the time taken 
to operate the Type III exit attributed to the type of exit mechanism. Participants 
operated the Type III exit quicker in the ADH “up and over” hatch condition than in the 
traditional “plug” exit condition. However, there was no statistically significant 
difference in exit release time due to exit type mechanism. The current research 
investigating an ADH exit mechanism in a smaller interior configuration replicates and 
supports the findings of Cobbett et al (1997). Cobbett et al found in a larger single aisle 
cabin participants operated the exit significantly faster with the modified “up and over” 
ADH exit than with the traditional “plug” exit, replicating the findings from this 
experiment.   
 
There were also significant differences in the exit operators’ perceptions of task 
difficulty. Participants perceived it as significantly more difficult to unlatch the exit 
hatch, use the exit operating handle and open the exit when the exit hatch mechanism 
was configured as the traditional “plug” exit, as oppose to when the exit was in the 
ADH “up and over” mechanism. This is in line with the findings of Cobbett et al (1997) 
who reported that more participants who operated the traditional exit mechanism 
reported difficulties compared to the number of participants who reported difficulties 
with the ADH mechanism. However, there were no significant differences due to exit 
type in participant’s perceptions of the clarity of exit operation instructions on the safety 
card or during the personal briefing given by the cabin crew or the instructions for 
disposing of the exit. The previous experiment had shown the complex nature of Type 
III exit operation and the benefits of providing detailed information on the tasks 
involved in operation of the Type III exit. As operation of the ADH exit was simpler 
and more intuitive, it is surprising that the instructions given on the safety card for the 
ADH mechanism were not perceived as clearer by exit operators.  
  
It was noted that in the current research programme, the cabin was configured to 
represent a smaller internal configuration, but the diameter of the actual fuselage was 
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not reduced. The Cobbett et al (1997) study did highlight potential difficulties with 
fitting the mechanism onto smaller diameter fuselages. However the exit mechanism 
tested during this experiment was just a prototype to evaluate the concept of an ADH 
exit mechanism within a smaller transport aircraft. Other ADH designs, such as the 
Boeing Next-Generation outward opening design, would not have the same issues with 
the reduced diameter fuselage associated with smaller transport aircraft.  
 
The findings from this experiment have provided further support to the recommendation 
of a number of cabin safety commentators (including Cobbett et al (1997); the NTSB 
(2000) McLean et al (2002); the CSHWG (2002) and R.G.W. Cherry and Associates 
(2006)) who have proposed the installation of ADH in place of traditional Type III exits 
on some aircraft types. The findings from this experiment have also provided further 
support to the NTSB recommendations that Type III exits with ‘automatic hatch 
stowage out of the egress path’ should be installed on all ‘newly manufactured aircraft’ 
(2000, p. 80). The experiment adds data on the issue of ADHs on board smaller 
transport aircraft as requested by the CSHWG in 2002. The findings from this 
experiment support one of the comments made by the CSHWG who felt that ‘smaller 
transport aircraft could benefit significantly [from non-disposable hatch designs] (FAA, 
2002, p. 6). 
 
12.2. Summary of Experiment Three 
The objective of Experiment Three was to investigate the effect of one type of ADH the 
‘upwards sliding’/ ‘up and over’ mechanism, compared to the traditional Type III ‘plug’ 
exit mechanism on exit operation in a smaller interior configuration. The results from 
the experiment have highlighted that the time taken to operate the exit and make it 
available for egress and participants’ perceptions of the operation task can be improved 
through the installation of an ADH on a smaller transport aircraft. 
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13.0 Introduction – Exit hatch placement 
 
13.1. Introduction to Experiment Four 
A review of simulated evacuation research studies, simulated trials and aircraft 
accidents has highlighted that Type III hatches were not always disposed of outside the 
aircraft and had been reported in a number of locations inside the cabin. These locations 
have included on the exit row seats, in the passageway leading to the exit and in the 
main aisle. It is likely that inappropriate placement of the Type III hatch may result in a 
blockage to the egress route and be a potential impediment to the remaining passengers 
who need to evacuate through the exit aperture.  
 
The effect of the placement of the exit hatch is unknown as there is limited publicly 
available literature on the issue. Although the hatch may be an impediment to all aircraft 
cabins irrespective of size, it was felt that potential impediments caused by 
inappropriate hatch disposal may be more pronounced in smaller transport aircraft. The 
reasons for this are related to the physical parameters of the smaller transport cabin. 
These cabins are likely to have only one or two seats either side of the main aisle and if 
the exit hatch is placed internally, due to the reduced length of the seat assembly, it may 
create a greater obstruction in this area. In addition, the reduced length of the seats may 
result in the disposed hatch impeding passenger egress along the main aisle to the floor 
level exits, as well as access to the overwing exits. Finally if the hatch is left in such a 
location inside the cabin whereby it impedes movement towards the exit, due to the 
limited headroom associated with a smaller transport aircraft, passengers will have 
restrictive space in which to traverse over the hatch and out through the aperture.  
 
13.2. Regulations on exit hatch disposal location 
After operation of a traditional Type III exit, the exit hatch is no longer attached to the 
aircraft fuselage. The exit operator is required to dispose of the hatch into an appropriate 
location where it does not impede egress. As previously highlighted in Section 5.4 the 
operation of and disposal of the exit hatch may place physical and comprehension 
demands on the exit operator. The disposal location should not impede firstly the egress 
through the exit row and aperture of the exit operator and subsequently the other 
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passengers who opt to use the exit. The exit operator has two options when considering 
the disposal location – outside or inside the cabin. Inside the cabin the hatch may be left 
on the seats either in the exit row or adjacent seat rows, on the floor in the exit row, 
adjacent to the fuselage if the cabin if configured with the outboard seat removed or the 
hatch may be placed into the main aircraft aisle.  
 
Following the accident at Manchester in 1985 and the egress difficulties experienced at 
the Type III exit, the AAIB recommended that the exit hatch should be disposed of 
outside the aircraft ‘to avoid the hatch becoming a further obstacle to evacuating 
passengers’ (AAIB, 1988, p. 136). Current UK CAA guidance to operators is that Type 
III exit hatches should be located outside the aircraft cabin after operation. Following 
Manchester, the CAA concluded that ‘the exit hatch is potentially a more significant 
hazard inside the aircraft and could, in some circumstances, become an obstruction’ 
(Barthelmess, 1989, p. 7).  
 
Although exterior placement is recommended by the UK regulator, this is not the case 
with other authorities who suggest that it is acceptable for the hatch to be disposed of 
outside or inside the aircraft cabin. Within the Advisory Circular on passenger safety 
cards (AC 121-24C), the FAA advise operators to display any manual tasks that 
passengers may be required to complete. One of the tasks is the placement of the Type 
III hatch. The advisory circular states that the card should show the ‘recommended 
placement of the hatch on the seat or outside the aircraft’ (FAA, 2003, p. 7) which 
implies that either placement is considered acceptable by the FAA.  
 
13.3. Industry guidance 
The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) in 2001 explored the issue of Type III hatch 
placement. The FSF found that the recommended exit hatch placement location varied 
between manufacturers and aircraft types. Airbus informed the FSF during a telephone 
interview that they usually suggest where a slide is deployed the exit hatch should be 
disposed of inside the aircraft. Whereas when an evacuation slide is not used, the hatch 
should be disposed of outside the aircraft. In this study the focus is on smaller transport 
aircraft and the possible implications of an external hatch coming into contact with a 
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slide are not relevant due to the absence of Type III exit slides on such aircraft. 
Although in conclusion Airbus were reported as stating that “the ultimate decision is left 
to the airline to determine” (FSF, 2001, p. 2). 
 
This final point made by Airbus is similar to that of Boeing, who informed the FSF that 
it was for the manufacturer to provide the equipment, including the operating 
instructions, but for the individual airlines to determine the disposal location of the exit 
hatch. Boeing went on to explain that they can suggest a number of options to the 
airlines which include external or internal disposal. However in conclusion, the Boeing 
representative stated that “the decision depends on the evacuation situation and 
ultimately is the operator’s responsibility based on their own criteria and conclusions” 
(FSF, 2001, p. 2).  
 
From these comments it seems that the hatch disposal guidance may be inside or outside 
depending on the presence of an evacuation slide or the airline’s operating procedures.  
However, if the hatch is left in an inappropriate location inside the cabin, it has the 
potential to impede egress and may prevent passengers from using the exit.  
 
13.4. Type III hatch disposal in accidents 
An accident analysis into Type III hatch disposal was conducted in response to 
regulatory activity on automatically disposed hatches (ADHs) and automatically 
operating exits (AOEs) by R.G.W Cherry and Associates (2006b). The project reviewed 
a number of aviation accidents to determine the number of Type III exits opened, and 
the occurrence of hatch disposal inside the aircraft cabin.  
 
The accidents used in the analysis were selected from either the Cabin Safety Research 
Technical Group (CSRTG) accident database v27 or from a library of accident reports. 
From these accidents, a subset were selected for analysis if they involved passengers on 
the aircraft, a fire, an emergency evacuation and that detailed information on the 
accident had been provided by the accident investigation team. 
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Based on these criteria, 87 accidents that occurred between 1967 and 2002 were 
reviewed within the study. Of the 87 accidents, 57 accidents included aircraft with Type 
III exits. Of the 57 aircraft, 65 Type III hatches were operated, although the study 
authors found that, unfortunately, the location of the disposed Type III exit hatch could 
only be determined for 17 of the exits. Based on the cases where hatch location could be 
determined, the study concluded that ‘approximately 80% were disposed of inside the 
cabin’ (2006b, p. 4).  
 
In three of the cases extracted by R.G.W. Cherry and Associates (2006b) from the 
accident database the hatch disposal location was reported as a hindrance to the 
evacuation (a point noted by the report authors). The reports were during the evacuation 
of the McDonnell Douglas DC-8 accident at Bangor, Maine in 1973 where it was 
reported that the hatch was left on the floor in the seat row and caused an impediment. 
The placement of the Type III hatch was also mentioned during the evacuation of the 
Boeing 737 following an engine fire at Calgary, Alberta, in 1984. The exit plug was 
reportedly disposed of on the exit row seats but the positioning resulted in a blockage 
along the exit row passageway.  Finally in the accident and subsequent evacuation from 
the McDonnell Douglas MD-82 aircraft at Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1999 hatch 
placement was mentioned. However the report was contradictory in places. A passenger 
reported that the hatch caused an obstruction at the exit and someone from the outside 
of the aircraft removed the plug to help the evacuation, but also that the passenger 
progress through the exit was “smooth” (R.G.W. Cherry and Associates, 2006b). 
 
The authors did highlight that of the 57 accidents, 35 involved the use of the Type III 
exits, but in only 12 cases was the disposal of, or placement of the Type III hatch 
detailed within the investigatory report. It was reported that it was not known if the 
absent information on exit hatch placement meant that the hatch did not impede the 
evacuation or that the hatch was disposed of correctly. The authors concluded that the 
data on the placement of Type III hatches is limited and the effect of hatch placement on 
the evacuation is indeterminate (R.G.W Cherry and Associates Ltd, 2006b).  
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It must be noted that during their analysis R.G.W Cherry and Associates Ltd reviewed 
the evacuation commentaries within the selection of accident reports to highlight any 
incidents where exit hatch disposal was cited as not impeding the evacuation and found 
two examples These were the evacuation of an aircraft at London (Heathrow) in 1992 
and one in the Virgin Islands in 1976. There were no other accidents where they felt the 
accident report gave an unambiguous comment of the influence of an internally 
disposed hatch on egress.  
 
The study authors concluded that ‘there is limited information in accident reports to 
suggest that disposal of Type III hatches internal to the aircraft are a frequent cause of 
evacuation impediment’ (R.G.W Cherry and Associates Ltd, 2006b, p. 15). If this 
statement was taken alone, the importance of the area may be questioned, however the 
report authors go on to state that ‘furthermore, the degree to which internal hatch 
disposal is an impediment to evacuation is unknown’ (p. 15). Although limited 
examples of the influence of hatch placement on evacuation were highlighted by this 
study, the review highlights the need for further work in the area to be conducted.  
 
13.5. Type III hatch disposal in experimental research  
During their study on passageway configuration at the Type III exit in 1989, Rasmussen 
and Chittum acknowledged that the disposal location of the Type III exit during the exit 
operation trials was not controlled, with observations from the trials suggesting ‘an 
indiscriminately discarded door may well be more detrimental to safe and rapid egress 
than many other controllable factors’ (Rasmussen and Chittum, 1989, p. 14). The study 
authors go on further to suggest that the placement of the Type III hatch may be 
dependent on the seating configuration adjacent to the exit, as it may not be as much of 
a hindrance with a 20” vertically projected passageway between the seats, as when a 
more restrictive passageway is present (Rasmussen and Chittum, 1989). Although not 
specifically addressed by Rasmussen and Chittum, the area adjacent to the Type III exit 
may be more restrictive on smaller transport aircraft as well as larger aircraft with a 
narrower exit row passageway.  
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The placement of the Type III hatch was also commented on by McLean et al (1992) 
during their study on the seating configuration adjacent to the exit. When the outboard 
seat was removed, the hatch was left in the clear area in a vertical position either leaning 
against the fuselage or the seat row in front of the exit on a number of occasions. 
Although the hatch was left it this location, it was acknowledged by the study authors 
that the placement of the hatch was not considered to impede egress (McLean et al, 
1992).  
 
During the McLean et al (1992) trials the hatch was also discarded by the hatch operator 
on the exit operator’s seat and on the floor of the exit row, with a higher incident of this 
behaviour when the access to the exit was at a minimum configuration. McLean et al 
(1992) state that ‘both of these placements can adversely affect the egress rate but the 
floor placement will generally be the most detrimental, [as] this placement may require 
those attempting to use the exit to step up into the seat to get past the door and/or move 
through the exit from a standing position on the outboard seat’ (McLean et al, 1992, p. 
14). In line with the findings of Rasmussen and Chittum, McLean et al concluded that 
the seating configuration may influence the hatch disposal location, ‘at least in the 
absence of specific instructions’ (McLean et al, 1992, p. 14).  
 
Fennel and Muir (1993) during their research into exit row seating configurations and 
Type III hatch weights (as discussed in Section 5.5.1) commented on the location of the 
disposed hatch within the different experimental configurations. Table 32 below shows 
the placement of the hatch by participants. 
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Table 32: Placement of hatch by participants.  Taken from Fennell and Muir (1993, 
p. 17) 
Hatch placement location Percentage of participants 
 Pre AN79 
(3” VP) 
Trial 1 
AN79 
(13”VP) 
Trial 1 
AN79 
(13”VP) 
Trial 2 
AN79 
(13”VP) 
Trial 3 
Outside on the wing 63.5% 37.5% 69.8% 80.2% 
On floor in exit row 2.1% 53.1% 25.0% 16.7% 
On seat in exit row 10.4% 7.3% 4.2% 2.1% 
On the aisle 4.2% - - - 
On seat in row in front of exit 2.1% - - - 
Failed to complete task 17.7% 2.1% 1.0% 1.0% 
 
As can be seen from Table 32, although the majority of operators disposed of the hatch 
outside the cabin, a number of operators placed the hatch inside the cabin, typically on 
the floor in the exit row or on the exit row seats. Interestingly a higher number of 
participants left the exit hatch on the floor where it was more likely to impede egress 
than on the seat assembly.  
 
It was noted by Fennell and Muir (1993) that approximately 85% of participants during 
their first trial with a 13” vertically projected passageway disposed of the hatch into a 
location (either inside or outside the cabin) which may have caused an obstruction to 
passengers either in the exit row or once through the exit aperture. However this result 
must be placed into context as the trials involved individual participants in the cabin and 
the results may have been different if other passengers had also been in the cabin 
(Fennell and Muir, 1993).  
 
Fennell and Muir highlighted that more passengers left the hatch inside the cabin during 
their first trial in the 13” vertically projected passageway when there was more space in 
the access row, although the number of participants who placed the hatch outside the 
cabin did increase as participants became more practiced in the task (Fennell and Muir, 
1993). 
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The placement of the exit hatch was also reported in the Cobbett et al study (1997). 
When reviewing the data from the first trial only, Cobbett et al reported that only 
approximately 40% of participants correctly disposed of the traditional Type III hatch 
outside the cabin. Cobbett et al (1997) provided details on the hatch placement positions 
of the participants who operated the traditional Type III exit hatch and these are shown 
in Table 33 below.  
 
Table 33: Hatch placement locations of participants operating the traditional Type III 
hatch (adapted from Cobbett et al, 1997). 
Hatch placement location Percentage of participants 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 
On the floor in exit row 16.7% 6.3% 4.2% 
On seat in exit row 10.4% 8.3% 8.3% 
Across dummy’s lap 10.4% 8.3% 6.3% 
Where the outboard seat had been removed from 16.7% 10.4% 4.2% 
On the floor behind the exit row (in OSR condition) 6.3% 8.3% 6.3% 
Correct disposal onto wing 39.6% 58.3% 70.8% 
* As the data have been converted into percentages in this table for ease of comparison across placement 
locations, due to rounding of decimal places to one decimal place, trial one and trial three totals equal 
100.1% 
 
As can be seen in Table 33, although many participants disposed of the hatch in the 
correct location outside the cabin by trial three, a high number of exit hatches were left 
inside the cabin during the first trial. Locations included on the floor in the exit area and 
on the exit row seat assembly.  
 
Exit hatch placement was also discussed during the Cobbett et al (2001) investigation 
into the influence of Type III exit operator’s briefings on exit operation as previously 
discussed in Section 5.5.2. Twenty-five per cent of participants left the exit inside the 
cabin, even though the exit operating instructions and briefing informed operators to 
leave the hatch outside. When the hatch was left inside it was left either on or between 
the seats in the exit row. Cobbett et al reported a significant effect attributable to level 
of exit operator’s briefing on correct disposal of hatch (deemed to be outside the cabin). 
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Significantly more operators who received a detailed briefing (either in verbal or written 
form) disposed of the hatch correctly compared to those operators who did not receive a 
briefing or were in the minimal briefing group. Cobbett et al remarked that although 
disposing of the hatch inside the cabin resulted in ‘an increase in the exit availability 
speed, it also meant that the hatch became a potential hindrance, obstructing passage 
through the exit’ (2001, p. 10).  
 
McLean et al’s (2002) evacuation study previously discussed in Section 1.9.2 relating to 
passageway configuration at the Type III exit was the first study to manipulate the 
placement of the Type III hatch on exit operation and passenger evacuation. Depending 
on the configuration under test, participants allocated to the task of exit operator were 
either given a safety card showing the hatch, after operation, disposed of outside the 
aircraft or inside the aircraft. The internal hatch placement safety information informed 
operators to place the hatch horizontally on the seats in the exit row leaning against the 
seatbacks.  
 
During the study it was noted by McLean et al (2002) that when the safety card showed 
hatch disposal outside the cabin, the operators complied with the instructions. When 
operators were informed to leave the hatch inside the cabin, the majority of operators 
placed the hatch in the location specified on the safety card, however a number of 
occurrences of incorrect placement were observed. Although McLean et al were not 
specifically looking at the effect of this incorrect placement on evacuation; this 
highlights the potential for the incorrect placement of the Type III hatch inside the 
cabin, the impact of which on evacuation is unknown.  
 
A significant effect was shown for naïve participants for hatch location on “exit ready to 
use time” (this was defined as the time taken from the start of the evacuation until the 
first participant started to egress through the exit), with times quicker when the hatch 
was disposed of inside the cabin compared to outside the exit (McLean et al, 2002). 
McLean et al also investigated the influence of the independent variables on the time for 
the first person to egress through the aperture (this performance timing was taken from 
the end of the exit ready to use time, until the first participant had moved through the 
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aperture). As with the exit ready to use measure, a significant effect was reported for 
hatch disposal location, with times quicker when the hatch was disposed of inside the 
cabin. McLean et al (2002, p. 10) concluded that ‘the time required for removal and 
disposal of the hatch was the primary variable in launching the evacuation flow.’ 
However, disposing of the hatch inside the cabin may speed up the initial part of the 
evacuation, but if the internally placed hatch becomes an obstruction, it is likely to have 
a negative effect on the overall evacuation time or the rate at which participants can 
evacuate through the exit. It is the overall evacuation rate that is of interest within the 
current experiment.  
 
Interestingly when looking at the overall evacuation during their repeated measures 
analysis, McLean and Corbett (2004) removed a number of individual evacuation times 
that were considered outliers as they were three standard deviations from the mean. This 
was possible due to the large sample size and resulted in the removal of 131 of the 
10,176 individual egress times. Of importance to the current discussion is the rationale 
given for the removal of these data, which was due to ‘errant individual subject 
behaviour, the exit being jammed with subjects, or the hatch becoming an impediment’ 
(McLean and Corbett, 2004, p. 7). Although McLean and Corbett were not specifically 
addressing the potential influence of hatch placement, and the placement of the hatch 
did not result in any trial being stopped, their study has highlighted the impediment that 
may result from an incorrectly disposed of Type III exit hatch throughout the whole 
evacuation.  
 
During the McLean et al (2002) study, there was also a discussion about the placement 
of the Type III exit hatch and the ability of exit operators to follow the safety 
information given to them. When the hatch was not placed in the location shown in on 
the safety card, the authors classified it as an ‘incorrect’ placement. Although the 
number of incorrect placements was small and all during the internal hatch disposal 
conditions, the locations of the incorrectly disposed hatches were provided and are of 
importance to the current study. All of the incorrect exit hatch placements were when 
the exit operator had been informed to leave the hatch inside the cabin. During three 
trials the hatch was placed on the floor of the exit row in a vertical position leaning 
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against the seat in front and once was moved during the evacuation from the seat to the 
floor. On three occasions the hatch was placed on the seats in the row behind the exit 
and on one occasion the hatch was placed on the other side of the cabin. On one final 
occasion the hatch was placed in between the seats in the exit row and the aircraft 
fuselage, although McLean et al reported that this location did not influence the 
evacuation.  
 
Although in conclusion, when looking at the overall influence of the hatch disposal 
location on operation and evacuation, McLean et al felt that ‘either hatch disposal 
location could be justifiably chosen for airline operations, as long as aft seat 
encroachment is limited to the centreline of the exit’ (2002, p. 15). In most cases where 
internal hatch placement was shown, the hatch was placed on the exit seat row assembly 
and did not impede egress. However, if the hatch were to be placed on the floor or 
knocked from the seat assembly either into its face or the floor it may impede the access 
to the exit. In addition the evacuation trials within this study were from a larger 
transport aircraft where there is likely to be more room for the passengers to manoeuvre 
within. The available space both due to the narrower fuselage and restrictive headroom 
is likely to be less in a smaller transport aircraft. 
 
13.6. Rationale for Experiment Four 
There seems to be a lack of publicly available information on the impact of the 
positioning of the exit hatch on evacuation. McLean et al (1992) recommended the need 
for ‘additional tests […] to quantify the specific effects of various door disposal 
locations’ (p. 15). This was reiterated by R.G.W. Cherry and Associates who concluded 
that ‘the degree to which internal hatch disposal is an impediment to evacuation is 
unknown’ (2006b, p. 15). 
 
As smaller transport aircraft have a narrower fuselage it was felt that potential 
impediments caused by inappropriate disposal may be more pronounced, therefore as an 
initial study simulated evacuations were only conducted in a smaller transport aircraft, 
with two seats either side of the main aisle.  
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As previously discussed in Section 5.1, regulatory thinking in 2002 was that 
automatically disposed hatches (where the hatch, once operated is still attached to the 
fuselage) should be required on newly certificated aircraft with at least 41 passenger 
seats. However it was also acknowledged by the Cabin Safety Harmonization Working 
Group that ‘research trials have not always included full evaluation of the situations that 
could arise with respect to the hatch’ and that further work was required in this area 
(FAA, 1999, p. 6). To date there is no regulatory requirement for the installation of 
ADHs on Type III exits. It was anticipated that conducting an experiment into the 
potential influence of inappropriate hatch placement on evacuation from a smaller cabin 
will provide the regulatory authorities and the aviation safety community with more 
information on evacuation from smaller transport aircraft when considering the 
passenger seating threshold for mandatory ADHs.  
 
In order to address these issues a final study into the influence of exit hatch placement 
on evacuation was undertaken. Data were only collected in a smaller interior cabin due 
to the need for more data to explore evacuations from these smaller aircraft types. 
Anecdotal evidence also suggested that regulatory thinking was still to require an ADH 
exit mechanism on aircraft with at least 41 passenger seats. As the available resources 
were limited, it was considered more important, in the first instance, to explore the 
influence of the internal placement of the hatch within a smaller transport aircraft. It 
was felt that any potential obstruction caused by the placement of the hatch may be 
more of an issue in a smaller interior cabin due to the limited space as a result of the 
narrower fuselage and restrictive headroom. 
 
13.7. Objective of Experiment Four 
The objective of Experiment Four was to investigate the effect of Type III hatch 
placement either outside the cabin or placed internally in the cabin either vertically or 
horizontally on passenger evacuation from a smaller transport aircraft cabin. Data were 
to be provided on both evacuation rates and passenger perception of the evacuation. 
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14.0. Method: Experiment Four 
 
14.1. Methodological considerations 
The methodological considerations relating to the realism of the cabin simulator and the 
sampling strategy were identical to those in Experiment One, as detailed in Section 2.1. 
As with Experiment One, this experiment involved groups of participants evacuating the 
cabin. As with Experiment One, a co-operative methodology was used. In order to add a 
degree of urgency to the evacuation, a group bonus was offered to all participants in the 
group, if all group members evacuated within an unspecified time limit. 
 
There was one addition challenge with the design for this experiment and that was the 
balance between ecological validity and experimental control. The issue revolved 
around the independent variable – the location of the Type III hatch. As the location of 
the hatch was the independent variable, it was crucial that the hatch was placed in the 
same location for each trial in the testing condition. 
 
14.2. Ethical and safety considerations 
As with Experiment One, the experiment was conducted in accordance with ethical 
guidelines and an ethics proposal was submitted to, and approved by the Human Factors 
Department Ethics Committee prior to the research trials taking place. Prior to the 
experiment, participant safety considerations were reviewed, with provisions in line 
with Experiment One put in place. Ethical and safety procedures as documented in 
Section 2.2 were followed with two exceptions. Both exceptions were due to participant 
safety concerns. Firstly an additional first aider was present outside the operational exit 
and secondly two additional members of the research team were present on the 
simulator during the trials. One additional member was located outside the operational 
exit to assist participants as they evacuated through the exit aperture. The second 
additional researcher was located inside the cabin and was seated in the vacant seat row 
opposite the Type III exit. These changes were made to ensure the safety of participants 
as they negotiated the Type III hatch when it had been placed inside the cabin and as 
they evacuated onto the wing.  
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The inclusion of a research confederate inside the cabin simulator to monitor participant 
safety was also used during the large evacuation programme reported by McLean et al 
(2002). In these trials the ‘safety monitor’ was located in the outboard seat of the seat 
row forward of the Type III exit. The monitor was instructed to be as inconspicuous as 
possible unless they were required to stop the evacuation if it was felt that there was the 
potential for injuries to participants (Corbett, McLean and Whinnery, 2003).  
 
14.3. Research design 
Experimental trials were conducted to investigate the influence of Type III hatch 
placement inside the cabin on evacuation. This resulted in a three groups post test 
design.  
 
14.3.1. Independent variables 
There was one independent variable in the research study – the location of the Type III 
hatch. Three different locations were tested – no hatch inside the cabin (i.e. to simulate 
hatch disposal outside the aircraft), the hatch placed vertically in the exit seat row, 
leaning against the seats and the hatch placed horizontally on the floor in the exit row, 
protruding into the main aisle. In order to ensure that the hatch was in the same location 
for each trial in the condition, a replica hatch was manufactured and fastened in the 
desired location in advance of the trial. 
 
14.3.2. Dependent variables 
The rate at which participants evacuated the cabin was the dependent variable from the 
evacuation trial. Evacuation performance timings were extracted from the time coded 
video footage of the trials, measured to one tenth of a second. All performance timings 
were taken from the Captain’s command to evacuate which was “Undo your seatbelts 
and get out!” until the last participant had their first foot on the wing4. 
 
                                                 
4
 It is noted that during experiment one, the time taken to egress was measured from the call to evacuate 
until the point at which the last participant had both feet on the wing. However due to the egress path 
participants took as they exited the simulator, the time for the second foot was sometimes difficult to 
obtain, therefore to enhance the reliability of the data, it was decided to use the time at which the first foot 
was placed on the wing 
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Participant rating scales were also collected from a post evacuation questionnaire 
designed specifically for evacuations through the Type III exit. A copy of the 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix R. The questionnaire asked participants to rate 
various aspects of their evacuation experience using a seven point Likert type scale and 
these responses were then used as dependent variables. The other questions on the 
questionnaire asked participants to select from a range of response options or provide 
qualitative comments about their experience.  
 
14.3.3. Experimental schedule 
The experimental schedule, showing the hatch conditions for each trial are shown in 
Table 34.  
 
Table 34: Experimental schedule for trials 
Group No Hatch placement  Group No Hatch placement  
Group 1 No hatch Group 13 No hatch 
Group 2 Vertical Group 14 Vertical 
Group 3 Horizontal Group 15 Horizontal 
Group 4 No hatch  Group 16 No hatch 
Group 5 Vertical  Group 17 Vertical 
Group 6 Horizontal  Group 18 Horizontal 
Group 7 No hatch  Group 19 No hatch 
Group 8 Vertical  Group 20 Vertical 
Group 9 Horizontal Group 21 Horizontal 
Group 10 No hatch Group 22 No hatch 
Group 11 Vertical Group 23 Vertical 
Group 12 Horizontal Group 24  Horizontal  
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14.4. Participants 
Twenty-four groups of up to 18 volunteers were recruited as participants, with each 
group participating in one session. Participants were recruited via local advertising 
using the criteria as reported in Experiment One.  
 
14.5. Equipment/materials 
14.5.1. Test facility 
The test facility as in the previous experiments was the Boeing 737 cabin simulator 
located at Cranfield University. The Type III exit was the available exit during all trials. 
A replica Type III hatch was constructed from wood and secured in the required 
location in advance of participants boarding the simulator. The hatch was constructed in 
line with the dimensions of a “typical” Type III hatch. As a result of the manufactured 
hatch the actual exit hatch for the Type III was not in place during the trials. Instead all 
exits were screened (using plastic sheeting) prior to participants boarding the simulator. 
On the call to evacuate the cover on the Type III exit was removed and participants 
evacuated via the Type III exit aperture.  
 
During all trials the facility was modified into the smaller interior configuration to 
represent a number of key features associated with smaller transport regional aircraft. 
All trials were conducted in low level lighting. The camera positions were as 
Experiment One, with an additional camera positioned towards the exit seating row 
where the hatch was located during the internal conditions.  
 
Photographs of the modified smaller cabin interior can be found in Appendix D. 
Photographs of the manufactured hatch and the internal hatch locations are provided in 
Appendix S.  
 
14.5.2. Materials 
As per Experiment One, participants were provided with a clipboard that contained all 
the paperwork for the trials. The trials materials included a volunteer information sheet 
similar to the one provided in Experiment One with specific trial details changed for this 
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experiment (a copy is provided in Appendix E). A volunteer consent and medical 
clearance form as per Experiment One was also provided (as shown in Appendix F). 
 
The demographic questionnaire used in Experiment One was again used to collect 
background information (a copy can be found in Appendix G), along with a post 
evacuation questionnaire (as shown in Appendix R). The post evacuation questionnaire 
asked participants about their experience of the evacuation and included information on 
the difficulty of moving down the aisle to reach the exit row, the difficulty of entering 
the exit row, the difficulty of moving between the seats at the exit row, and the 
difficulty of moving through the exit and out of the aircraft. Participants were asked to 
provide a difficulty rating for each of these elements on a seven point scale where 1 was 
very easy and 7 was very difficult. The post evacuation questionnaire also asked 
participants about any physical features within the cabin that had helped or hindered 
their evacuation. Participants were asked to provide open responses to these questions 
where applicable. Other questions were included on the post evacuation questionnaire at 
the request of the sponsor, however these were not of relevance to the current 
experiment and have not been analysed. 
 
14.6. Procedure 
14.6.1. Pre-trial procedure 
On arrival, members of the research team greeted each participant and provided them 
with the relevant trial details as reported in Experiment One.  
 
14.6.2. Trial procedure 
14.6.2.1. Seating 
Participants were assigned seats within the cabin as they arrived at the testing session. 
The allocation of participant seating was conducted via random allocation. Boarding 
was completed in two phases: participants allocated seats in rows 1, 2 and 3 boarded via 
the front Type I door and participants allocated seats in rows 5 and 6 boarded via the 
rear service door. This was done to prevent participants physically manoeuvring around 
the Type III hatch (when it was placed inside the cabin) prior to the call to evacuate.  
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14.6.2.2. Safety briefings 
Once seated, a member of cabin crew provided a safety briefing which included the 
location of the exits, demonstrations of the use of seatbelts and oxygen masks and the 
location of the safety card. This briefing was as that delivered in Experiment One, with 
the exception that the operator’s briefing was not delivered (as there was no operator 
present). A transcript of this briefing can be found in Appendix I. 
 
14.6.2.3. The call to evacuate 
When the safety briefing was complete, the cabin crew checked the cabin and that 
participants had their seatbelts fastened. The trials were to simulate an emergency 
evacuation on take off, so shortly after the cabin check a pre-recorded evacuation 
scenario was played. This scenario was identical to that used in Experiment One and is 
shown in Appendix J. The evacuation scenario included a period of engine noise 
(lasting approximately 30 seconds) followed by an announcement from the Captain to 
“Undo your seat belts and get out!” The lighting within the cabin was also changed on 
the call to evacuate, from take off lighting to emergency lighting. 
 
14.6.2.4. Cabin crew actions 
On the call to evacuate, the cabin crew member, who was located at the front of the 
cabin, commanded passengers to evacuate the aircraft and directed them towards the 
Type III exit.  Passengers were urged to move quickly throughout the evacuation. The 
cabin crew member used assertive, concise, positive commands, in accordance with the 
findings of Muir and Cobbett (1996). The evacuation was deemed complete when all 
passengers had evacuated the cabin. Members of the research team were located outside 
the exit and were instructed to marshal participants to a place of safety.  
 
14.6.3. Post-trial procedure 
After evacuating, participants were asked to complete a post-evacuation questionnaire. 
This questionnaire had been designed specifically for evacuations through the Type III 
exit. A copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix R. On completion of the post-
evacuation questionnaire, participants were thanked, debriefed and paid. Finally, 
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participants were provided with a thank you letter as per Experiment One, containing 
contact details for the research team. A copy of this letter is provided in Appendix K.   
 
14.7. Analysis 
The video footage was edited and a time code was added. Data were then extracted from 
the video footage to allow the calculation of the dependent variable. All performance 
evacuation data, along with the quantitative responses from the post evacuation 
questionnaires were entered into SPSS version 14 for quantitative analysis.  
 
Qualitative comments provided in response to the open questions on the post evacuation 
questionnaire were collated on a question-by-question basis and have been used to add 
depth to the quantitative results. 
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15.0. Results: Experiment Four 
 
15.1. Sample 
A total of 397 participants took part in the testing programme. Two hundred and forty-
three participants were male (61.2%) and 153 were female (38.5%), with data not 
provided by one participant.  Participants provided their age at the time of the testing 
session. Participants’ ages ranged from 20 to 50 years, with a mean age of 31.4 years, 
and a standard deviation of 8.9 years. 32 participants were left handed (8.1%), 354 were 
right handed (89.2%) and eight passengers were ambidextrous (2%), with three 
participants not providing any data. Most participants had flown previously on a 
commercial flight (376 participants, or 94.7%), with one participant also reporting that 
they had been involved in a previous actual emergency evacuation, evacuating via a full 
door onto an evacuation slide. 
 
15.2. Completed evacuations 
In total, all planned evacuations were conducted across 24 trials, with eight trials in each 
condition. There were no reported injuries and no participant withdrawals. 
 
15.3. Participant evacuation data 
15.3.1. Summary descriptive results 
Table 35 details the summary descriptive data for each group. Data are provided on the 
hatch condition, the number of participants within the group (18 were recruited for each 
group, however several participants failed to attend the session), the evacuation latency 
period, the overall evacuation time and the calculated evacuation rate. All mean times 
and mean participant ratings have been rounded up to one decimal place. 
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Table 35: Summary data for each group. 
Group Hatch 
condition 
Number of 
participants 
Evacuation 
latency 
(seconds)5 
Overall 
evacuation 
time 
(seconds)6 
Evacuation 
rate (pax 
per minute)7 
Group 1 No hatch 17 4.9 23.0 53.0 
Group 2 Vertical 18 6.4 37.2 33.1 
Group 3 Horizontal 17 6.1 27.0 45.9 
Group 4 No hatch 17 3.6 23.2 49.0 
Group 5 Vertical 16 3.7 28.3 36.6 
Group 6 Horizontal 15 4.4 26.1 38.7 
Group 7 No hatch 16 4.4 22.0 51.1 
Group 8 Vertical 16 4.3 28.4 37.3 
Group 9 Horizontal 16 5.5 26.9 42.1 
Group 10 No hatch 16 4.6 22.6 50.0 
Group 11 Vertical 17 4.9 31.4 36.2 
Group 12 Horizontal 15 4.1 23.9 42.4 
Group 13 No hatch 17 MD8 24.8 MD 
Group 14 Vertical 16 4.9 31.2 34.2 
Group 15 Horizontal 16 4.0 26.0 40.8 
Group 16 No hatch 17 3.5 25.7 43.2 
Group 17 Vertical 16 5.9 31.9 34.8 
                                                 
5
 The latency time was taken from the call to evacuate to the first foot of the first participant was placed 
on the simulator wing.  
6
 The overall evacuation time was taken from the call to evacuate to the first foot of the last participant 
was placed on the simulator wing.  
7
 Calculated using the formula n-1/t, where n is the number of participants and t is the time between the 
first foot of the first participant was placed on the simulator wing and the first foot of the last participant 
placed on the simulator wing. 
8
 Due to a technical fault, the external camera did not record during the evacuation and not all evacuation 
times were available, therefore the trial was recorded as missing data. 
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Group 18 Horizontal 16 6.3 28.2 40.8 
Group 19 No hatch 18 3.4 24.1 49.2 
Group 20 Vertical 18 5.8 35.8 34.2 
Group 21 Horizontal 17 4.9 26.3 45.0 
Group 22 No hatch 17 5.3 29.3 40.2 
Group 23 Vertical 15 5.8 30.3 34.2 
Group 24 Horizontal 18 6.4 30.4 42.6 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 35, demonstrate some variation in the evacuation rate, 
in number of passengers per minute who evacuated through the Type III exit aperture, 
across the different hatch placement conditions.  
 
15.3.2. Evacuation rates 
Mean evacuation rates for participants to evacuate in each condition are given in Table 
36, it is noted that data were available from 23 trials, due to the missing data from group 
13.  
 
Table 36: Mean evacuation rates for passengers per minute (ppm) to egress through 
the Type III exit in each condition. 
Hatch placement Total 
No hatch in cabin Horizontal 
placement 
Vertical  
placement 
 
48.0 
(sd 4.6) 
42.8 
 (sd 2.3) 
35.1 
(sd 1.5) 
41.5 
(sd 6.0) 
 
As can be seen in Table 36, there is some variation in egress rates due to test condition. 
The data were entered into a one-way ANOVA which produced a significant main 
effect on evacuation rates (passengers per minute) F(2,22) = 35.3, p=0.01 due to hatch 
placement. In order to further explore the differences in the evacuation rates, Tukey’s 
post hoc tests were performed on the available data. The post hoc tests demonstrated a 
significant difference in evacuation rates between participants in the no hatch in the 
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cabin condition and those in both the horizontal hatch placement condition and the 
vertical hatch placement condition. There was also a significant difference between 
rates in those evacuating in the vertical hatch condition and the horizontal hatch 
condition. Evacuation rates were higher when there was no hatch in the cabin than when 
the hatch was placed either horizontally or vertically in the cabin. In addition, 
evacuation rates were significantly higher when evacuating with the hatch placed 
horizontally compared to when it was placed vertically as shown in Table 36.  
 
15.4. Perceived difficulty of the evacuation 
In order to investigate passengers’ perception of the evacuation procedure, data obtained 
from a selection of questions on the post-evacuation questionnaires were also analysed. 
One question on the post evacuation questionnaires related to the difficulty experience 
in moving down the aisle. The mean difficulty ratings are provided in Table 37. A one 
way ANOVA  conducted on these data revealed no statistically significant differences 
attributable to hatch placement F(2,389) = 2.87, p=0.06. 
 
Table 37: Mean participant ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very difficult) 
for difficulty of moving down the aisle in each condition.   
 Hatch placement Total 
 No hatch in 
cabin 
Horizontal 
placement 
Vertical  
placement 
 
Difficulty of moving 
down the aisle 
3.0 
(sd 1.6) 
2.8 
 (sd 1.4) 
2.5 
(sd 1.5) 
2.7 
(sd 1.5) 
 
Participants were also asked about the difficulty of entering the exit row. The mean 
difficulty ratings are provided in Table 38. A one way ANOVA conducted on these data 
revealed no statistically significant differences attributable to hatch placement F(2,390) 
= 2.20, p=0.11. 
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Table 38: Mean participant ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very difficult) 
for difficulty of entering the exit row in each condition.   
 Hatch placement Total 
 No hatch in 
cabin 
Horizontal 
placement 
Vertical  
placement 
 
Difficulty of entering 
the exit row 
3.1 
(sd 1.5) 
3.4 
 (sd 1.7) 
3.5 
(sd 1.8) 
3.3 
(sd 1.7) 
 
The post evacuation questionnaire asked participants to rate the difficulty of moving 
between the seats at the exit row. The mean difficulty ratings are provided in Table 39.  
 
Table 39: Mean participant ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very difficult) 
for difficulty of moving between the seats at the exit row in each condition.   
 Hatch placement Total 
 No hatch in 
cabin 
Horizontal 
placement 
Vertical  
Placement 
 
Difficulty of moving 
between the seats at the 
exit row 
2.9 
(sd 1.6) 
3.2 
 (sd 1.5) 
3.7 
(sd 1.7) 
3.3 
(sd 1.6) 
 
The data were entered into a one-way ANOVA which revealed a significant effect of 
hatch placement on perceived difficulty ratings of moving between the seats in the exit 
row F(2,390) =8.99, p=0.01. In order to identify where the significant differences were, 
Tukey’s post hoc tests were performed. The post hoc tests demonstrated a significant 
difference in difficulty ratings between participants in the no hatch in the cabin 
condition and those in the vertically placed hatch condition. Participants reported that 
moving between the seats at the exit row was more difficult in the vertically placed 
hatch position than when there was no hatch in the cabin, as shown in Table 39. The 
difference between the participant difficulty ratings in the vertically placed hatch 
condition and the horizontally placed hatch condition did not quite reach statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level. However the results demonstrated a trend, in that 
participants rated it as more difficult when the hatch was placed vertically compared to 
when it was placed horizontally. There were no significant differences in participant 
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difficulty ratings between the no hatch in the cabin condition and the horizontally 
placed hatch condition.  
 
Finally, participants were asked to rate the difficulty of moving through the exit. The 
mean difficulty ratings are provided in Table 40.  
 
Table 40: Mean participant ratings (where 1 was very easy and 7 was very difficult) 
for difficulty of moving through the exit in each condition.   
 Hatch placement Total 
 No hatch in 
cabin 
Horizontal 
placement 
Vertical  
Placement 
 
Difficulty of moving 
through the exit 
3.3 
(sd 1.5) 
3.1 
 (sd 1.5) 
3.5 
(sd 1.4) 
3.3 
(sd 1.5) 
 
The data were entered into a one-way ANOVA which revealed a significant effect of 
hatch placement on perceived difficulty ratings of moving through the exit F(2,390) 
=3.16, p=0.04. In order to identify where the significant differences were, Tukey’s post 
hoc tests were performed. The post hoc tests demonstrated a significant difference in 
difficulty ratings between participants who evacuated with the hatch located vertically 
in the exit row compared to those participants who evacuated with the hatch located 
horizontally in the exit row. Participants reported that moving through the exit was more 
difficult in the vertical placed hatch position as shown in Table 40. There were no 
significant differences in perceived ratings between the no hatch in the cabin condition 
and the horizontally and vertically placed hatch conditions.  
 
15.5. The placement of the exit hatch 
In addition to the rating scales, the post evacuation questionnaire asked participants in 
an open response format if there were any factors that had hindered them during their 
evacuation. Of particular interest to the current experiment are the responses relating to 
the placement of the exit hatch and the influence the presence of the hatch had on their 
perception of the evacuation. A summary of the responses provided are presented 
below. 
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Participants who evacuated without a hatch inside the cabin reported that they were 
hindered by other passengers, the limited headroom available due to the overhead 
lockers and the available space/seats in the exit row. A selection of the comments is 
provided here:  
 
“Passengers hinder the path, so I have to wait in line.” (Participant 711, no hatch 
condition, group 7). 
 
 “People not listening to instruction: i.e. going wrong way – not towards nominated 
exit.” (Participant 1910, no hatch condition, group 19). 
 
“Low head height.” (Participant 1007, no hatch condition, group 10). 
 
“Low ceiling – overhead storage…” (Participant 1311, no hatch condition, group 13). 
 
“Narrow gap between seats in exit row – I banged my shin trying to get out quickly.” 
(Participant 1013, no hatch condition, group 10). 
 
In response to the same question, the most reported hindrance by participants who 
evacuated with the hatch in the vertical position was the item or blockage that was 
placed in the exit row. The blockage was reported by 69 participants, this was 67.6% of 
the total number of participants in the vertical condition who responded to this question 
(n = 102). Other factors that were reported as hindering participants included the 
seats/available space in the exit row (it is noted that this may be related to the exit hatch 
located within the exit row vertically), the overhead lockers, the other passengers in the 
cabin and the size of the exit aperture. A sample of the comments provided in response 
to this question is provided.  
 
“Obstruction on floor by seat next to exit – had to climb over.” (Participant 504, 
vertical hatch condition, group 5). 
 
 “The emergency exit door sitting in the exit row - had to climb over/around it.” 
(Participant 1310, vertical hatch condition, group 13). 
 
“The seats in the exit row.” (Participant 1107, vertical hatch condition, group 11). 
 
“Headroom over seats very low. Door blocking exit row.” (Participant 213, vertical 
hatch condition, group 2). 
 
“Other people in the exit row, small exit door way.” (Participant 2304, vertical hatch 
condition, group 23). 
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“Speed of exit of other passengers. Obstruction in exit aisle.” (Participant 1403, 
vertical hatch condition, group 14). 
 
Finally, respondents who experienced the hatch located horizontally within the exit row, 
reported that they were hindered by a number of factors. As with the vertically placed 
hatch trials the most frequent response was the blockage on the floor in the exit row 
(47/85 respondents), this was 55.3% of the total number of participants in this condition 
who responded to this question. Other factors that were reported as hindrances were the 
overhead lockers/available headroom and the other passengers evacuating the cabin. A 
sample of the responses is provided.  
 
“The exit door was in the aisle in the way making it very narrow.” (Participant 608, 
horizontal hatch condition, group 6). 
 
“The emergency door lying on the floor.” (Participant 1810, horizontal hatch 
condition, group 18). 
 
 “The height of the luggage hatch is too low.” (Participant 913, horizontal hatch 
condition, group 17). 
 
“The limited headroom made it more difficult.” (Participant 1807, horizontal hatch 
condition, group 18). 
 
 “Other passengers”. (Participant 611, horizontal hatch condition, group 6). 
 
“Passengers in aisle - not moving quick enough.” (Participant 2109, horizontal hatch 
condition, group 21). 
 
Other issues reported as hindering during the evacuation across all conditions (although 
by a smaller number of participants) included the lighting available and other 
configurational aspects of the cabin (i.e. the aircraft seats and the seatbelts), along with 
some miscellaneous comments.  
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16.0. Discussion – Experiment Four 
 
16.1. The influence of hatch placement on evacuation rates 
The results from the experiment indicated that Type III hatch placement had a 
statistically significant effect on passenger evacuation rates from a smaller transport 
aircraft. The rate at which participants evacuated the cabin was significantly higher 
when there was no hatch in the cabin, compared to when the hatch was placed either 
vertically or horizontally in the cabin. In addition, the evacuation rate was significantly 
higher when the hatch was placed horizontally in the cabin compared to when it was 
placed vertically in the cabin.  
 
It is not surprising that the rate at which participants evacuated was slower when hatch 
was placed horizontally or vertically, compared to when there was no hatch in the cabin, 
as the hatch lead to an obstruction in the area surrounding the exit.  When the hatch was 
placed vertically in the cabin there was a total obstruction of the exit row and when the 
hatch was placed horizontally in the cabin there was a partial obstruction in both the exit 
row and the main aisle. The results add support to the accounts from some accidents 
where the placement of the Type III hatch inside the cabin has been described as an 
impediment to evacuation (e.g. the accidents at Calgary and Little Rock). Although no 
other experimental studies have explicitly investigated the influence of hatch placement 
on evacuation, hatch placement has been raised as an issue within other evacuation 
experiments. The findings from the current experiment are in agreement with 
Rasmussen and Chittum (1989) who concluded that an incorrectly placed hatch could 
have a negative effect on passenger evacuation. The findings also support McLean et al 
(1992 and 2002) who reported that some internal hatch placements could have a 
‘detrimental’ effect on evacuation. 
 
These results highlight the importance of ensuring that hatch operators understand what 
is required of them and are able to dispose of the hatch into an appropriate location so 
that it does not impede egress.  One way to ensure that the Type III hatch could not be 
placed in an inappropriate location would be to have an automatically disposed hatch. 
With such a design the hatch once operated is still attached to the aircraft fuselage and 
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does not need to be disposed of into a safe location. The benefits of such a design have 
been shown in Experiment Three on a smaller transport aircraft and by Cobbett et al 
(1997) on a larger single aisle aircraft.  
 
16.2. The influence of hatch placement on participants’ perceived difficulty of the 
evacuation 
Participant’s perceptions of the evacuation trials when moving between the seats at the 
exit row and moving through the exit and out of the aircraft also revealed significant 
differences attributable to hatch placement. Importantly, the results from the post 
evacuation questionnaires were aligned with the performance evacuation data. The rate 
of egress was slower when the hatch was placed inside the cabin compared to when 
there was no hatch present, with participants also perceiving aspects of the evacuation to 
be more difficult when the hatch was disposed of internally in the cabin.  
 
When moving between the seats at the exit row, a significant difference in difficulty 
ratings was shown. Participants reported more difficulty in moving between the exit row 
seats when the hatch was placed vertically inside the cabin compared to when there was 
no hatch within the cabin. This result is not surprising as the placement of the hatch 
caused an obstruction in the exit row. The difference in difficulty ratings between the 
trials with the hatch placed vertically in the cabin and those when the hatch was placed 
horizontally in the cabin did not quite reach statistical significance, however the results 
demonstrated a trend in that participants rated it as more difficult when the hatch was 
placed vertically compared to when it was placed horizontally. There was no 
statistically significant difference in perception ratings when there was no hatch in the 
cabin compared to when the hatch was placed horizontally in the cabin.  
 
When looking at the data on participant’s perception of moving through the exit and out 
of the aircraft, again a significant difference was reported. On this aspect of their 
experience participants reported moving through the exit and out of the aircraft as more 
difficult in the trials with the hatch placed vertically than when the hatch was placed 
horizontally. This result is not surprising as the placement of the hatch in the vertical 
position caused a complete obstruction in the exit row, with the majority of participants 
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having to climb up onto the seats to get over the hatch and then back into the exit row 
prior to leaving through the exit. No significant differences were found between the 
other hatch placement conditions. 
 
Surprisingly, there was no significant difference between hatch placement conditions on 
participant’s perceptions of entering the exit row. It was thought that due to the 
placement of the hatch, participants may have perceived it significantly more difficult to 
enter the exit row when the hatch was located in this area. The placement of the Type III 
hatch inside the cabin was shown to significantly influence the rate at which participants 
could evacuate the aircraft cabin and influence participants’ perceptions of aspects of 
the evacuation. In addition, the qualitative responses on the post evacuation 
questionnaires suggested that hatch placement inside the cabin was perceived as a 
hindrance during the evacuation.   
 
When asked to comment on any factors within the cabin that had hindered their 
evacuation, the majority of participants who evacuated with the hatch placed 
horizontally or vertically in the cabin reported that the blockage had hindered them. In 
addition, other passengers, the exit aperture and aspects of the smaller transport aircraft 
environment including the reduced headroom due to the overhead lockers were reported 
by participants across all three hatch placement conditions as hindering their evacuation. 
  
16.3. Methodological considerations 
As acknowledged in the method section for this experiment, the greatest challenge in 
this study was achieving an appropriate balance between ecological validity, 
experimental control and participant safety with regards to the placement of the Type III 
hatch. As the hatch disposal location was the independent variable under test, it was 
imperative that the hatch was placed in the same location for each trial in the condition. 
Also it was essential that participant safety was considered at all times and any risks to 
participants from the placement of the hatch were minimised. This meant the hatch had 
to be fastened in the desired location in advance of the trial. It is recognised that this has 
reduced the ecological validity of the scenario, however as participant safety and 
experimental control were maintained, confidence can be placed in the results obtained.  
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16.4. Summary of Experiment Four 
The objective of Experiment Four was to investigate the effect of exit hatch placement 
inside the cabin on passenger evacuation through a Type III from a smaller transport 
aircraft (smaller interior configuration). The results from the experiment have 
highlighted that the placement of the exit hatch inside the cabin can have a detrimental 
effect on evacuation rates.  
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17.0. Discussion and Conclusions – Overall research programme 
 
17.1. Summary of results 
The Type III exit has been shown to be an important egress route during some 
evacuations. Accident reports as highlighted in Section 5.4 have highlighted some of the 
physical and comprehension difficulties experienced by exit operators when required to 
operate the exit and the difficulties experienced by passengers in evacuating through the 
exit aperture. Research into the difficulties experienced by operators and potential 
modifications to improve the exit operation task and egress through the exit are critical 
as Type III exits are installed on a number of aircraft types in current operation.  
 
The aim of this series of experiments was to explore factors influencing passenger 
evacuation through the Type III exit from smaller transport aircraft including the 
operation of the Type III exit. It was felt that the area was less understood as previous 
evacuation studies have focussed on large single aisle aircraft or very large 
transportation aircraft. It was not known if the findings would generalise to smaller 
transport aircraft. Overall the series of experiments have found that many of the issues 
in relation to Type III evacuation and especially exit operation from larger single aisle 
aircraft are also applicable to cabin interiors typical of those of smaller transport 
aircraft. The findings from the individual experiments are discussed below, with the 
overall contribution to knowledge discussed at the end of the section.    
 
Experiment One found that the interior configuration associated with a smaller transport 
aircraft (number of seats abreast of the aisle and available headroom) and the vertical 
projection distances test at the Type III exit row did not significantly influence 
evacuation rates. However from the qualitative comments received the headroom 
available in the smaller transport interior configuration was perceived by passengers as 
hindering them during the evacuation, but this did not significantly influence the overall 
evacuation rates.  
 
Experiments Two and Three then explored the operation of the Type III exit. The results 
revealed that a major modification to the exit mechanism, in that the exit hatch was 
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automatically disposed of, was required to improve the time taken to operate the exit. In 
comparison, a minor modification to the operating handle mechanism on a traditional 
Type III exit did not improve exit operation. The major modification made the exit 
operation task simple and intuitive to the untrained exit operator and removed many of 
the physical difficulties associated with operation of the traditional Type III exit and the 
disposal of the hatch. This resulted in a reduction to the time taken to make the exit 
available for evacuation. It is suggested that the minor modification to the operating 
handle mechanism did not assist operators as it did not remove the inherent difficulties 
of the size and weight of the hatch, the need to manoeuvre it in the limited space and 
dispose of it into an appropriate location. Experiment Three has shown the benefits of 
installing an ADH in smaller transport aircraft as well as larger single aisle aircraft as 
previously shown by Cobbett et al (1997). The findings suggest that ADHs should be 
installed on smaller transport aircraft as well as larger cabins.  
 
It is appreciated that the number of aircraft currently flying with traditional Type III 
exits is likely to be considerable and a retrofit programme may be resisted by industry. 
Although an ADH is the preferred solution, Experiment Two has also shown that the 
benefits of providing an in-depth briefing to exit operators in advance of asking them to 
operate the exit can improve the time taken to operate the exit. In addition the detailed 
information was shown to improve participants’ perceptions of the exit operation task. 
The findings from Cobbett et al (2001) had shown the benefits of providing detailed 
information in a larger single aisle cabin, with further support provided by this 
experiment and also that the findings are generalisable to smaller transport aircraft 
cabins.  
 
The final experiment (Experiment Four) explored the influence of hatch placement on 
evacuation through the exit from an interior configuration typical to that of a smaller 
transport aircraft. The experiment was only run in this interior configuration as it was 
felt that although a misplaced hatch may impede evacuation from all cabins irrespective 
of size, with the configuration of a typical smaller transport aircraft (i.e. reduced 
fuselage width and available headroom) the effects may be more pronounced. The 
experiment found that when the hatch was placed internally, the rate at which 
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passengers could evacuate was decreased compared to when the hatch was disposed of 
outside the cabin. When the hatch caused a total blockage to the exit row, the effect was 
greater than when only a partial blockage was present. This experiment has suggested 
that the benefits of an ADH exit mechanism are not only in exit operation, but as the 
disposed hatch remains attached to the fuselage it does not have the potential to impede 
passenger egress. 
 
The aim and overriding contribution to knowledge of the series of experiments was to 
explore a number of issues linked to evacuation and Type III exit operation in smaller 
transport aircraft, as prior to this work there were only limited data on evacuation from 
smaller transport aircraft. The impact of the smaller interior configuration did not 
appear to influence the rate at which passengers could evacuate through the Type III 
exit and operate the exit, however the lower headroom associated with the smaller 
interior configuration was perceived by passengers as hindering them during the tasks. 
As with large single aisle aircraft, passengers encountered difficulties with the operation 
of the Type III exit on a smaller transport aircraft. These experiments have added to 
knowledge concerning the benefits of an automatically disposed hatch exit mechanism 
on a smaller transport aircraft and demonstrating the benefits of providing an in-depth 
detailed briefings (in both large and small aircraft interior configurations) on improving 
the time taken to operate the Type III exit and on operators’ perception of the task. The 
final contribution to knowledge was demonstrated in Experiment Four. Prior to this 
experiment the impact of a Type III hatch placed inside the cabin on evacuation rate had 
not been quantified. This experiment has shown the negative effect it has on evacuation 
rate from a smaller transport aircraft. In summary, the series of experiments have raised 
some important issues regarding evacuation through the Type III exit and operation of 
Type III exits from smaller transport aircraft. 
 
17.2. Evaluation of the test methodology 
17.2.1 Co-operative (collaborative) methodology: Experiments One and Four 
As this was an initial investigation into evacuation from a smaller transport aircraft 
cabin, the group evacuation trials were conducted under a co-operative methodology. 
Urgency was added by informing participants that they would all receive a bonus at the 
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end of the session, if, as a group, they evacuated within a time limit on each trial. It is 
however noted that participants were not informed of the time limit nor were they 
informed how quickly they had evacuated after each evacuation. This strategy led to 
participants behaving in a collaborative manner. Previous research has shown that a 
collaborative motivational technique produces behaviours akin to those which might be 
in evidence in a full scale emergency demonstration, or a non-life threatening accident 
(Muir et al, 1989). In a life-threatening emergency situation, further evacuation 
problems due to the independent variables under examination may become more 
apparent. Hence, these results may not generalise readily to an actual life-threatening 
emergency situation. Nevertheless, with Experiment Four, the results suggest that even 
with the collaborative trials, the placement of the hatch appeared to impede egress and 
hinder participants. It may be that this effect is heightened in competitive trials, or a 
life-threatening emergency, although research would be required to confirm this.  
 
17.2.2 Individual participants: Experiments Two and Three 
It is noted that the evacuation trials reported within Experiments Two and Three were 
conducted with a single participant as opposed to a group of participants. The rationale 
for this was linked to the objectives of the experiment, which were to investigate Type 
III exit operation. As there was only a single participant there was no competition or 
assistance provided by additional participants, as may be the case in an actual 
emergency evacuation. It should also be noted that the evacuation was not time 
dependent (i.e. as in the case of a fire) as participants were not provided with a time 
limit in which to operate the exit and evacuate the cabin. During the second experiment 
with individual participants (Experiment Three), three research confederates were 
present in the cabin to add a degree of pressure on the participant to operate the exit and 
evacuate as quickly as possible. However the ‘stooge’ passengers did not assist the 
participant with exit operation as may be the case in group or real life evacuations. 
Hence, future research should investigate factors influencing the operation of the exit 
during group evacuations when more than one passenger may be involved in exit 
operation.  
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17.3. Smaller transport aircraft interior configurations 
All of the experiments have investigated factors influencing evacuation and Type III 
exit operation from smaller transport aircraft in a 2 x 2 seating configuration. It is 
acknowledged that a 2 x 2 configuration is not the only seating arrangement found on 
smaller transport aircraft. Some commuter or regional jets are configured with one seat 
each side of the main aisle (i.e. Embraer Bandeirante and Fairchild Metro) or two seats 
on one side of the aisle, with only one seat on the other side of the aisle (i.e. Jetstream 
31/41 and Embraer Brasilia.). This should be borne in mind when drawing conclusions 
from the research programme as the findings may not be generalisable to other regional 
aircraft seating configurations. It is recommended that seating configurations found in 
other smaller transport aircraft is an issue which merits further research into emergency 
evacuation and the operation of the Type III exit.  
 
17.4. Limitations 
As participants were aware they were taking part in a simulated evacuation trial they 
may have been more aware of the evacuation procedures and safety information than 
they would be on a routine flight. However difficulties in exit operation and evacuation 
were still experienced and these difficulties may be more pronounced during a real 
evacuation. It could be argued that especially with the individual participant trials, 
participants were aware that they would be required to operate the Type III exit, 
however the video footage demonstrated that some participants on the call to evacuate 
initially moved away from the exit or looked to the cabin crew for further guidance 
before operating the exit. This behaviour was also witnessed in the group evacuations in 
Experiment Four where some participants on the call to evacuate initially moved to the 
other exits located at the front and rear of the cabin. From this behaviour it is suggested 
that not all passengers assumed they were evacuating through the Type III exit, even 
though they may have been more aware of the evacuation procedures as it was a 
simulated trial. 
 
It is acknowledged that trials were only conducted with participants who were aged 
between 20 and 50 years of age and were relatively fit  and healthy and this must be 
borne in mind where drawing conclusions from the study. However it is felt that if 
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difficulties in exit operation and evacuation were experienced during these trials, they 
would only be exacerbated in real aircraft emergency evacuations.  
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18.0. Recommendations for Future Research 
 
The series of experiments reported within this thesis have raised some important issues 
regarding operation of Type III exit and evacuation through the exit from smaller 
transport aircraft cabins. As this was an initial investigation into evacuation and exit 
operation from smaller transport aircraft, a number of recommendations for further 
research are proposed.  
 
In order to enhance the ecological validity when the interior configuration of the smaller 
transport aircraft was addressed both the number of seats either side of the main aisle 
and the available headroom were investigated in combination and not in isolation. 
Based on the qualitative findings it is recommended that further experiments should 
investigate these variables in isolation to determine if either variable is more influential 
on evacuation rates, the time taken to operate the exit and passenger perception of the 
difficulty of the task.  
 
As highlighted in Experiment One, further work is recommended on access to the Type 
III exit in smaller transport aircraft, with experiments to address different vertical 
projections at the exit passageway on evacuation. Based on the findings from 
Experiment Two recommendations for future study include further investigation into 
Type III exit operator’s briefings, perhaps with consideration of some of the 
improvements suggested by participants. The influence of different briefings and 
different forms of delivery could then be investigated in relation to exit operation and 
passenger perception, possibly involving more participants in the cabin or different 
emergency scenarios.  
 
Experiment Three highlighted the benefits of installing an ADH on the time taken to 
operate the exit and operator perception. As the exit mechanism used in this experiment 
was a prototype to examine the concept, recommendations for future work include the 
design and development of other ADH mechanisms, with operational testing with naïve 
participants. Finally, Experiment Four has highlighted the impediment caused by an 
inappropriately placed Type III exit hatch inside the cabin. Due to the comprise between 
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participant safety, experimental control and ecological validity that had to be reached 
during the experiment, further work could explore means of configuring the hatch and 
cabin simulator to allow the hatch to be in the aperture at the start of the evacuation and 
placed in the desired location by an exit operator as the evacuation commences. In 
addition only two internal placements were investigated within Experiment Four, 
further work should investigate the effects of hatch placement in different locations 
inside the cabin and directly outside the exit aperture. Finally further work should 
investigate internal hatch placement in narrower cabins (i.e. 1 x 2 seating 
configurations) as the placement of the hatch in relation to the other internal features 
(e.g. the main aisle) is likely to be different  
 
As previously discussed, the exit operation trials were conducted with individual 
participants. It is recommended that the influence of exit operating mechanism, 
briefings and interior configurations on exit operation are explored with other 
passengers in the cabin, as would be the case in a real emergency. In addition, as the 
group evacuation trials were conducted with a co-operative methodology, it is 
recommended that further exploration of the issues associated with exit operation and 
evacuation from smaller transport aircraft should be conducted utilising a competitive 
methodology. It is anticipated that this investigation will provide data on the difficulties 
experienced when evacuating when there is a high motivation to evacuate quickly. The 
final recommendation from the series of experiments is that further investigation of 
other internal cabin configurations (e.g. cabin widths with 1 x 2 seats abreast) are 
conducted to determine if the reported findings are replicated.  
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20.0. Appendices 
Appendix A: Post-evacuation questionnaire – Experiment One 
 
Volunteer Number: _______________________ 
 
The information we ask for in this questionnaire relates to the evacuation you have just 
completed. Please be honest, and complete as many questions as possible. 
 Your answers may help us to improve the safety of air travel.   
 
1.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty in 
undoing your seatbelt. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
2.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is paying no attention, and seven is paying full attention, to what 
extent would you say you listened to the safety briefing provided by the Flight Attendants? Please 
circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 No 
attention 
     Full 
attention 
 
3.  For what reasons did you not give the safety briefing your full attention? Please circle all that 
apply.  
  
 a.  Not applicable – I gave the briefing my full attention (please go to question 4) 
 b. I had seen the briefing before 
 c. It’s basic knowledge 
 d.  My view was obstructed 
 e. I was distracted by someone else 
 f. It went on for too long 
 g.  I didn’t think I needed to 
 h. Other (Please specify) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4.  Did you read the safety card that was in the seat pocket in front of you? Please circle one option 
only. 
  
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
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5.  How do you think the cabin crew aided your evacuation? Please circle all that apply. 
  
 a. Directed me to the exit 
 b. Shouted helpful instructions 
 c.  Shouted encouragement 
 d. Pushed passengers through the exit 
 e. Other (Please specify) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.  How do you think the cabin crew hindered your evacuation? Please circle all that apply.  
  
 a. Shouted too much 
 b. Shouted too loud 
 c.  Added to the confusion of the situation 
 d. Pushed passengers through the exit 
 e.  Did not help passengers who needed help 
 f.  Occupied space or got in the way 
 g.  Distracted me from more important things 
 h. Other (Please specify) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.  
 
In what ways could the cabin crew have improved your evacuation?  
 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
8.  In what ways did your fellow passengers help your evacuation? 
  
 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
9.  In what ways did your fellow passengers hinder your evacuation?  
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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10.  In what ways could your fellow passengers have improved your evacuation?  
  
 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
11.  What strategies did you use when evacuating? Please circle all that apply 
  
 a. Climbed over seats 
 b. Waited in line 
 c.  Pushed past other passengers 
 d. Pushed other passengers towards the exit 
 e. Allowed passengers to get in front of me 
 f. Tried to get out my seat and move as far as possible down the aisle before others could 
 g.  None 
 h. Other (Please specify) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
12. Do you think that the strategies you used: (Please circle one option only) 
  
 a. Helped your evacuation 
 b. Hindered your evacuation 
 c.  Did not make any difference 
 
13.  Did any physical features within the cabin help your evacuation? Please circle one option only 
  
 a. No 
 b. Yes (Please specify what helped you, and how) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
14. Did any physical features within the cabin hinder your evacuation? Please circle one option only 
  
 a. No 
 b. Yes (Please specify what hindered you, and how) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
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15.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty of 
moving down the main aisle to reach the exit row. Please circle one option only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very 
Easy 
     Very 
Difficult 
 
16.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty of 
moving between the seats at the exit row. Please circle one option only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very 
Easy 
     Very 
Difficult 
 
17.   Were you the person (or one of the people) who opened the exit in the trial you just completed? 
(Please circle one option only).  
  
 a. Yes – Please continue answering the following questions 
 b. No – Please go to question 24 
 
18.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in unlatching the exit hatch. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
19.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in opening the exit hatch. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
20.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in moving the exit hatch out of the way. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
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21.  Where did you leave the exit hatch first when you moved it out of the way? Please circle one 
option only.  
  
 a. Outside the cabin 
 b. Inside the cabin, against the wall below the exit 
 c.  Inside the cabin, on the floor in the passageway leading to the exit 
 d.  Inside the cabin, on my seat  
 e.  Inside the cabin, on one of the seats in the exit row 
 f.  Inside the cabin, on the seats in the row in front of the exit row 
 g.  Inside the cabin, on one of the seats in the row behind the exit row 
 h.  Inside the cabin, on the floor in the main aisle 
 i.  I can’t remember 
 j.  Other (please specify) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
22.  What, if anything, do you think was difficult about operating this type of exit? Please circle all that 
apply.  
  
 a. Not applicable – the hatch was not difficult to operate (move to question 23)   
 b. The handles on the hatch were difficult to grip 
 c. The handles on the hatch were in the wrong place 
 d.  The hatch was too big 
 e.  The hatch was too heavy 
 f.  I did not expect to have to bear the weight of the hatch 
 g.  I did not expect the hatch to have to come back in to the cabin 
 h.  I did not expect to have to turn the hatch 
 i.  The hatch does not operate the same as a normal door 
 j.  Other (please specify) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  
23.  If you were flying on a commercial aeroplane, based on your experience today, would you be:- 
(Please circle one option only)  
  
 a. More willing to sit by this exit than before  
 b. Less willing to sit by this exit than before 
 c. As willing to sit by this exit as you were before 
 
24. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in moving through the exit and out of the aircraft. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
25. If there are any comments that you would like to make about the trial you have just completed, 
please do so here. 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B: Sample recruiting advertisement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Earn up to £15 in an hour!  
 
Aircraft Cabin Evacuation Trials 
 
The Human Factors Group at Cranfield University are recruiting 
volunteers to take part in evacuations from a cabin simulator. Please do 
not volunteer if you have previously taken part in trials using the small 
(Boeing 737) cabin simulator. 
 
Volunteers will be required on one occasion, for approximately 1-1½ 
hours, and will undertake a single evacuation. Some of the evacuations 
may take place in low level lighting and you may be required you to lift a 
weight equivalent to that of a heavy suitcase. You will not be required to 
use emergency chutes on this occasion. 
 
An attendance payment of £12.50 will be given to all those who 
participate, and there will also be the opportunity to earn a £2.50 bonus. 
Volunteers must be aged 20 - 50. Volunteers must also be fit, as the trials 
could be physically demanding. 
 
There are several sessions available [add dates and times]. For further 
information, please contact [……] on telephone 01234 […..] If [……] is 
unavailable, please leave a message, including a daytime telephone 
number and we will call you back. 


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Appendix C: Sample booking confirmation letter 
Cranfield University 
Cranfield 
Bedfordshire 
 MK43 0AL 
England 
Fax +44 (0) 1234 [……] 
Tel + 44 (0) 1234 [……] 
Dear Volunteer 
 
Thank you for volunteering to take part in the cabin evacuation trial which is to take place on: 
[insert date].To ensure that the trials runs smoothly, it is essential that you arrive at the 
revolving-door entrance to Hangar 3 (Building 83, School of Engineering) at [insert time].You 
will be met by a member of the research team.   
 
All volunteers must be between the ages of 20 and 50, and be normally fit and healthy. 
Volunteers should weigh no more than around 15 stones/95.25 kg, and should not be 
excessively overweight. The trials may be physically demanding, so please do not take part if 
you have any history of the following illnesses: heart disease, high blood pressure, fainting or 
blackouts, diabetes, epilepsy or fits, deafness, chronic back pain, ankle swelling, depression, 
anxiety, other nervous/psychiatric illnesses, fear of enclosed spaces, fear of heights, fear of 
flying, brittle bones, asthma, bronchitis, breathlessness, chest trouble, allergy, lumbago sciatica, 
or any other serious illness or recent surgery. Additionally, women who are pregnant, or who 
think they may be pregnant, should not take part. On arrival at the session, you will be asked to 
complete a medical questionnaire. This form will be checked by a first aider for health and 
safety and insurance purposes.   
 
We will require you to take part in a single evacuation and to complete several questionnaires. 
You will be required for approximately 1-1½ hours. Some evacuations may take place in low 
level lighting. You will not be required to use the emergency chutes on this occasion, although 
you may be required to lift a weight equivalent to a heavy suitcase. All volunteers will be paid 
£12.50 for attending the session. In addition, there will be the opportunity to earn a £2.50 bonus 
if everybody in your group evacuates the cabin within a time limit. Please note these trials are 
collaborative and not competitive. 
 
Your safety is of the utmost importance. Please ensure that you wear trousers, long sleeve tops 
and trainers or flat pumps and socks. Please do not wear earrings which may come loose, or 
which may get caught on clothing. It is not advisable to wear spectacles during the actual 
evacuation. Coats and bags will not be allowed on the aircraft, although we will provide a 
secure, supervised area in which they may be left. 
 
Please ensure that you have read and completely understand this information, as you will be 
asked to sign a form to confirm your agreement to participate in the trials. Please do not hesitate 
to contact us if you have any queries about the information that has been supplied. Also, we 
would be grateful if you could let us know if you are no longer able to participate. 
 
Again, thank you for volunteering. We look forward to seeing you on [insert date]. 
 
Human Factors Group 
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Appendix D: Photographs to accompany Experiment One 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph D1: The test facility in the large interior configuration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph D2: The test facility in the small interior configuration. 
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Appendix E: Volunteer information sheet 
 
It is essential that you read this document carefully, and fully understand its contents before 
completing the Volunteer Consent and Medical Clearance form. If you feel after reading this 
document that you do not wish to take part, then please do not feel obliged to do so. 
 
1) Health and Medical 
 
a) For insurance purposes, all volunteers must be aged between 20 and 50. 
 
b) Volunteers must have no history of the following: Heart disease, high blood pressure, 
fainting or blackouts, diabetes, epilepsy or fits, deafness, chronic back pain, ankle swelling, 
depression, anxiety, other nervous/psychiatric illnesses, fear of enclosed spaces, fear of 
heights, fear of flying, brittle bones, asthma, bronchitis, breathlessness, chest trouble, 
allergy, lumbago sciatica, or any other serious illness.  
 
c) All volunteers who are undergoing any medical treatment or who have recently undergone 
surgery should consult with the medical officer before agreeing to participate.  
 
d) Women who are pregnant, or who think they may be pregnant, should not take part. 
 
2) Safety 
 
To ensure the safety of all volunteers, a number of precautions have been taken: 
a) If an evacuation of the aircraft is necessary, you should make your way to the exits that the 
Cabin Crew say are available. Various fixtures and fittings within the cabin have been 
padded to reduce the risk of injury in the event of an accident.  
 
b) You may be required to open and/or move through the passenger operated over wing exit. 
Again, fixtures and fittings around this exit have been padded to reduce the risk of injury in 
the event of an accident. If you are seated next to this exit, you will be briefed by cabin crew 
on the location of the instructions, in case you are required to open this exit. Please note that 
the exit weighs about the equivalent of a heavy suitcase. You should not attempt to open 
this exit unless a member of Cabin Crew instructs you to do so.  
 
c) When moving through aircraft exits, please mind your head. If you are required to evacuate 
using the passenger operated exit, ensure that you lift your feet and legs clear of the sill. 
Research staff will be available outside the exits being used, to assist you in moving away 
from the doors. 
 
d) At least two members of the Cranfield research team will be present on the aircraft at all 
times; these individuals will make themselves known to you. Researchers on the aircraft 
carry alarms, as do personnel located outside the exits. If you hear an alarm, then this is a 
signal to HALT. This indicates that a problem has occurred, and that the trial has therefore 
been stopped. If a trial is stopped, you must stop immediately and await instruction from the 
research team. 
 
e) A first aider is on hand. If you feel the need to consult the first aider, please do not hesitate 
to do so. 
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3) Payment 
Today we will require you to take part in a single evacuation. All volunteers will be paid £12.50 
for attending. In addition, there will be a bonus of £2.50 paid to every member of your group if 
everyone in the group evacuates the cabin within a time limit. It is important that you exit the 
aircraft as quickly as possible.  
 
4) Insurance 
You are advised that the test is undertaken at your own risk. The University has arranged 
personal accident insurance which provides benefit in the event of you sustaining accidental 
bodily harm. No further claims are admissible, nor shall the University be held liable in the 
event of any accidental injury or damage outside these benefits. 
 
Scope of Insurance Cover: Accidental Bodily Injury 
 
Temporary Total Disablement, per week £150 
Temporary Total Disablement, where not otherwise gainfully employed, 
per week 
£25  
(Maximum 104 weeks)  
  
Permanent Total Disablement     £100,000 
(Other than loss of sight of one or both eyes or loss of one or more limbs)  
  
Loss of one or more limbs     £100,000 
  
Permanent Total Loss of Sight of One or Two Eyes  £100,000 
  
Death   £100,000 
   
5) Personal Information 
 
a) All personal information that you provide will be treated with the strictest confidence. You 
have been provided with a volunteer number to ensure that all information you provide 
remains anonymous. This means that although the information you provide will be used by 
Cranfield University for research purposes, you will not be personally identifiable by name, 
age or other personal characteristic. 
 
b) These trials will be video recorded by Cranfield University. The video footage will be used 
in research to investigate the factors which influence survival in the event of an aircraft 
emergency. Some of this footage may also be used for promotional purposes. If you take 
part in these trials, you consent to your image being used in this manner, although any other 
personal details you provide will of course remain confidential. 
 
c) You are free to withdraw from these trials at any stage during the session. If you wish to do 
so, then simply inform a member of the research team or the first aider. 
 
After reading this document carefully, you should also complete the Volunteer Consent 
and Medical Clearance form. This will be checked and signed by the first aider. 
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Appendix F: Volunteer consent and medical clearance form 
 
Volunteer number: _____________ 
Age:   _____________ 
Sex:   _____________ 
 
Part A: To be completed by the Cranfield Research Team  
 
Volunteer height: __________  Volunteer Weight: __________ 
 
Part B: Your Medical History 
It is essential that you answer these questions truthfully and completely. The answers you 
provide to these questions will be treated with the strictest confidence, although they will be 
checked by the evacuation nurse.  
 
   
 
   
1. Have you ever experienced any of the following: Please tick:  
 No Yes  
a. Heart disease    
    
b. High blood pressure    
    
c. Fainting or blackouts    
    
d. Diabetes    
    
e. Epilepsy or fits    
    
f. Deafness    
    
g. Chronic back pain    
    
h. Ankle swelling    
    
i. Depression    
    
j. Anxiety    
    
k. Nervous/psychiatric illness    
    
l. Fear of enclosed spaces    
    
m. Fear of heights    
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Have you ever experienced any of the following (cont.) Please tick:  
 No Yes  
n. Fear of flying    
 
  
 
o. Brittle bones    
    
p. Asthma    
    
q. Bronchitis    
 
  
 
r. Breathlessness    
    
s. Chest trouble    
    
t. Allergy    
    
u. Lumbago sciatica    
    
v. Any other serious illness    
    
2. Are you currently receiving medical treatment?    
    
3. Have you undergone surgery within the last 6 months?    
    
4. Is there any possibility that you may be pregnant?    
    
 
 
Part C: Volunteer Consent Declaration 
 
I, ___________________________________________ (please print your name) confirm that I 
have read and completely and fully understand the “Volunteer Information” provided. I have 
completed my Medical History details fully and truthfully. I believe my health and fitness are 
good enough for me to cope with the work involved in the aircraft safety trial which is to take 
place today. I therefore give my consent to taking part in this research. 
 
Signature_____________________________________  Date________________ 
 
 
Part D: Medical Clearance 
 
First aider: _______________________   Date_________________ 
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Appendix G: Demographic questionnaire 
Volunteer Number:_________ 
 
1. Please tell us your age:  ______ (years) 
 
2.  Sex: (circle one) 
 
 a.  Male 
 b.  Female 
 
3. Are you: (circle one) 
 
 a.  Left Handed 
 b.  Right Handed 
 c.  Ambidextrous 
 
 
4.  What is your highest level educational qualification? (circle one) 
  
 a.  None 
 b. GCSE Grade D or below / CSE Grade 2 or below 
 c.  GCSE or O Level Grade C or above or equivalent   
 d.  'A' Levels or equivalent 
 e.  Higher National Certificate or Diploma, or equivalent 
 f.  Bachelor degree 
 g.  Post-graduate degree 
 
 
5.  Have you previously participated in an evacuation test? 
 
 a.  Yes  If Yes, how long ago?_________(months) 
 b.  No  If No, please skip to question 7. 
 
 
6.  If you previously participated in an evacuation test, did it involve going through: (circle 
all that apply) 
 
 a.  A full door (floor-level exit) onto a slide (chute). 
 b.  A full door (floor-level exit) onto a platform or ramp. 
 c.  Smaller exit in the cabin (over-wing exit). 
 d.  I do not remember. 
 
 
7.  Have you ever flown in a commercial airplane? 
 
 a.  Yes 
b. No (if No, please skip to question 10) 
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8.  If you have flown in a commercial airplane, have you ever had to make an emergency 
evacuation from the aircraft? 
 
 a.  Yes 
 b. No (if No, please skip to question 10) 
9.  If you have had to make an emergency evacuation from a commercial airplane, did you 
go through: (circle all that apply) 
 
 a.  A full door (floor-level exit) and use a slide or chute 
  for the evacuation. 
 b.  A smaller exit (over-wing exit) in the cabin. 
 c.  I do not remember. 
 
 
10.  Do you get dizzy or tend to lose your balance when you look down from a height?  
 
 a.  Yes  
 b.  No   
 
 
11. Do you have a tendency to get dizzy or feel like you are about to lose your balance 
when walking? 
a.  Yes 
 b.  No 
 
 
12.  Do you sometimes feel as though you are falling or going to fall or jump when you are 
near the edge of a high platform? 
 
 a.  Yes 
 b.  No 
 
 
13.  On the following scale, circle the number that represents the degree of lack of ease or 
fear you have of heights. 
1 2 3 4 5 
None never Rarely Occasionally Often Extreme always 
 
 
14.  On the following scale, circle the number that represents the degree of lack of ease or 
fear you have when you are in very small rooms, elevators, or other close, cramped, 
spaces.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
None never Rarely Occasionally Often Extreme always 
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15. On the following scale, circle the number that represents how good you think your 
reflexes are.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Very slow Slow Average Fast Very fast 
 
 
16.  On the following scale, circle the number that represents your ability to move with 
quick and easy grace. (That is, how physically agile and nimble you think you are). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very poor 
 
Not very agile About average Better than average Very agile 
17. On the following scale, circle the number that represents your ability to be mentally 
quick and resourceful. (That is, how mentally agile and nimble you think you are.) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very poor Not very agile About average Better than 
Average 
Very agile 
 
 
18. Do you have any limitations in the use of your arms, hands, legs, feet, hips, etc.? (circle one) 
 
 a. Yes (please explain)______________________________________________ 
 b.  No 
 
 
19.  Which of the following general types of shoes are you going to wear during this 
evacuation test? (circle one) 
 
 a.  Loafers/moccasins/slip-on shoes 
 b.  Shoes with laces that tie 
 c.  Boots (lace or slip-on styles) 
 d.  Sandals 
 
 
 
Please check that you have answered all questions that apply to you. 
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Appendix H: Researcher’s briefing 
 
Welcome and thank you all for coming this afternoon. I am going to tell you a little bit about 
what we are all doing here. Firstly, I’ll give you a little bit of background about the trials and the 
cabin safety work that we do, and secondly I’ll tell you a little bit about what to expect when we 
take you up and board you on our aeroplane.  
 
Helen Muir has been doing cabin safety work here at Cranfield now for well over ten years, and 
one of the things we look at is passenger behaviour in the event of an emergency. Lots of things 
can have an influence on how quickly passengers can get out in the event of an aircraft accident.  
 
Now, we know that accidents are fortunately very rare, but one of the problems is that when 
they do occur there is often a fire within the cabin, and if there is a fire there are usually toxic 
smoke and fumes, and conditions within the cabin can become non survivable within around 
two minutes. So, obviously it is very important if there is an accident that we can get people out 
in less time, because it is truly awful, as you can imagine, to actually survive the impact of the 
crash, and then not be able to make your escape from the aeroplane.  
 
So, a lot of the work that Professor Muir has done is looking at how physical things within the 
cabin, maybe the lighting, the seating arrangements, where the exits or the exit signs are, where 
the cabin crew stand, or how the cabin crew behave, all of these things can have an influence on 
how quickly we can get passengers out in the event of an emergency. So it is quite important 
work, and as a result of the research that has being done here a number of regulations have been 
changed. So it is work that has helped to made air travel safer for everybody.  
 
What we are doing today, essentially we have asked you to come along to do one evacuation 
trial for us this afternoon, so thank you all very much for coming. I hope you are not too worried 
about what is going to happen, but hopefully I can put you at ease a little bit. What we are going 
to do is pay you £12.50 for coming along this afternoon and taking part. We are going to do one 
evacuation, and what I will say to you is that if everybody within the group gets out of that 
cabin within a given period of time, we will pay everyone a £2.50 bonus as well, so you have 
the chance to earn up to £15 today. What we don’t do unfortunately is tell you what the time 
limit is, that is the catch! So what you actually have to do is to make sure you get out of that 
aircraft as quickly as you can.  
 
What we will do is walk you up to the aircraft and board you, our cabin crew here will place 
you into your seats and then you will have a pre-flight safety briefing. This will be typical of the 
kind of briefing you would receive if you were going on a real flight somewhere, and then you 
will here the sound of the engines starting up and you will hear a few things going on just like 
the real thing, but without the duty-free drinks I am afraid! Then you will hear a few sounds and 
you will hear the captain say eventually ‘Undo your seatbelts and get out’ and that is your cue 
that an emergency has happened. Then, you have to make your way out of the aircraft. Now 
there will be cabin crew there as I have said, and it is very important that you listen to the cabin 
crew’s instructions and that you do what the cabin crew ask you to do. O.K? Is everybody clear 
on that? 
 
When the evacuation has finished, there will be stewards outside the exit, who will be able to 
tell you where to move to and where to stand, to make sure you are safe. When you have 
actually evacuated the aeroplane we will bring you back down here and ask you to fill in the 
pink questionnaire which is on your clipboard.  
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I know there is quite a lot of questionnaire information that we are asking for, but as well as 
finding out how quickly people can get out of the aeroplane, it is very important to know what 
kind of things can help, so do taller people get out more quickly, do older people get out more 
quickly, and it is only when we know what is going on that we can help to make things better. 
So I appreciate that we do ask for a lot of information, but all of it is very important to the 
research and what we are trying to do.  
 
I should mention that when you are in the aircraft you may actually be asked to use an 
emergency doorway that is located over the wing. The overwing exit would actually be operated 
by a passenger, and it is important if you are asked to use that exit, that you only use that exit 
when you are told to by cabin crew and that you read the instructions carefully for using that 
exit.  
 
In the event that anything does go wrong up there, touch wood it is quite safe as we are not 
actually taking off, what we do have is a procedure for stopping an evacuation if we are not 
happy with it, or if we think somebody is going to get hurt. Although we ask you to move very 
quickly, we obviously don’t want you to trample all over each other, and if that does happen 
what we will do is stop the evacuation. The way we do that is using one of these alarms. If you 
just want to cover your ears, as it is quite loud… [sounds rape alarm] … and if you hear that 
while you are up there, you know you should just stop whatever you are doing and wait for 
instructions from the cabin crew.  
 
Any questions so far on what I’ve told you? No, OK. Well, shortly we will go up and board the 
cabin. I just want to ask you beforehand, if you’ve got any long earrings or necklaces or 
anything dangly, any watches with expensive straps or anything that you don’t want to take on 
the aeroplane, we would rather that you left those kind of things here. We will be locking the 
door, so you are quite safe leaving those things here when we go up to the aeroplane. 
 
Any questions at all before we go up? All right, lets go. 
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Appendix I: Safety briefings 
  
Passenger pre-flight safety briefing 
 
On boarding:  
Ladies and Gentlemen, welcome on board. For your personal safety, any light articles which 
you have brought on board the aircraft should be placed in the overhead bins, or under the seat 
in front of you. Please ensure that hand luggage does not obstruct the aisles or any emergency 
exit. Passengers are reminded that this is a non-smoking flight. Portable telephones must not be 
used at any time. Electronic equipment such as computers tape recorders etc may only be used 
when the seat belt signs are off. 
 
Safety demonstration: 
As the safety equipment on this aircraft may differ from that on other aircraft, it is in your own 
best interests to pay attention to this safety briefing.  
 
In the seat pocket in front of you there is a safety card, which the Captain would like you to read 
carefully before takeoff.  This contains details of the demonstration. 
 
The emergency exits are clearly marked and are being pointed out to you.  These are the two 
doors at the rear of the cabin and the emergency over-wing exit located in the centre of the 
cabin.   
 
For those of you unfamiliar with the operation of the seat belt, it is fastened and adjusted as 
demonstrated…. and unfastened like this. 
 
We would also like to advise you of the emergency oxygen supply on board. Should additional 
oxygen be required throughout the cabin the panel above your head will open automatically and 
masks like these will drop down. Remain seated, pull the mask towards you, place over nose 
and mouth, and breathe normally. Adults should fit their own masks before assisting children. 
 
Please now ensure that your seat table is folded away your seat back is upright with the armrest 
down and you seatbelt is tightly fastened.  
 
Thank you for your attention. We would like to wish you a pleasant flight. 
 
 
Briefing provided to the passenger seated adjacent to the Type III exit 
 
Good afternoon/evening sir/madam. I’d just like to point out that you are seated next to an 
emergency exit. In the event of an emergency, you may be required to open that exit. The exit 
weighs the equivalent of a heavy suitcase. Are you happy that you could open that exit in the 
event that you were required to do so? (If not, change seats with another passenger) 
 
Instructions for opening the exit are on the placard on the seat back in front of you, and also on 
the safety card in the seat pocket in front of you (point to both). 
 
Please note that you must not open that exit unless a member of cabin crew instructs you to do 
so. There could be a fire outside. 
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Appendix J: Evacuation scenario – Experiment One 
 
The scenario described below was used for each evacuation. 
 
 
“Ladies and gentlemen. This is your captain speaking. We are currently in a queue of aircraft 
and should be airborne in a few minutes).  
 
Approximately 30 seconds of engine noise, followed by “Undo your seatbelts and get out!” 
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Appendix K: Thank you letter 
 
Cranfield University 
Cranfield 
Bedfordshire 
 MK43 0AL 
England 
 
Fax: 01234 [……] 
Tel: 01234 [……] 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in these evacuation trials. Should you experience any problems 
following these trials, and would like to talk to someone, please do not hesitate to contact the 
Human Factors Group at the above address. 
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Appendix L: Post-evacuation questionnaire – Experiment Two 
 
Volunteer Number: ___________ 
 
The information we ask for in this questionnaire relates to the evacuation you have just 
completed. Please be honest, and complete as many questions as possible. 
Your answers may help us to improve the safety of air travel. 
 
1.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty in 
undoing your seatbelt. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
2.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is paying no attention, and 7 is paying full attention, to what extent 
would you say you listened to the safety briefing provided by the flight attendant? Please circle 
one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 No 
attention 
     Full 
attention 
 
3.  For what reasons did you not give the safety briefing your full attention? Please circle all that 
apply.  
 
 
 a.  Not applicable – I gave the briefing my full attention 
 b. I had seen the briefing before 
 c. It’s basic knowledge 
 d.  My view was obstructed 
 e. I was distracted  
 f. It went on for too long 
 g.  I didn’t think I needed to 
 h. Other (Please specify) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.  If you listened to the safety briefing, did it help your evacuation? Please circle one option only. 
 a. Yes – please specify how it helped your evacuation 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 b. No – please specify how it did not help your evacuation 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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5.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is paying no attention, and 7 is paying full attention, to what extent 
would you say you listened to the personal briefing provided by the flight attendant indicating you 
were seated next to the overwing exit and might therefore be required to operate it in an 
emergency? Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 No 
attention 
     Full 
attention 
 
6.  For what reasons did you not give the personal briefing your full attention? Please circle all that 
apply.  
  
 a.  Not applicable – I gave the briefing my full attention  
 b. I had seen the briefing before 
 c. It’s basic knowledge 
 d.  My view was obstructed 
 e. I was distracted  
 f. It went on for too long 
 g.  I didn’t think I needed to 
 h. Other (Please specify) __________________________________________________ 
 
7.  If you listened to the personal briefing, did it help your evacuation? Please circle one option only. 
  
 a. Yes – please specify how it helped your evacuation 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 b. No – please specify how it did not help your evacuation 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8.  Did you read the safety card in the seat pocket in front of you? Please circle one option only. 
  
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
 
9.  If you read the safety card, did it help your evacuation? Please circle one option only. 
  
 a. Yes – please specify how it helped your evacuation 
___________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 b. No – please specify how it did not help your evacuation 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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10.  Did the diagrams on the safety card correspond to the briefing given by the flight attendant? Please 
circle one option only. 
  
 a. Yes – please specify in what way the diagrams corresponded to the briefing? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 b. No – please specify in what way the diagrams did not correspond to the briefing? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very clear and 7 is very unclear, please indicate the clarity of the 
exit operation instructions given in the safety card and seatback placards. Please circle one 
number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
clear 
     Very 
unclear 
 
12.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very clear and 7 is very unclear, please indicate the clarity of the 
exit operation instructions given to you personally by the flight attendant. Please circle one 
number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
clear 
     Very 
unclear 
 
13. What improvements could be made to the personal briefing, such that they would enhance your 
actions in the event of an emergency evacuation?  
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in finding the exit’s operating handle. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
15.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in unlatching the exit hatch. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
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16.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in using the exit operating handle. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
17.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in opening the exit hatch. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
18.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced due to the weight of the hatch. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
19.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced due to the size of the hatch. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
20.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very clear and 7 is very unclear, please indicate the clarity of the 
instructions for disposing of the door.  Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
clear 
     Very 
unclear 
 
21.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in moving the exit hatch out of the way. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
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22.  
 
Where did you leave the exit hatch first when you moved it out of the way? Please circle one 
option only.  
 a. Outside the cabin 
 b. Inside the cabin, against the wall below the exit 
 c.  Inside the cabin, on the floor in the passageway leading to the exit 
 d.  Inside the cabin, on my seat  
 e.  Inside the cabin, on one of the seats in the exit row 
 f.  Inside the cabin, on the seats in the row in front of the exit row 
 g.  Inside the cabin, on one of the seats in the row behind the exit row 
 h.  Inside the cabin, on the floor in the main aisle 
 i.  I can’t remember 
 j.  Other (please specify) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
23.  Did anything relating to the exit hatch help your evacuation? Please circle one option only.  
  
 a. No 
 b. Yes (Please specify what helped you, and how) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
24.  Did anything relating to the exit hatch hinder your evacuation? Please circle one option only. 
  
 a. No 
 b. Yes (Please specify what hindered you, and how) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
25.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty of 
moving between the seats at the exit row. Please circle one option only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very 
Easy 
     Very 
Difficult 
 
26. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in moving through the exit and out of the aircraft. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
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27.  Did any physical features within the cabin help your evacuation? Please circle one option only.  
  
 a. No 
 b. Yes (Please specify what helped you, and how) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
28.  Did any physical features within the cabin hinder your evacuation? Please circle one option only.  
  
 a. No 
 b. Yes (Please specify what hindered you, and how) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
30.  If you were flying on a commercial aeroplane, based on your experience today, would you be: - 
(Please circle one option only)  
  
 a. More willing to sit by this exit than before 
 b. Less willing to sit by this exit than before 
 c. As willing to sit by this exit as you were before 
 
31. If there are any comments that you would like to make about the trial you have just completed, 
please do so here. 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix M: Additional photographs to accompany Experiment Two 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph M1: The Type III exit in the large interior configuration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph M2: The Type III exit in the small interior configuration. 
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Photograph M3: The Type III exit hatch with the retracted (conventional) handle mechanism. 
 
 
 
Photograph M4: The Type III hatch with the fixed (modified) handle mechanism. 
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Appendix N: Type III exit operator’s briefings – Experiment Two 
 
Minimal briefing provided to the passenger seated adjacent to the Type III exit 
 
Good afternoon/evening sir/madam. I’d just like to point out that you are seated next to an 
emergency exit. In the event of an emergency, you may be required to open that exit. The exit 
weighs the equivalent of a heavy suitcase. Are you happy that you could open that exit in the 
event that you were required to do so? 
 
Instructions for opening the exit are on the placard on the seat back in front of you, and also on 
the safety card in the seat pocket in front of you (point to both). 
 
Please note that you must not open that exit unless a member of cabin crew instructs you to do 
so. There could be a fire outside. 
 
In-depth briefing provided to the passenger seated adjacent to the Type III exit 
 
You are seated at an emergency exit. You may be required to operate this exit (point) in the 
event of an evacuation. Listen carefully to the instructions. 
 
You must take no action unless you hear the command ‘Undo your seatbelts and get out!’ Look 
outside for a hazard such as fire (point to window). If a fire is present do not open the exit. 
 
To support the exit place your hand in the recess (point).To open the exit, pull down the 
operating handle (point) as far as it will go. The exit will fall inwards at the top. The exit is not 
hinged and will come towards you, away from the opening. The exit is very heavy and will need 
effort to remove fully from the opening.  
 
Once removed, throw the exit out of the aircraft. This will require considerable effort. Exit the 
aircraft onto the wing. Move away from the aircraft. 
 
Do you understand the instructions I have given you? Do you have any questions? 
 
Please take the safety card from your seat pocket in front of you and study the instructions for 
exit operation. These instructions are also found on the seat back on front of you (point). 
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Appendix O: Evacuation scenarios – Experiment Two 
 
Two evacuation scenarios were used during each test session. Scenario one was used for the 
first trial and scenario two for the second trial. 
 
Scenario one involved a period of engine noise lasting approximately 1 minute and 40 seconds, 
followed by “This is your captain speaking, we have an emergency, undo your seatbelts and get 
out!” 
 
Scenario two involved a period of engine noise lasting approximately 20 seconds, followed by 
“Undo your seatbelts and get out!” 
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Appendix P: Post-evacuation questionnaire – Experiment Three 
 
Volunteer Number: _______________________ 
 
The information we ask for in this questionnaire relates to the evacuation you have just 
completed. Please be honest, and complete as many questions as possible. 
 Your answers may help us to improve the safety of air travel.   
 
1.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty in 
undoing your seatbelt. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
2.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is paying no attention, and 7 is paying full attention, to what extent 
would you say you listened to the safety briefing provided by the flight attendant? Please circle 
one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 No 
attention 
     Full 
attention 
 
3.  For what reasons did you not give the safety briefing your full attention? Please circle all that 
apply.  
  
 a.  Not applicable – I gave the briefing my full attention 
 b. I had seen the briefing before 
 c. It’s basic knowledge 
 d.  My view was obstructed 
 e. I was distracted  
 f. It went on for too long 
 g.  I didn’t think I needed to 
 h. Other (Please specify) ________________________________________________________ 
 
4.  If you listened to the safety briefing, did it help your evacuation? Please circle one option only. 
 a. Yes – please specify how it helped your evacuation 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 b. No – please specify how it did not help your evacuation 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
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5.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is paying no attention, and 7 is paying full attention, to what extent 
would you say you listened to the personal briefing provided by the flight attendant indicating you 
were seated next to the overwing exit and might therefore be required to operate it in an 
emergency? Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 No 
attention 
     Full 
attention 
  
6.  For what reasons did you not give the personal briefing your full attention? Please circle all that 
apply.  
  
 a.  Not applicable – I gave the briefing my full attention  
 b. I had seen the briefing before 
 c. It’s basic knowledge 
 d.  My view was obstructed 
 e. I was distracted  
 f. It went on for too long 
 g.  I didn’t think I needed to 
 h. Other (Please specify) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.  If you listened to the personal briefing, did it help your evacuation? Please circle one option only. 
  
 a. Yes – please specify how it helped your evacuation 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
  
 b. No – please specify how it did not help your evacuation 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
  
8.  Did you read the safety card in the seat pocket in front of you? Please circle one option only. 
  
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
 
9.  If you read the safety card, did it help your evacuation? Please circle one option only. 
  
 a. Yes – please specify how it helped your evacuation 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
  
 b. No – please specify how it did not help your evacuation 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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10.  Did the diagrams on the safety card correspond to the briefing given by the flight attendant? Please 
circle one option only. 
  
 a. Yes – please specify in what way the diagrams corresponded to the briefing? 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
  
 b. No – please specify in what way the diagrams did not correspond to the briefing? 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
11.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very clear and 7 is very unclear, please indicate the clarity of the 
exit operating instructions given in the safety card and seatback placards. Please circle one 
number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
clear 
     Very 
unclear 
 
12.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very clear and 7 is very unclear, please indicate the clarity of the 
exit operating instructions given to you personally by the flight attendant. Please circle one 
number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
clear 
     Very 
unclear 
 
13. What improvements could be made to the personal briefing, such that they would enhance your 
actions in the event of an emergency evacuation?  
 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
14.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in finding the exit operating handle. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
15.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in unlatching the exit hatch. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
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16.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in using the exit operating handle. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
17.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in opening the exit hatch. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
18.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced due to the weight of the hatch. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
19.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced due to the size of the hatch. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
20.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very clear and 7 is very unclear, please indicate the clarity of the 
instructions for disposing of the door.  Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
clear 
     Very 
unclear 
 
21.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in moving the exit hatch out of the way. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
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22.  Where did you leave the exit hatch first when you moved it out of the way? Please circle one 
option only.  
 a. Outside the cabin 
 b. Inside the cabin, against the wall below the exit 
 c.  Inside the cabin, on the floor in the passageway leading to the exit 
 d.  Inside the cabin, on my seat  
 e.  Inside the cabin, on one of the seats in the exit row 
 f.  Inside the cabin, on the seats in the row in front of the exit row 
 g.  Inside the cabin, on one of the seats in the row behind the exit row 
 h.  Inside the cabin, on the floor in the main aisle 
 i.  I can’t remember 
 j.  Other (please specify) _______________________________________________ 
 
23.  Did anything relating to the exit hatch help your evacuation? Please circle one option only.  
  
 a. No 
 b. Yes (Please specify what helped you, and how) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
24.  Did anything relating to the exit hatch hinder your evacuation? Please circle one option only. 
  
 a. No 
 b. Yes (Please specify what hindered you, and how)  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
25.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty of 
moving between the seats at the exit row. Please circle one option only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very 
Easy 
     Very 
Difficult 
 
26. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in moving through the exit and out of the aircraft. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
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27.  Did any physical features within the cabin help your evacuation? Please circle one option only.  
  
 a. No 
 b. Yes (Please specify what helped you, and how) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
28.  Did any physical features within the cabin hinder your evacuation? Please circle one option only.  
  
 a. No 
 b. Yes (Please specify what hindered you, and how) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
29.  If you were flying on a commercial aeroplane, based on your experience today, would you be: - 
(Please circle one option only)  
  
 a. More willing to sit by this exit than before   
 b. Less willing to sit by this exit than before 
 c. As willing to sit by this exit as you were before 
 
30. If there are any comments that you would like to make about the trial you have just completed, 
please do so here. 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix Q: Additional photographs to accompany Experiment Three 
 
 
Photograph Q1: The Type III hatch in the small interior configuration with traditional “plug” 
exit mechanism. 
 
Photograph Q2: The disposed traditional “plug” hatch on aircraft wing. 
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Photograph Q3: The Type III hatch in the small interior configuration with “up and over” ADH 
exit mechanism. 
 
 
Photograph Q4: The Type III hatch with “up and over” ADH exit mechanism in motion. 
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Photograph Q5: The disposed ADH hatch up in the fuselage. 
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Appendix R: Post-evacuation questionnaire – Experiment Four 
 
Volunteer Number: _______________________ 
 
The information we ask for in this questionnaire relates to the evacuation you have just 
completed. Please be honest, and complete as many questions as possible. 
 Your answers may help us to improve the safety of air travel.   
 
1.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is paying full attention, and 7 is paying no attention, to what extent 
would you say you listened to the safety briefing provided? 
Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Full 
attention 
     No 
attention 
 
2.  For what reasons did you not give the safety briefing your full attention? Please circle all that 
apply.  
  
 a.  Not applicable – I gave the briefing my full attention (please go to question 3) 
 b. I had seen the briefing before 
 c. It’s basic knowledge 
 d.  My view was obstructed 
 e. I was distracted by someone else 
 f. It went on for too long 
 g.  I didn’t think I needed to 
 h. Other (Please specify)  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very helpful, and 7 is not at all helpful, please indicate the extent to 
which you think the safety briefing assisted you in this evacuation?  
Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very 
helpful 
     Not at all 
helpful 
 
4.  The cabin crew provided a safety briefing and demonstration prior to this evacuation. With 
hindsight, what information do you think could have been included to improve your evacuation?  
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
5.  Did you read the safety card that was in the seat pocket in front of you? Please circle one option 
only. 
  
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
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6.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty in 
undoing your seatbelt. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
 
7.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty of 
moving out of your seat to reach the main aisle. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very 
Easy 
     Very 
Difficult 
 
8.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty of 
moving down the main aisle to reach the exit row. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very 
Easy 
     Very 
Difficult 
 
9.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty of 
entering the exit row. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very 
Easy 
     Very 
Difficult 
 
10.  On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty of 
moving between the seats at the exit row. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very 
Easy 
     Very 
Difficult 
 
11. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very easy and 7 is very difficult, please indicate the difficulty you 
experienced in moving through the exit and out of the aircraft. Please circle one number only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very     
easy 
     Very 
difficult  
12. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very helpful and 7 is not at all helpful, please indicate the extent to 
which cabin crew instructions assisted you in this evacuation. Please circle one option only. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very 
helpful 
     Not at all 
helpful 
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13.  If there are any comments you would like to make about cabin crew instructions in this 
evacuation, please provide them here.  
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
14.  Did anything within the cabin help your evacuation? Please circle one option only 
  
 a. No 
 b. Yes (Please specify what helped you, and how) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
15. Did anything within the cabin hinder your evacuation? Please circle one option only 
  
 a. No 
 b. Yes (Please specify what hindered you, and how) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  
16.  What strategies did you use when evacuating? Please circle all that apply 
  
 a. Climbed over seats 
 b. Waited in line 
 c.  Pushed past other passengers 
 d. Pushed other passengers towards the exit 
 e. Allowed passengers to get in front of me 
 f. Tried to get out my seat and move as far as possible down the aisle before others could 
 g.  None 
 h. Other (please specify) 
 ________________________________________ 
17. Do you think that the strategies you used: (Please circle one option only) 
  
 a. Helped your evacuation 
 b. Hindered your evacuation 
 c.  Did not make any difference 
  
18. If there are any other comments you would like to make regarding the evacuation you have just 
completed, please provide them here (please continue overleaf if required). 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
Please check that you have answered all relevant questions. Thank you. 
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Appendix S: Additional photographs to accompany Experiment Four 
 
 
 
Photograph S1: No hatch in cabin condition (i.e. hatch disposed of outside the cabin). 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph S2: No hatch in cabin condition (i.e. hatch disposed of outside the cabin). 
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Photograph S3: Exit hatch disposed of horizontally in cabin condition. 
 
 
 
 
Photograph S3: Exit hatch disposed of horizontally in cabin condition.
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Photograph S5: Exit hatch disposed of vertically in cabin condition. 
 
 
 
Photograph S6: Exit hatch disposed of vertically in cabin condition.  
 
